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The study of human rights and democracy has received a great 
deal of attention over recent decades. The concepts involved are still 
poorly understood, although there is a broad measure of agreement 
that they should be associated with such classic freedoms as freedom 
of expression and association; and there has been still less agreement 
about the attempts that have been made to measure democracy or 
human rights on a broadly cross-national basis. After a preliminary 
discussion, the dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 
(i) Can human rights be measured? (ii) Still more so, can they be 
measured on a cross-national basis? (iii) Can countries be ranked on 
the basis of their human rights performance? (iv) What variables 
might be employed in a comparative analysis of this kind? (v) Is 
there agreement about the ranking of countries that emerges from 
inquiries of this kind? The dissertation examines these questions in a 
variety of settings and seeks, in conclusion, to establish their value 
within the context of comparative politics.
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In trod u ction
Human rights is a central concept in political science, yet it is still 
poorly understood. It is a concept very much contested not only 
between East and West but also between developed and developing 
countries. It has received unprecedented attention over the past four 
decades since the adoption by the United Nations of the first 
international document on this subject, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in 1948. Since that time an even greater number of 
individuals and institutions have been concerned with the issue. 
Different political leaders, for instance Jimmy Carter in the United 
States, have championed human rights, and made them the basis 
upon which foreign policy should be determined.
Since the 1960s organizations which are concerned with this 
issue have been mushrooming, though still overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the west. More political scientists have been 
concerned with human rights and related issues, and have tried to 
develop different criteria upon which countries' performances may 
be judged.
In this respect the present work tries to assess the extent to 
which different inquiries have successfully dealt with the subject. 
This will make it possible to pinpoint the difficulties that may arise 
whenever one is to undertake such an exercise. This dissertation 
contains three parts.
The definition and content of human rights are not yet 
universally agreed upon; differences in political ideologies, religions 
and the variety of historical events have made it difficult to secure 
general agreement on such issues. Furthermore, the United Nations
1
has increased its list of what can be considered as human rights in 
the light of the different circumstances that the world has 
experienced. Thus, the first part of this dissertation deals with the 
issues of definition and content. And in order to best cover the 
significant issues that are involved, this part has been divided into 
three chapters.
The first chapter discusses the concept of human rights in 
general. It reviews the literature available from the Greek 
philosophers up to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, and the Covenant that followed in 1966. This 
includes, further, the different philosophies and religions, that have 
had some impact on the shaping of human rights as they are known 
today.
The second chapter develops the question of rival conception of 
human rights. I will particularly stress the contestation between East 
and West. It is generally agreed that these two groups of states have 
had two completely different understandings of what human rights 
are or cover. This clash really added a new dimension to the human 
rights which were already known. Furthermore, such a clash made 
an agreed definition even more difficult to attain. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the discrepancy between these rival 
interpretations has become narrower since the mid and late 1980s, 
after the different reform programmes introduced in the former 
Communist countries, and after the collapse of communist rule in the 
former USSR itself and Eastern Europe.
The third chapter investigates the ’new rights' which have 
em erged  after many of Third World countries achieved 
independence and the changes that the world experienced over the
2
last two decades. These rights are usually referred to as the 'third 
generation' or 'rights of solidarity'.
After this preliminary discussion, part two of the dissertation 
examines at length some of the work that monitors human rights or 
that has attempted to measure human rights and democracy on a 
cross-national basis. In this connection the case studies chosen are
thought to provide the best possible picture of the difficulties and 
the limits of any exercise aimed at measuring human rights and
democracy on the one hand, and the obstacles one faces when human
rights are examined. Thus this parts comprises:
Amnesty International, which is examined in chapter four, is one 
of the most respected non-governmental organizations. Although it 
adopts a very narrow definition of human rights, its findings are 
nonetheless very authoritative. I will discuss the organization and its 
work, and the extent to which it succeeds in carrying out its work. 
Some of the issues that could not be found in the literature were 
raised directly with the staff at the British Section of Amnesty in 
London.
The fifth chapter examines the work of the UN Human Rights 
Committee It is a body set up in 1976 under the provisions of article 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
tries to help countries to enhance their human rights records by
providing expertise and advice. Its work offers a basis of comparison 
between countries and their efforts to take into account the 
Committee's remarks and bring their laws within the bounds of the 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. 
I have had first hand experience of the work of the Committee not 
only by interviewing Professor R. Higgins, a member of this 
Committee, but by watching the Committee at work during several
sessions in July 1991 in Geneva.
Chapter six examines the work of Charles Humana, a British 
academic, who developed a methodology whereby human rights can, 
at least in principle, be measured. His work has become a matter of 
public controversy after the publication of the Human Freedom 
Index by the United Nations Development Program in June 1991. The 
chapters examines his work thoroughly, to conclude whether such an 
exercise is in itself possible.
Chapter seven concentrates on two studies which have
attempted to measure democracy: this includes the work of both 
Robert Dahl and Kenneth Bollen. The cross-national study of 
democracy is bound to create some controversy concerning the 
variables chosen and the methods applied.
In chapter eight a lengthy discussion will focus on the work of
another independent organization which is concerned with human
freedoms: Freedom House in New York. The chapter scrutinizes the 
Survey it publishes and the different ranking of countries that the 
Survey contains.
The dissertation concludes in part three with a discussion of the 
extent to which political scientists and the organizations considered 
have successfully conceptualized the problem of human rights, and 
whether the task of comparing human rights on a cross-national 
basis is possible. It also indicates some of the elements that might 
form part of the agenda of the comparative study of human rights in 
the future.
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Chapter one 
Human rights: A historical background
The idea of human rights as it is known to us today is a product 
of a process that has been evolving over the centuries. Actually it can 
be traced back as far as the Greek and the Roman philosophers. 
Different religions, cultures, philosophies and circumstances have 
made a significant contribution towards the understanding and the 
broadening of such a concept.1 This made the definition as well as 
the origins of the idea quite a wide issue upon which consensus and 
agreement among scholars has yet to be reached.
In this chapter an attempt will be made to clarify different 
issues surrounding the concept of human rights. Having said that 
does not automatically mean that there will be no disagreements on 
the issue after this work. Nonetheless, the aim is to show the reader 
that many scholars have tried to define human rights and their 
content on the one hand, and their origins and universal character on 
the other. Furthermore, I shall look at the philosophies that have had 
a strong impact on the nature of those human rights that are known 
to us.
Considering these facts the approach in this chapter will be 
historical; mainly to review the literature available on the subject 
and highlight the disagreements among scholars. In the course of 
doing so, the concept of human rights, as will be seen later, keeps 
"stretching" to include different rights that were not known to men
l-" In  in ternational politics^ differences o f culture, national traditions, and 
political interset must be counted for their impact on the conception of human 
rights." A. S. Rosenbaum, ed., The Philosophy of Human Rights. International 
P e rsp ec tiv e s .(London: Aldwych, 1980) p. 7
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at a certain point in their development. Therefore, it is proposed that 
human rights should be looked at as an evolutionary process that 
keeps changing.
I: A historical setting
The concept of human rights is relatively new in today's politics. 
However, the idea itself goes back as far as the creation of man,2 
although most scholars trace it back to the Greek and Roman
philosophers. Burns Weston argues that:
Most students of human rights trace the historical 
origins of the concept to ancient Greece and Rome,
where it was closely tied to the premodern natural law 
doctrine of Greek stoicism.3
The crux of the matter is not to state which of the theories is
true and which is not, as much as to state that some forms of human
rights were known to man very early in his development. Greek 
philosophers spoke of many freedoms that are essential today, and 
Roman cities witnessed some practices which are at the heart of 
today's idea of human rights. However, they were not as 
sophisticated as they are now and manifest some shortcomings in 
several respects.4
2-M olsin  and Johanes. "The philosophy of the U niversal D eclaration of 
Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly , (6) 1984 pp. 311-12. They state that: 
"For Paine the rights of man can be traced back to the creation of man itself."
3-B. H. Weston, "Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly, (6) 1984 p. 258.
4-Freedom  of movement, for instance, was known to both Greeks and 
Romans. M aurice Cranston argues that:"The Greeks them selves were free to 
travel, and they did travel. The Romans also allowed the free movement of 
people, and were more tolerant of immigration than had been the Greek states. 
At the time of the empire persons of foreign extraction made up almost ninety 
percent of the population of Rome itself." W hat are human rights? (New York: 
Taplinger, 1973) p. 33. However, these doctrines found slavery and serfdom to
7
1-1: The Origins of human rights
It is difficult to come to a general agreement concerning the 
origins of human rights.5 Some see this concept as a new version of 
natural right, and therefore, natural right is the source for human 
r ig h ts .6 In other words, the concept clearly specifies that human 
rights find their source in nature, rights held by humans by the mere 
fact of being human.7 However, this statement still does not solve 
the problem of the origins.
If nature, or the fact of being a human was the source of human 
rights, one would state that the more fundamental problem of the 
universality of the concept, cannot be addressed. The fact that 
be legitim ate.
5-"Philosophers within one nation, much less in multicultural world society,
have never agreed on where rights come from and what are rights properly 
speaking." D. P. Forsythe, Human Rights and W orld Politics 2nd ed., rev. 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) p. 160. Furthermore, Gewirth, 
states that: " ...K ant, K ierkegaard, N ietzsche, Mill and Marx, who hold,
respectively, that the criteria for having rights consist in or are determined 
by reason, religion, power, utility and economic class or history." A. Gewirth,
H um an R ights. Essays on Justification and App lica tion  (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982) p. 42.
6-B. H. Weston, 91984) op. cit. p. 257. See also R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in 
In terna tiona l R elations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 32 
when he states that: "Human rights are taken by some writers to be simply the 
contem porary expression of natural rights, corresponding to natural duties in 
the classical rendering of the law of nature."
7-J. Donnelly, T h e  Concept of Human Rights (London: Croom Helm, 1985) 
"The very term  "human rights" points clearly to their source: humanity, 
hum an nature, being a person or human person." p. 27. See also L. J. 
M acfarlane, T h e  Theory and Practice of Human Rights (London: M aurice
Temple Smith, 1985) p. 5. "The concept of human rights emerged out of the 
much earlier conception of natural right, which initially was no more than a 
derivative element in the medieval Christian doctrine of Natural Law. Natural
rights were the moral expectations men had to others should behave towards
in accordance with the requirements of Natural Law."
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human rights are considered as part of the historical development of 
mankind clearly jeopardizes this understanding. At this stage, I shall 
limit myself to the sources of human rights.
The concept of human rights as it is understood today can be 
traced back to the emergence of capitalist markets in Western 
Europe. Donnelly asks "why there were no human rights in
traditional non-Western and Western societies"? He believes that:
Because prior to the creation of capitalist market 
economies and modern states, the problems that human
rights seek to address, the particular violations of
human dignity that they seek to prevent, either did not 
exist or ? ? ? ?  widely perceived to be central social 
problem s.8
To just limit the origin of human rights to seventeenth-century 
Europe and the philosophies that have evolved since would leave out 
of consideration some of the very important influences on human 
rights, i.e., religions.9 Christianity, Judaism and Islam, the major 
religions in the world, have some aspects of human rights in them.10
8-J. D onnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989) p. 64. M oreover, Page argues that: "More 
accurate in Condorcet's observation that the notion of human rights was 
absent from the legal conceptions of the Romans and Greeks; this seems to hold 
equally of the Jewish, Chinese, and all other ancient civilizations that have 
since came to light." Page, "The roots and origins of human rights." In A. H. 
Henkin, ed., Human Dignity. The Internationalization of Human Rights (New
York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1979) pp.1-2.
9-J. Kaplan, "Les Origines Juives des Droits de L’homme." Revue des Sciences
Morales et Politiques, 144 (1) 1989 p. 18. " Le President R6nd Cassin qui est d 
l'origine de la Declaration Universelle des Droits de L'homme a appeld au cours 
d 'une conference intitulde < les droits des religions vis-d-vis des droits de 
l'homme > "
10-" Les dix commandements ont ete le premier code morale issu d'une 
relig ion." Ibid.,
" <Ne commets point d'hommicide> n'est pas reconnaiter le droit a la vie" Ibid.,
p. 19. See also J. Rozier, "Sources Catholiques des Droits de L'homme." R e v u e
9
These, however are much criticised as not being rights but "mere
duties”. Donnelly, for instance, stresses that there are no human 
rights, as they are now understood, in Islam.11 Most of the "rights" 
proclaimed in Islam, or even in the ten commandment, prove to be 
duties in their origins. The right to life, and of freedom of expression,
are mere duties not to kill and to speak the truth.
Rather than arguing much about these positions, what matters 
more in this chapter is to show that religions have played a
significant role in the shaping of the concept of human rights, 
although these ’rights’ were did not satisfy many who advocate that 
what religions brought were only duties. They nonetheless have 
helped to secure some of the "rights" and the human dignity that 
human rights seek to secure.
Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that a right involves 
a duty, or they are two sides of the same coin,12 then one would 
conclude that what religions really brought were rights. What one’s 
duty is can be somebody's right, and vice versa.
des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 144 (1) 1989 pp. 53-4. "Pour employer une 
autre im age, on peut dire que l'arbre genealogique des droits de l'homme 
com porte plusieurs racines et que le Catholicisme et l'une d'entre elles." 
Moreover, M. Arkoun, "Origines Islamiques des Droits de L'homme." Revue des 
Sciences M orales et Politiques, 144 (1) 1989 p. 25. "II s'agit de montrer que 
l'lslam en tant que religion est non seulement ouvert a la proclamation et a la 
defence des droits de l'homme, mais le Coran, Parole de Dieu, a defini ces droits 
au debut du VII siecle, bient avant les revolutions de l'occident."
11-J. D onnelly, (1989) op. cit. p. 51. "These alleged human rights, however 
prove to be only duties to rulers and individuals not held by anyone."
12-"Rights and duties are two facets of the same picture. Whoever demands a 
right to liberty has to respect a similar right in others which circumscribes 
his right to personal liberty very considerably.” J. Donnelly, (1985) op. cit. p. 
77. M oreover, S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters argue that; "Rights and duties are 
different names for the same normative relation, according to the point of 
view from which it is regarded." Quoted from R. J. Vincent, (1986) op. cit. p. 9.
10
However, the concept of human rights started to develop very 
quickly in seventeenth-century Europe following the creation of
cap ita list markets and the em ergence of different liberal
philosophies. These societies have witnessed a change in their 
structures and thus a system was needed to curtail the injustices that 
began to develop and to protect human dignity.
Different philosophies and events have played a major role in 
the shaping of human rights. The Magna Carta (1215) and the
English, French and American Revolutions undoubtedly laid down the 
foundations for the emergence of such a concept. Moreover, the
slogans the French Revolution proclaimed of "Liberte, Egalit£,
Fraternity" are seen as the starting point to the whole philosophy of 
human rights, and each concept represents one generation of human 
r ig h ts .13 The American Declaration of Independence on July 4th,
1776, stressed that:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights, that among those are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.14
Nonetheless, apart from religions, the rapid changes brought
about with the industrial revolution and the capitalist market,
different philosophies, based mainly on natural law theory, have 
emerged to safeguard the human dignity. A new social order was 
needed.
The natural theory was developed by John Locke, who is seen as 
the source of the doctrine of human rights. He stressed that men
13-D. P. Forsythe, (1989) op. cit. p. 6. "It is traditional to group these rights 
in to  three categories, paralleling the French Revolution and its slogan of 
liberty , egality and fraternity."
14-B. H. Weston, (1984) op. cit. p. 260.
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have natural rights to life, liberty and property. Men, in Locke's
society, are rational and capable of action. In other words, they 
pursue happiness and look for self-preservation. Such natural rights 
are enjoyed by everybody and because they find their origin in 
nature entail the respect by others.
However, when men entered a civil society, the need for a new 
structure for society was to be created. Humans in Locke's view are 
sociable Thus, man entered into a "social contract" with the state.
Weston argues that:
Humankind surrendered to the state only the right to 
enforce these natural rights, not the rights themselves;
and that the state's failure to secure these reserved
rights (the state itself being under social contract to 
safeguard the interests of its members) gives rise to a 
right to responsible popular revolution.15
Thus, Locke used his individualistic theory to challenge the 
divine right of the kings, and to argue the supremacy of the 
parliament. The idea behind that social contract is that the two
parties should fulfil what they have agreed upon. Each party has 
taken some obligations that should be respected. However, when the 
state fails to protect these natural rights of men, then a popular,
responsible revolution is legitimized.
However, if man has a natural right to do anything, then it 
follows that nobody has the duty or the responsibility of respecting
others' natural rights. This point was made by Hobbes. He argued 
that:
But that the right of all men to all things, is in effect no 
better than if no man had right to do anything. For
15-Ibid., 258. Furtherm ore, M orsink argues that: "Since these rights are
derived from the authority of nature and not from the authority of the state, 
the state cannot take them away except for the purpose of securing these same 
rights." op. cit. p. 317.
12
there is a little use of benefit of the right of man hath, 
when another as strong or stronger than himself, hath 
right to the same.16
Obviously, although they both derive from Natural Law, the two 
theories differ. Locke sees men as sociable and rational; their rights 
are effective and everybody in society respects them. Hobbes, 
however, sees society as a jungle and whoever is the strongest 
dictates his will. Because by nature man tends to transfer some of 
power of the others to himself, and therefore, whenever two 
interests are in conflict one always tends to resist such a transfer.17 
His model was an irrational individual, with the strongest keeping 
the rest in order. In effect, he was advocating total monarchy or 
statism .
Both Hobbes’s absolute theory and Locke's limited one find their 
roots in the theory of Natural Rights. Their main concern was the 
individual. This individualism was associated with natural right 
philosophy, so were all the declarations that were proclaimed in the 
eighteenth century.
However, the natural right theory was not immune from 
criticism, and was even rejected as a source for human rights.
16-C. B. MacPherson, "Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke." In D. D. Raphael, 
ed., Political Theory and the Rights of Man ( London: Macmillan, 1967) p. 3. 
D onnelly states that: "In Hobbesian state of nature, rights would be rarely 
respected  (and then only out of self-in terest o f the duty-bearer), and 
enforcem ent would be only through self-help." J. Donnelly, (1989) op. cit. p. 
12.
17-"H obbes believed that outside civil society, with no legal system  
prevailing, it is right for each person to do whatever he will do. In a sense 
each person has a natural right to do anything, to act however or possesses 
whatever he can, with no limits." T. R. Machan, Human Rights and Human 
L iberties. A Radical Reconsideration of the Am erica Political Tradition 
(Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1975). p. 19.
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Philosophers such as Burke, Bentham and Marx, among others,
represented the objection to it. Bentham, for instance, argues that:
Right...is the child of law, from real law come real right, 
but from imaginary laws, from "law of nature", come 
imaginary rights...Natural Rights is simple nonsense; 
natural and imprescriptible rights (an American phrase) 
rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.18
Moreover, the criticism of socialist thinkers such as Engels and 
Marx is particularly important. Undoubtedly the clash between the 
two main doctrines had a great impact on the understanding of 
human rights and their codification in international instruments by
the United Nations. Rosenbaum rightly argues that:
The main contribution to human rights theory in the 
nineteenth century, and practically to the idea of 
freedom and equality, must be appraised with respect 
to the clash between (liberal) individualism and
(socialist) collectivism. Whereas the liberal critique was
largely directed toward social change within capitalist 
framework, the Marxist critique advocated the abolition 
of capitalism in favour of economic collectivism.19
I shall not go far in highlighting the differences between the two
18-B. H. Weston, (1984) op. cit. p. 261. Further, "Green found the doctrine of
natural rights unacceptable for three reasons: it assumed that individuals
brought into society rights that did not derive from society; it asserted that 
these rights could be held against society; and it detached rights from the
duties individuals owed their society." M. Freeden, R ights (Milton Keynes: Open
University Press, 1991) p. 20. Moreover, R. J. Vincent argues that: "Both Hegel 
and Burke had the "same fear that the doctrine of absolute freedom would lead 
to the destruction of the social order." However, "Hegel did not deny that there 
were rights of individuals to life, liberty and property. Indeed they formed the 
basis for man's participation in civil society. But this was not civil society in
Locke's sense. Hegel meant by it the system of needs that were met by the
exchange in the market- and this was a society into which men entered as 
men, and not as members of a particular society." R. J. Vincent, (1986) op. cit. 
p. 29.
19-A. S. Rosenbaum, ed., (1980) op. cit. p. 20.
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approaches, as this will be dealt with in a more detailed fashion in 
the next chapter. However, the point that needs to be stressed is that 
such a clash has added a new dimension to the understanding of
human rights.
Socialists stressed the need to suppress a number of individual 
rights to achieve higher rights for mankind as a whole. To Marx, 
individual rights were nothing but abstract, bourgeois rights.20 The 
unit of analysis should be moved from the individual to the
collectivity or the community.
According to the Marxist view, what people really want are
concrete rights, which can only be achieved under socialism. In the 
dialectical changes of society, socialism is a further step forward in 
the development of mankind, a superior stage to capitalism. Such a 
transform ation will eventually lead to a classless society: 
communism. Therefore, a new structure for the society is needed and 
a break away from the actual socio-economic conditions is of 
param ount importance for this transformation. The abolition of 
private property, collective ownership of the means of production 
and the centrally planned economy, in the Marxist view, are able to 
safeguard such ideals that human rights try to protect. By removing 
class conflict, there will be no other obstacles for the development of 
mankind. In such a classless society, with the socio-economic 
conditions, the issue of human rights can no longer be addressed.21
20-"Hum an rights were nothing but those of bourgeois ? ? ? ? ? ? ,  the member 
o f civ il society, i.e., egoistic man, man separated from other men and the 
com munity." M. Freeden, (1991) op. cit. p. 21. Wyzanski Jr. argues: "What he 
[M arx] did recognize was that m ost o f the political and civil rights are 
m eaningless unless one has an econom ic and educational foundation adequate 
to take advantage of them." C. E. Wyzanski Jr., "The Philosophical Background 
o f the Doctrine of Human Rights." In A. H. Henkin, ed., (1979) op. cit. p. 12.
21 -"To M arx, any talk of rights possessed by people equally, inalienably,
1 5
The individual will enjoy rights as a member of the society or the 
collective.
There is no doubt about the impact of Marxist thought on the 
issue of human rights. The adoption of such an ideology by different 
countries in the twentieth century has opened up the debate, once 
more, about what human rights really are. This can well be
understood in the debates that preceded the adoption of the first 
international instrument on human rights, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.
Pollis and Schwab remind us that:
On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, by a vote of 48 in favour, none against, 
and eight abstentions (including the Soviet Union, South 
Africa and Saudi Arabia), adopted and proclaimed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22
The Universal Declaration, adopted after the Second World War 
and the atrocities w itnessed,23 set a new common standard for 
achievement that societies would bear in mind and try to safeguard 
the rights proclaimed in it.
absolutely, and universally would have to await the communist epoch when all 
persons will have reached a common nature, total equality and perfection. 
Until then people are in a state of incompletion and imperfection, incapable of 
justifying equal human rights." T. R. Mochan (1975) op. cit. p. 41.
22-A. Pollis, and P. Schwab, eds., Human Rights. Cultural and Ideological 
P erspectives. (New York: Praeger, 1979) p. 4.
23-The pream ble of the Universal Declaration states that: "...disregard and 
contem pt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which outraged 
the conscience of m ankind..." In addition, Diemer argues that: "Its [the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] background is, on the one hand, the 
"barbarous acts" experienced in the recent past, i.e., the Second World War
with its outrages against m illions of victim s and the other hand, the 
aspirations from the advent in the world in which human beings shall enjoy 
freedom. It is decided against the enemy who has prevented this from being 
achieved, or does not wish it to be achieved." UNESCO, P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
Foundations of Human Rights (Paris, 1966). p. 97.
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Unlike the previous declarations, the Universal Declaration 
included provisions for economic, social and cultural rights. If one 
looks at the articles of the Declaration, it can be seen that the first 
twenty one articles deal with civil and political rights, and articles 22 
to 29 deal with economic, social and cultural ones.
Such an inclusion undoubtedly reflected the views of those who 
believed in these latter, more "concrete" rights. There were long 
debates in the United Nations' Third Committee to agree on the final 
draft of the Declaration. The delegate of the USSR, for instance, 
Lazreg notes:
considered that the draft did not satisfy the three 
conditions which were indispensable to the completion 
of the Declaration, namely; a guarantee of basic 
freedoms for all, with due regard to the sovereignty of 
states; a guarantee that human rights could be exercised 
with due regard to the particular economic, social and 
national circumstances prevailing in each country; and a 
definition of the duties of the citizens to their country, 
their people and their state.24
It should be pointed out that Saudi Arabia abstained as well 
from the vote on the adoption of the final draft of the Declaration. As 
pointed out, Saudi Arabia, which is among countries which believe in 
the supremacy of Islam, believes that the provisions of the 
Declaration have been practiced by them for over fourteen centuries. 
They also argue that the Declaration seeks to apply a western model 
in a very different social and cultural environment.25
24-M. Lazreg, "Human rights, state ideology. A historical perspective." In A. 
Pollis, and P. Schwab, eds., (1979) op. cit. p. 36.
25-"They [the Saoudis] took the D eclaration to be a competing document 
cla im ing  un iversality , when, in fact, its contents were lim ited to the 
particu la ris tic  goal o f applying a western mode of social, political, and 
econom ic practice onto a culturally and philosophically different world." Ibid.,
17
However, when it came to the adoption of a legal binding
instrument for human rights, it was soon realized that a single
instrument could not be achieved. Two different Covenants came into
being eighteen years later (1966), one on Civil and Political Rights,
the other on Social, Economic and Cultural rights. They both came 
into force a decade later (1976) after thirty five states had ratified 
each of them.
Moreover, different human rights international instruments 
have been adopted since that time, making the issue of human rights 
encompass more than these two sets of rights.
II: Definition of human rights
After the historical setting to the development of the concept of 
human rights, a definition of the concept should be attempted. One 
may argue that a definition should have been the starting point of 
the discussion, yet it was important to point out that the concept of 
human rights kept changing and undoubtedly influenced its 
definition. I shall try to give different definitions attempted by 
scholars, and will develop those definitions further in the sections 
that follow.
Maurice Cranston, amongst others, argues that:
Human rights is a twentieth-century name for what has 
been traditionally known as natural right.26
If one agrees with this statement, one is left with another task of 
p. 34.
26-M . Cranston, Human Rights To-dav (London: Ampersand, 1962) p. 7. See 
a lso  J. D onnelly , "Human Rights as N atural Rights" H um an R ig h ts  
Q u a r t e r l y ,(6) 1986 p. 391. "The term human rights is generally taken to mean 
w hat Locke and his successors meant by natural rights; namely, rights 
(entitlem ents) held simply by virtue of being a person (human being).
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defining what is meant by natural rights? All that the statement 
states is that the concept of human rights is relatively new, and was 
not known to men at a previous certain point. This still leaves the 
need to explain what human rights really mean. It helps to show the 
origin of the concept, which was discussed earlier, but this does not 
tell us anything about the content. The word "right" in this concept is 
not clear. What made the situation more difficult is Donnelly's
definition. He states that:
Human rights are those held simply by virtue of being a 
person. To have a human right one need not be or do 
anything special, other than to be born a human 
being.27
Donnelly suggests that human rights are those entitlements one 
has by the mere fact of being human. Nonetheless, this is not always 
the case for two reasons:
First, not every right held by a human being is a human right. 
Donnelly himself acknowledges this fact.28
Second, it seems that the definition above excludes any action. A 
right is a claim. If one has/had not done anything, there would not 
have been any human rights as they are known today. They are 
claims as well which presuppose a way for implementing these 
claims and protecting these rights.29 In this sense, Andrew Levine
concludes that:
A human right, then, is a claim advanced within the 
'human community', which is possessed by virtue of
27-J. Donnelly,(1985) op.cit. p. 8.
28-"N ot all the right held by human being are 'human rights', for example, 
contractual and constitutional rights are held by humans but are not 'human 
righ ts'."  Ibid.,
29-"In its original sense, a right is a claim advanced by an individual or 
group enforceable by law." A. Levine , "Human Rights and Freedom". In A. S. 
Rosenbaum, ed., (1980) op. cit. p. 137.
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being human, and advanced to all other humans.30
Having established the fact that a right, as a human right, is a 
claim in itself, the concept as a whole has become clearer. It should 
be pointed out that the two main criticisms of Donnelly's definition 
could have been avoided had he included the two characteristics in 
his definition. He was aware of the fact that a right is a claim. He 
states that:
The word 'right' encompasses at least two concepts of 
great political and moral significance. On the one hand,
'right' refers to moral righteousness, as in 'it is just not 
the right thing to do'! On the other hand 'right' may 
refer to enti t lement , as in the claim 'I have a right to...'
This second sense of entitlement distinguishes rights, as 
human or otherwise.3 1
Such a distinction between these two kinds of rights helps to 
identify where human rights stand. In this division, Donnelly 
suggests that human rights are rights in the political sense of the 
concept. They are entitlements for everybody. The sentence "I have 
the right" is certainly stronger than the moral version of, for 
instance, "what you did was right". Rights in the moral sense, 
according to him, cannot be seen as human rights in this distinction. 
Let us try to imagine a situation where someone has just helped a 
hungry man by giving him enough money to buy his food, or donated 
his blood to save a dying patient at a hospital bed. From a moral 
point of view, what the person did was "right", nonetheless, does the 
hungry man or the dying person have the "right" to the person's 
money or blood?
From a moral viewpoint, the hungry man had a moral right to
3 0 -Ib id .,
31-J. Donnelly (1985) op. cit. p. 3.
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the person's money. Nonetheless, the claim is even stronger in the 
case of the patient. One may argue that depriving the patient from 
that blood is actually killing him, or deliberately letting the person 
die.
Having dealt with Donnelly’s division of rights and his 
classification of human rights as political ones, I now turn to the 
division attempted by Cranston, who claims that they are moral 
rights.
Cranston distinguishes two types of rights: legal and moral
righ ts .32 Within the category of legal rights, he identifies five types:
(a) general positive rights, (b) traditional right and liberties, (c) 
nominal "legal" rights, positive rights, (d) liberties, and immunities of 
a limited class of person and (e) positive rights, liberties, and
immunities of a single person. To him, none of the above types of 
rights can be said to constitute human rights since they are limited in 
scope; either they deal with a person and a privileged group or with 
people under a given jurisdiction. In the second type, i.e., moral
rights, the types identified are: (a) moral rights of one person only,
(b) moral rights of anyone in a particular situation, and (c) moral
rights of all people in all situations. Since the definition is that they 
are rights by the mere fact of being human, it is no surprise to see 
that human rights in Cranston's division fall within the last category, 
i.e., the moral rights of all people in all situations.33 Cranston argues 
that:
32-M. Cranston, "Human Rights. Real and Supposed". In D. D. Raphael, ed.
(1967) op. cit. pp. 47-9.
33-C ranston states that: "The place which human rights occupy in my
classification is readily understood. Human rights are a form of moral rights,
and they differ from other moral rights in being the rights of all people at all
times and in all situations." Ibid., p. 49.
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Because these rights are universal we should naturally 
expect them to be few in number; and we should expect 
them to be highly generalized in their formulation.34
The two scholars differ in p o s i t io n in g  human rights. The 
former sees them as political, the latter as moral. If one takes the 
second classification, which seems fairly adequate, more questions 
need to be asked. If human rights are the moral rights of all people 
in all situations, then are they rights in the sense of claims or
entitlements, or are they duties and obligations? If they are moral, 
as Cranston suggests, how can one speak about the universality of 
morals? It is common knowledge that religions, circumstances and 
traditions play a significant role in the shaping of the morals and the 
conduct of people in a particular country. Universality based on 
morals is accordingly a difficult proposition to argue convincingly.
Professor Raphael also distinguishes two types of rights; of
recipience and of action, and concludes that human rights are rights 
of recipience.35 To him, a human right is a positive right: it must 
mean receiving something, and is a right in relation to others.
However, all these definitions and classifications do not so far 
speak about the implementation and protection of human rights.
Freeden sees that:
...a human right is a conceptual device, expressed in 
linguistic form, that assigns priority to certain human or 
social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate
functioning of human being; that is intended to serve as 
a protective capsule for those attributes; and that 
appeals for a deliberate action to ensure such a
protection.36
3 4-Ib id .,
35-D. D. Raphael, "Human Rights Old and New" In D. D. Raphael, ed., (1967) op. 
cit. pp. 56-9.
36-M. Freeden (1991) op. cit. p. 7.
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Once again this definition does not satisfy the questions asked at
the beginning of this chapter. Here one is faced with a question of
choice and priorities as a protective measure towards the proper 
functioning of a human being. This definition seems to suggest more 
questions than it provides answers. Although it provides the reader 
with a new element in the definition of human rights, it opens up the 
possibility that human rights are not rights enjoyed by everybody by 
the mere fact of being human. The choice among "certain human or 
social attributes" is a vague one, and does not automatically lead to 
the same demands. This definition suggests that human rights 
depend on the circumstances and the choices made and the priorities 
assigned at one particular period of time in a given country.
What is quite clear from the discussion above is that there is no 
precise and universally agreed definition of the concept of human 
rights. In a multicultural world, with the differences in beliefs, 
traditions and in economic conditions, what seems to be a human 
right for someone does not seem to be so for someone else.37 This 
can be best understood by considering the content of human rights.
I ll:  Contents of human rights
It was suggested elsewhere in this chapter that the most fruitful 
approach to human rights is an historical one and that rights should 
be regarded as an evolutionary process. Different philosophies and
37-"Again some more recent human rights theorists have argued that they 
must be defined in terms of some desired ideal of what human communities
should be. Here again in the ideal terms of which the rights are to be defined
emerges from human desires, preference, or choice and cannot be identified 
as true or correct.... For as long as their source is a desire or choice without a 
standard of right and wrong, these rights are not objective but arbitrary, even 
if widely accepted." T. R. Mochan, (1975) op. cit. p. 42.
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circumstances have added new rights to the original list which most
scholars refer to as the "first generation" of human rights, i.e., civil
and political rights. Economic, social and cultural rights, which have
come to be known as the "second generation", have emerged out of 
the writings of socialist thinkers such as Saint-Simon, Marx and
Engels. For the time being I shall limit myself to these two types of 
rights only. It must be borne in mind that there is another category 
or generation of human rights, which will be the focus of the third 
chapter.
Whether human rights should include both generations or just
the first is a question that has created a lot of controversy.3 8
Scholars, including Maurice Cranston, have argued that the second
generation cannot possibly be accepted as human rights. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of such rights will hinder the protection of 
what really human rights are .39 There can be no definitive 
conclusion as to whether or not economic, social and cultural rights 
are human rights. However, what has made the situation more
difficult is the issue of universality of human rights itself. Moreover, 
the enjoyment of such rights depends very much on how wealthy a 
country is. In other words, the enjoyment of the second generation of 
human rights depends on the wealth of a country, and how able it is 
to provide for such Tights'.
38-"Philosophers generally agree that civ il and political rights m ust be 
counted as human rights. However, there is a basic controversy about whether 
socioeconom ic rights, or, as they sometimes called, welfare rights, are to 
account as human rights." A. S. Rosenbaum, ed., 1980. p. 30.
39-M. Cranston (1973) op. cit. p. 65. "The traditional human rights are political 
and civil rights such as the right to life, liberty, and a fair trial. What are now 
being put forward as universal human rights are economic and social rights... 
The philosophical objection is that the circulation of a confused notion of 
human rights hinders the effective protection of what are correctly seen as 
human rights." See also M. Cranston, in D. D. Raphael, ed., (1967) op. cit. p. 43.
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Such claims assign civil and political rights to the category of 
human rights whereas economic, social and cultural rights do not 
qualify. The latter's scope is narrower since they deal with nationals 
of a particular state only. In other words, they are not human rights, 
but citizen rights. People have to qualify to enjoy them. Cranston
argues that:
If we may continue to call these social and economic
rights which Babeuf and Tom Paine were claiming the 
droits du c i t o y e n s , it may help to make clear that 
these droits du c i to ye n  (in a rather special sense)
belong to a logical category which is distinct from that 
of the droits de I'homme, or natural rights, or human
rights traditionally (and, as I maintain correctly)
understood as 'political and civil rights'.40
Apart from this objection on the inclusion of the second
generation into the category of human rights, Cranston has developed 
a three-fold test upon which human rights authenticity is judged. 
According to him, a right has to be tested against these three
characteristics if one is to judge whether the right in question is a 
human right or not. These tests are:41
1 -P r a c t ic a b ility
This test stands against what can be done. In other words, 
Cranston sees that it is absurd to claim something as a right, if it 
cannot actually be exercised. This analysis leads one to the material 
question, discussed above, concerning how wealthy a country is. It is 
practically impossible for these "rights" to be secured for everybody, 
in less prosperous societies.
Securing civil and political rights can be done by simply
40-M . Cranston, " Human Rights. A Reply to Professor Raphael" In D. D. 
Raphael, ed., (1967) op. cit. p. 98.
41-M. Cranston (1963) op. cit. pp. 40-42.
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establishing judicial guarantees which eventually would safeguard 
these rights. The rights to life, freedom of movement and of thought, 
for instance, depend on governments' will, whereas economic, social 
and cultural ones are for a category of people only and depend very 
much on the material conditions of every country. The provision of 
article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,42 for 
instance, suggests that such rights are only limited to working 
people. These rights do not embrace the population as a whole and
therefore cannot be considered as human rights. Apart from the fact
that their achievement is dependent on the material resources of the 
country, one would argue further that these rights are enjoyed by 
somebody as a member of a society, i.e., only nationals, or peoples 
within one category such as workers, have such a right, and this 
enjoyment does not extend to everybody beyond the borders of the 
sta te .
One would go along with Cranston in his first test. Obviously, he 
had made a significant impact on judging the authenticity of human 
rights. However, his first test is clearly inadequate for two reasons
based on a close scrutiny of the Universal Declaration.
First, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration reads as follows:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realization, through national 
effort and international cooperation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each state, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality.
One sees from the above article that the Declaration has taken
42-Article 24 Of The U. D. H. R. reads as follow: "Everyone has the right to rest 
and le isure, including reasonable lim itation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay."
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into account that such rights have to be in "accordance with the 
organization and resources of each state", which seems to be one 
disagreement upon which Cranston had based his judgement. 
Furthermore, the Declaration had called for international co­
operation within this field and had stressed that these rights were 
undoubtedly significant and inadequate for the dignity of the human 
person.
Second, Paragraphs (1) and (2) of A rticle 21 of the 
D eclaration ,43 although a political right in their content, seem to be 
very limited in their scope.
It is common knowledge that taking part in the government is a 
political right, nonetheless, this right has the peculiarity of being 
limited. Every civil and political right included in the Declaration 
addresses "everyone", however, the right in article 21 addresses 
"everyone ... in his country". This is to suggest that a person has to 
qualify to enjoy such a right. This right is a right of a citizen. It would 
be absurd to think that a person from an African country, for 
instance, had the right to take part in the government of Japan or 
Sweden. This is practically impossible.
Macfarlane rightly argues that:
Practicability is an issue with all human rights, not just 
economic and social rights, since resources are always 
required either for their realization or protection.44
Because civil and political rights need only the will of 
governments, and economic, social and cultural rights need material
43-Paragraph (1) and (2) of Article 21 of the Declaration read as follows:
(1)=Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly  or through freely chosen representatives.
(2)=Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
44-L. J. Macfarlane (1985) op. cit. p. 10.
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resources for their implementation, they have come to be known as 
negative and positive rights respectively. One objects to such a 
division and, as Macfarlane has suggested above, both sets need 
resources for their implementation.
It goes without saying, as pointed out earlier, that the enjoyment 
of social and economic rights depends on the resources of a country. 
However, the enjoyment of civil and political rights requires 
qualified judges, the training of the police and the military forces, for 
which resources are needed. Such programmes require the positive 
action of government and therefore make civil and political rights 
positive as well.
It would perhaps make more sense to imagine the practicability 
of social, economic and cultural rights in the long run, bearing in 
mind the resources of each state, and the international co-operation 
the Universal Declaration sought, rather than seeing nationals from 
one state taking part in the government of another.
2-G enuinely universal
The second test Cranston suggests is that the right should be 
genuinely universal. This test overlaps with the previous one in 
many instances; however, I shall try to avoid repeating points that 
have already been considered.
Human rights are rights for everybody wherever they are. Any 
right which excludes any people, or suggests any qualification to 
enjoy it, cannot be possibly considered a human right. Furthermore, 
if one takes Tom Paine's suggestion that "there could be no rights 
w ithout duties",45 "to impose on men a "duty which they cannot 
perform", Cranston argues, "is as absurd in its way, though perhaps
45-M . Cranston, "Human Rights. A Reply to Professor Raphael." In D. D. 
Raphael, ed., (1967) op. cit. p. 96.
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not cruel, as bestowing on them a "right" which they cannot possibly 
enjoy."46
This test undoubtedly disqualifies social, economic and cultural 
rights from the category of human rights for the reason discussed 
earlier. They are meant for specific categories of people. 
Furthermore, they impose a burden on states which cannot be 
overcome under the special circumstances which each country 
experiences.
The right to take part in the government is restricted to the 
people of one country only as is the case with social, economic and 
cultural rights. Furthermore, it is limited only to a particular people 
within the country. Depending on the constitution of countries, a 
people may be restricted from enjoying such a right for different 
reasons such as age or health.
If one has to speak of a right being genuinely universal, one has 
to define what is meant by that first. Genuinely universal, as one 
understands it, means that a right should be enjoyed by everyone, 
everywhere, regardless of sex, race, religion,...etc. This, it follows, 
confirms that not only the right to life and liberty, for instance, are 
universal but that different economic rights are as well. The right to 
food, subsistence, shelter and medical care are indeed universal. 
They are needed by everybody wherever they are to preserve the 
right to life itself and protect the dignity of the human person.
3-Param ount im portance
This is the third and last test and the one which raises most 
difficulties. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to judge 
whether one set of rights is of paramount importance, or more 
important than the other. Furthermore, even within the same set of
4 6 -Ib id .,
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rights, if a more pragmatic approach is taken, it can be said that 
some rights are more important than others. Within civil and political 
rights, for instance, the right to life and freedom from torture and 
other cruel and inhuman treatment are clearly of paramount 
importance, more important than the denial of freedom of speech or 
of movement. Charles Humana, for instance, in his second attempt 
(1986) to measure human rights on a cross-national basis, selected 
seven rights, among his list of forty, which he thought were of 
paramount importance. His work will be explored further in chapter 
six. This would result, it seems, in the fact that not all civil and 
political rights are human rights if the test is to be applied. The aim 
behind this test, and others, is to make a selection of what could be 
considered as human rights. Whichever "right" fails to pass cannot be 
considered as such.
Now, I turn to contrast the two sets of rights. The rights are 
weighted to achieve their importance. Nonetheless, this is very much
a matter of who the person is and where he happens to be. The
importance of something can be very much stretched and flexible. It
may mean different things to different people. It goes without saying 
that the prevention of murder, or equality before the law, are more 
im portant than, for instance, holidays with pay. Nonetheless, the 
degrees of importance may vary from one country to another, and 
that does not always lead to the conclusion that civil and political 
rights are more important than economic, social and cultural 
r ig h ts .47 To the poor, the underfed and the ill, undoubtedly food,
47-D om inguez argues that: "At the top of the hierarchy, I would place
concern for any identifiable government action that reduces a people's right 
to life and health. Attention would be focused not only on political massacres, 
a rb itra ry  action by the governm ent, but also on governm ents whose 
id e n tifiab le  actions aggravate fam ines and epidem ics." J. I. Dominguez,
3 0
shelter and medical care are more important than freedom of 
movement or expression.48 The former set of rights in this case will 
not only enhance the human personality, but may preserve the right 
to life itself.
It can be asserted that although such tests are important, 
nonetheless they do not offer a clear cut distinction between the two 
sets of rights.49 The example given above will further confirm this 
claim. It seems that Cranston has based his tests on the "right to 
holidays with pay", which he mentioned as the example in his tests 
to prove their validity. For a test to be successful it has to include the 
different rights included in the Declaration.
Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, one may conclude 
that agreement among scholars has yet to be reached on what human 
rights are, and where they come from. Some scholars, among them 
Cranston, have taken them to mean just civil and political rights. 
Others have selected a comprehensive set of rights which includes 
both sets. "Fouad Ajami", Richard Falk states, "emphasizes four sets 
of concerns that embody the maximum feasible consensus at the 
time":50
"Assessing Human Rights Conditions." In J. I. Dominguez, et al. E n h a n c i n g  
Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw-hill, 1979) p. 23.
48-Isaiah Berlin stresses that: "It is true that to offer political rights, or 
safeguards against intervention by the state to men who are halfnaked, 
illiterate, underfed and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical 
help or education before they can understand, or make use of, any increase in 
their freedom." Huang, M. "Human Rights In a Revolutionary Society. The case 
of China." In A. Pollis, and P. Schwab, eds., (1979) op. cit. p. 61.
49-This conclusion is also reached by Professor Raphael who states that: "I 
agree with Mr. Cranston that there are appropriate tests, but they do not in 
fact draw a clear line between the earlier and the later concepts of human 
rights." D. D. Raphael, "Human Rights: Old and New." In D. D. Raphael, ed., 
(1967) op. cit. p. 63.
50-R . Falk , "Com parative Protection of Human Rights in C apitalist and
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1-The right to survive; hence the concern with the war 
system and nuclear weaponry.
2-The right not to be subject to torture.
3-The condemnation of Apartheid; it is accepted that 
other societies violate social equality but that South 
Africa's blatant, officially sanctioned and codified racism 
is practically intolerable.
4-The right to food.
If one looks at Ajami's selection of rights, one sees that it 
includes different rights that are not included in the Universal 
Declaration. While the right to food, not to be subjected to torture, 
and the right to survive are familiar ones, it is not the case for the 
condemnation of apartheid. It should be pointed out that the right to 
survive, in the sense that it is concerned with the war system and 
nuclear weaponry, can be understood to mean the right to peace. 
This right, and to some extent, the condemnation of apartheid, are 
rights of the third generation, which will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter three.
The differences in this perception undoubtedly have a significant 
impact on the policies taken by different countries, and how they 
provide for what they think are human rights. This, in turn, will 
influence what can be labelled as a violation of such a right, the 
differences in standards and the criteria upon which such standards 
are achieved. The traditional clash between the liberal and socialist 
viewpoints is the best example, and it will be discussed further in 
the next chapter.




Human rights East and West: A comparison
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the clash between 
the capitalist and the Marxist ideologies had added a new dimension 
to our understanding of human rights. I shall develop this dimension 
further in what follows.
In their criticism of capitalist societies, communist theorists
regarded individual rights as abstract and argued that people should 
be concerned not with the form of human rights, but with their 
content. While world opinion condemned the communist countries' 
record on human rights, their spokesmen claimed that human rights 
were better provided for under their systems. And this was the crux 
of the difference between the two ideologies
However, it should be pointed out from the beginning that the 
former communist countries have witnessed dramatic changes, which 
resulted in the end of communist rule in some of them (Poland and 
Czechoslovakia), and the total disappearance of others at the other 
end of the spectrum (East Germany and what was formerly the 
Soviet Union). Therefore, the discussion will follow a historical 
sequence: the first part will deal with these countries before the 
changes took place, and in later parts it will to consider the changes 
that have taken place in regard to human rights.
It is generally agreed upon that East and West have different
perceptions of human rights. Their dispute can be summarized under 
three headings. First, while capitalists believe in the supremacy of 
the individual, communists focus on the community or group rights
instead. In their view, the individual will eventually benefit from
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these group rights, as his rights will be better provided for within 
the community. Second, communists give priority to what they 
regarded as the content of human rights, i.e., economic, social and
cultural rights, whereas in capitalist countries the stress is on the
traditional civil and political rights of the individual. Finally, in terms 
of the international supervision of human rights practices, while 
some Western countries call for international mechanisms for the 
monitoring of human rights records, communist countries on the 
other hand traditionally saw this practice as interference in their 
internal affairs and therefore, stressed the importance of states' 
sovereign ty .1
Up to less than a decade ago, this was the general practice.
Because of such priorities and commitments from both sides, each 
progressed very well on the priorities undertaken. Communist 
countries in general, at least up to the 1970s, achieved significant
advances in the fields of social and economic rights. The provision of 
jobs, housing, medical care and education, among others, were the 
pride of communist countries and the indicators upon which they
1-In China, for instance, Edwards et al argue that: "any inquiry into the 
C h inese  rig h ts  s itua tion  by a foreign governm ent or in ternational 
organization is regarded as intervention in Chinese domestic affairs and, 
consequently, a violation of international law." R. R. Edwards, et al. H u n a n  
Rights in C ontem porary China (New York, Colombia University Press, 1S85) 
pp. 52-3. V incent states that: "The Soviet view of the tract o f domestic 
jurisdiction that is protected by the principle of non-intervention is, as we 
have seen much wider than that of the West, and includes the question of 
human rights agreem ents. Thus any western mention of im plem entation is, 
in the Soviet view, an intervention in domestic affairs." R. J. Vincent, H uma n  
Rights in In ternational Relations (Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 
1986) p. 73. M oreover, "International action in this field [human rights] 
should be lim ited, according to them [Socialist countries] to m assive and 
flagrant violations of human rights, individual cases being m atters within 
the exclusive domestic jurisdiction." S. P. Marks, "The Peace-Human Rights- 
Development Dialectic." Bulletin o f  Peace Proposals, 11 (4) 1980 p. 339.
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compared themselves with the West2. However, they ignored or 
failed to secure the traditional ones. Furthermore, they have always 
resisted international monitoring systems and did not cooperate with 
international or regional bodies.
Therefore, when one talks about civil and political rights, the 
first impression that comes into one's mind was that the situation is 
at its worst in the former communist countries; people were very 
oppressed, jails were full and a climate of distrust dominated the 
political scene. Everybody feared their neighbour and had to do what 
they were told, whereas in the West, everybody was free to do 
whatever they liked, and are entitled to say whatever they thought.
Nonetheless, the situation has been changing gradually since the 
mid 1980s, not only in the former Soviet Union, but in the majority 
of the former Eastern bloc. Since Gorbachev was elected General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, 
dramatic changes, among which policies towards human rights, have 
taken place that were unimaginable even a decade ago.
Among these changes and reforms, I shall concentrate on those 
concerned with human rights. In general, there has been a steady 
shift towards the traditional set of rights that were earlier ignored, 
and some of the welfare rights have suffered.3
2-"The Soviet Government rejected interference in Soviet dom estic affairs 
and asserted the superiority of Soviet socio-economic rights to those in 
cap ita list countries, with their high rates of inflation and unem ployment in 
the late 1970s." Anthony Marcham, "Human Rights in the Region", in Eas t e r n  
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1992 (London: Europa 
Publications, 1992) p.26.
3-In the Soviet Union, for example, White reports that: "At the other end of 
the spectrum an increasing number lived in poverty: at least 70 million, or a 
q u arte r of the total population, according to an estim ate published in 
I z v e s t iy a  in late 1990... Another social category that was rapidly increasing in 
the early 1990s was the unemployed: acknowledged for the first time in the
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However, before going in depth into the discussion of the 
changes in Eastern Europe, a comparative study of human rights 
between East and West may be appropriate. I shall concentrate on 
the priorities assigned to the two sets of rights by each party to 
stress the differences between them. In the course of so doing, the 
reader should bear in mind that covering every aspect of the two 
sets of rights in countries in both the Western and Eastern worlds is 
beyond the scope of this study. Thus, I shall limit myself to some 
aspects of each set and apply them to a few countries where 
appropriate. Hence, freedom of movement and of expression, as 
samples for civil and political rights are the subject of the first 
section. In the second, I look at economic and social rights and how 
they are provided for in different countries. I look particularly to the 
rights to work and to medical care. The chapter concludes with an 
account of the recent developments that have occurred in the 
countries of Eastern Europe. The improvement that has taken place 
in different aspects of civil and political rights, and how economic 
and social rights have been affected, is of particular interest.
I: Civil and political rights
1990 plan report, the figure given (about 2 million) was understood to be a
considerab le  underestim ate." S. W hite, G orbachev and After (Cam bridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 134. It should be pointed out further that 
the fall in growth rates meant that the performance of Communist countries 
deteriorated from the 1970s onwards. Furthermore, Marcham reports that: "In
many areas of the economy production was falling. For instance, the output of 
petro leum , the USSR primary source of energy, declined by almost 10% 
between 1988 and 1990... Between December 1990 and March 1991 the price of 
cooking oil and eggs have trebled in the state stores of Moscow, where,
according to the traditional communist claim, prices never rose." A. Marcham, 
(1992) op. cit. p.28.
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Civil and political rights lie at the heart of human rights. Some 
take them as the principal measurement to judge whether a 
government respects human rights or not. Because of their 
commitment to the content of human rights, communist countries 
have generally tended to ignore this category of rights. Moreover, 
since the traditional perception of human rights encompasses only
this dimension, communist countries have always been criticized for 
not securing such rights.
In the following, I shall look at two aspects of the question; how 
were they provided for in communist countries? And are they 
absolute in the West or not? The aspects considered are:
1-1: Freedom of expression
Freedom of expression means freedom of speech, to hold any 
opinion and express it freely without any interference from anybody. 
It has been the subject of article 19 of both the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
former states that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
inform ation and ideas through any m edia and
regardless of frontiers.4
It is seen as one of the most important rights. Freedom of 
expression may enhance the state apparatus in making the right 
decision that concerns every citizen in a given country. It is one form
4-1. Brownlie, ed., B asic  Documents in International Law 1st edition, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1967) p. 135.
3 7
of democracy by which civilized governments are ruled or ought to 
be ruled. By securing this right, a government brings its citizens into 
political life, makes them more active in political matters, and helps 
them to feel that they have a say in the running of their country. 
Thus different constitutions, in different countries, indeed claim to 
provide for this right.
However, one should not limit oneself to what the provisions of 
constitutions are, the practices should be scrutinized as well. 
Moreover, even if freedom of expression is secured by the
constitution, one does not have to take it as value free; everyone can
say whatever they like. Freedom of expression is generally restricted 
either by laws, in matters of states' security, or moral obstacles, not 
to do any harm to anybody. In other words, one person's freedom 
finishes when another's begins.
In the former USSR, for instance, article 50 of the 1977
constitution stated that;
In accordance with the interests of people and in order 
to strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens 
of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the 
press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and 
demonstrations. Exercise of these political freedoms is
ensured by putting public buildings, streets and squares
at the disposal of the working people and their 
organizations, by broad dissemination of information, 
and by the opportunity to use the press, television, and 
radio.5
If one looks at the texts, one will find that freedom of speech is 
secured. As a matter of fact, the article quoted above proves that. 
However, there is a gap between what is printed and what is really 
happening in reality. In the former USSR, freedom of speech was
5-F. E. Dowrick, ed., Human Rights. P roblem s. Perspectives and Texts 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1979) p. 207.
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connected with the interests of the people, on the one hand, and the 
strength and development of the communist system on the other. 
This implies that any speech which does not satisfy these conditions 
may be punished by law. Furthermore, it was linked to the means of 
communication controlled by the state apparatus such as the press, 
television and radio.
One must also bear in mind the formerly leading role of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the nomemklatura  system 
through which certain posts had to be approved by the Party. 
Furthermore, one must allow for the heavy system of censorship 
under which all information had to be subject to a very close 
scrutiny, which controlled what could be said.
Under such circumstances, how could it be possible to speak 
about freedom of speech? How could the Soviet citizen use such 
means, i.e., the press, television and the radio, which were controlled 
by the state, to express his opinion if he was criticizing the system? 
The Soviet writer Anatolii Kuznetsov explained when he left his 
country that:
L ife is like some constant unbroken theatrical 
production. You never say out loud what you really 
think, only what you ought to say... Insofar as we have 
to live in that theater, every person has a sort of 
collection of phrases which he speaks and says publicly, 
and a corresponding collection of actions. For a normal 
human being, it is extremely difficult to lead such a 
double life.6
The question of dissidents was the major issue to arise when the 
human rights situation in the communist states was discussed. 
Generally, they were leading figures in their societies and whatever
6-A. Dallin, and G. W. Breslauer, Political Terror in the Communist Systems 
(Stanford/C alifornia: Stanford University Press, 1970) pp. 126-7.
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happened to them became publicly known. Milne argues that:
It is the duty of the communist citizen loyally to follow 
the directives of the Communist Party in all political 
matters. To challenge the political leadership of the 
Party is to proclaim oneself an enemy of Communism.
That is what the dissidents have done, which is why 
they are in trouble.7
Dissidents in the former USSR, because of their position, faced 
different charges varying from exile and labour camps to psychiatric 
hospitals. The latter was the notorious treatment reserved to them.
The situation in China did not differ much from what is already 
seen in the former Soviet Union. The right to freedom of expression 
is, formally speaking, secured by the constitution. Article 28 states
that:
Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the
press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration 
and freedom to strike, and enjoy freedom to believe in 
religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to 
propagate atheism.8
Yugoslavia, to some extent, represented the exception to 
communist countries. In comparison to other countries in Eastern 
Europe, one may argue that the situation there was slightly better.9 
This was perhaps due to the fact that it had more contact with the
7-A. J. M. M ilne, "The idea of human rights: a critical inquiry." In F. E.
Dowrick, ed., (1979) op. cit. p.35.
8-F. E. Dowrick, ed., (1979) op. cit. p. 211
9-"O ne sim ple m easure of the difference betw een Y ugoslavia and the 
Com m unist regim es was to compare the new spapers. The Belgrade daily 
P o l i t i k a , was no longer entirely taken up with success stories about 
production in Y ugoslavia and reports of strikes and slumps in the Western 
w orld. It has begun to carry again inform ative surveys o f international 
politics, advertisem ents from the main Belgrade stores, serial imported from 
abroad and a Walt Disney comic strip." D. Wilson, T ito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 76.
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West. Different Western newspapers, for instance, could be easily 
found in Yugoslavia; and movement across international borders was 
largely unrestricted.
However, having said that does not automatically mean that in 
this country citizens were free to express themselves. There were 
some restrictions on the matter; the political leadership, for instance, 
could not be criticised. Different trials and harassment took place 
such as in the case of Milovan Djilas and the Praxis group.
It is widely known that in Western countries this right is 
secured. Everybody is free to hold an opinion and express it. The 
practice, if one goes deeper in the question however, shows that the 
difference may not be as absolute as is generally believed.
1-2: Freedom of movement
Along with the former USSR, communist countries were criticised 
because they did not provide for this right.
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
that:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country.10
The general practice in the former USSR was that there was no 
freedom of movement since the Soviet Constitution did not recognize 
it as a right, in contrast with the provisions of both the Universal 
Declaration and especially the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Thus, it was one of the major issues on which Soviet policy was
10-1. Brownlie, ed., (1967) op. cit. p. 135.
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criticized.
However, although it is not recognized as a right, practice has 
shown that a substantial number of people, mainly Soviet Jews, 
Soviet Americans, and Soviet Germans have been granted exit visas 
to emigrate.11
The situation in China did not differ much. The country's 
constitution does not guarantee freedom of movement. Edwards et al. 
argue that:
Freedom of movement of the individual within China is 
restricted by the policy of banning any move from the 
place of registration, except on assignment.12
Furthermore, foreigners visiting these countries did not easily 
obtain entry visas. They had to be subjected to a very intensive 
administrative process. There were some variations among them 
such as in the case the case of the former Yugoslavia. There has been 
a relaxation of its borders, tourists could go to Yugoslavia without the 
need for any formal or diplomatic invitation. Yugoslav citizens could 
travel abroad, especially workers who have been sent to Germany 
because of unemployment prevailing in the country.
The attitude of the Yugoslav government could be ascribed to 
the economic situation in the country. Yugoslavia had one of the 
worst economic performances among the communist countries; an 
increasing level of unemployment and a very high level of inflation. 
Thus, there was a tendency towards tourism and sending its workers 
abroad as a source of hard currency.
11-G. Edwards, "Human Rights and Basket III Issues: areas of change and 
continuity." International Affairs , Volume 61, 1985. Table 1, p. 634.
12-R. R. Edwards, et al. (1986) op. cit. p. 55. Moreover, according to a Chinese 
com m entator, the 1982 "Constitution provides guarantees where possible and 
where it is not possible it does not guarantee freedom (for example, it does not 
guarantee freedom to change one's residence)." Ibid., p.56.
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These attitudes of communist countries towards civil and 
political rights were not very different, such as freedom of assembly, 
of religion etc.... However, the point that needs to be stressed here is 
that it would be a mistake to conclude that in the West, these human 
rights are provided for ideally.13 Capital punishment, for instance, 
exists in the United States; not only this, in common with the former 
communist countries, it is inflicted on minors as well. According to
the Novosti Press Agency:
The United States is in fact the only capitalist state 
where death penalties are given to minors. There are 
only six states in the US where death penalties cannot 
be used against criminals under 18 of age. In 31 of the 
states which practice capital punishment, the age limit 
is still lower or is not specified at all. Both black and 
white citizen from the poorest sections of society are as 
a rule sentenced to death if their supposed victim is 
w hite .14
II: Economic, social and cultural rights
What should be mentioned from the beginning is that 
these rights are not generally accepted as rights that 
every government has to secure. They are not as equal 
as the rights discussed above.
If these rights are looked at closely within the 
communist thinking and practice, indeed a lot of
13-According to Novosti Press Agency, in the United Kingdom, for instance, 
"C itizens' freedom  of movement was restricted during the strike, (miners' 
general strike, March 19, 1984, March 13, 1985) Police would often stop people 
on the road to investigate them back or arrest them. In the first 27 weeks of 
the strike, 164,508 alleged participants in pickets were denied entry into the 
county of Nottingham alone." Novosti Press Agency, Human Rights in the 
C apitalist World (Moscow: Publishing House, 1987) p. 39.
14-Ibid., p. 56.
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communist countries have done very well in this area to 
challenge capitalist ones. They have been concerned 
with the enhancement of the standards of living of their 
population; providing jobs and housing, free education 
and medical care. Up to two decades ago a lot of people 
regarded the achievements of communist states in these 
areas as impressive.15
Some argued that the concern of communist countries 
with this set of rights could be ascribed to the lack of 
the legitimacy of the systems. It was an attempt to gain
popular support. Tokes argues that:
Because of the Eastern European regimes’ chronic 
difficulties in gaining genuine popular support on
ideological grounds these processes have compelled the 
communist party-states to shift the foundations of their 
legitimacy from political- ideological justification of 
domination to economic performance and satisfaction of 
popular expectations for increasing living standards, 
accelerated delivery of social services and other
tangible material benefits.16
Whatever arguments have been used to support or reject the 
tendency of communist states to stress these kinds of rights, it 
should be borne in mind that the communist countries achieved very 
high levels in many of these areas.
In the following sections I shall focus on some aspects of social 
and economic rights and how they are provided for in these 
countries, with some comparison with capitalist ones. These aspects
15-Indeed one would argue, according to statistics up to the 1970s, that
Com m unist countries have really  achieved very high levels of literacy,
provision of jobs, cheap hosing (the rent did not increase since 1928), medical 
care, and free education.




2-1: The Right to work
Article 23 (1) of the Universal Declaration states that:
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work 
and protection against unemployment.17
In general terms, this right has been secured in the communist 
countries -with some exceptions. In these countries in general, he 
who did not work, did not eat. Work was not only a right but a duty. 
Hence, they tried to secure this right through their constitutions and 
legal codes.
In the former USSR, for instance, this right was secured by 
article 40 of the Constitution which promised everyone a job, in 
contrast with western countries where unemployment was very 
c o m m o n .18 Unemployment has been seen as one of the major
sources of social problems such as delinquency, prostitution and 
different kinds of crimes. By securing this right, communist 
governm ents were trying to avoid the emergence of these
phenomena on the one hand, and making everybody help in the 
development of the society on the other. According to the U. N. 
Economic and Social Council's report on the world social situation in 
1985:
17-1. Brownlie, ed., (1967) op. cit. p. 136.
18-A ccording to the Novosti Press Agency: "In the developed cap italist
countries, when their economies are experiencing a degree of recovery, there 
are 28 million people who are fully unemployed. According to official data; 8.5 
m illion Americans, 3.2 British, 2.3 French, and 2.2 millions resident of the 
Federal Republic of Germany." Novosti Press Agency, The Concern for Human 
Rights. Real and False (Moscow: Publishing House, 1986) pp. 28-9.
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If in the socialist countries guaranteed employment is a 
basic principle, the citizens having the right and the 
duty to participate in society through work.19
The right to work in the communist countries was linked with 
the different social values; "it is a duty", "an honour". Thus, it had to 
be fulfilled by everybody in the society who was able to do so.
Szymanski argues that:
Not only a job is considered to be a worker's right but, 
also working is considered to be a social duty. Soviet 
law stipulates that no one can live from rents, 
speculation, profit or black marketing, as such activities 
are considered to be living off the labour of another - 
social parasitism.20
Moreover, the law punished people who did not work. Article 
209 of the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republics (R.S.F.S.R.) 
criminal code, as interpreted by the presidium of the R.S.F.S.R. 
Supreme Soviet in 1975, provided for "social parasites". Macfarlane 
notes that:
persons living 'on unearned income with avoidance of 
socially useful work for more than four month in 
succession or for periods adding up to one year', along 
with systematic vagrants and beggars, to be punished 
by imprisonment or corrective labour for up to one 
year.21
In China, the situation was not different from what was seen in 
the former USSR, because different constitutions have stressed the 
importance of this right. Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution stated
19-Ibid., p.30.
20-A. Szymanski, Human Rights in the Soviet Union ( London: Zed Books,
1984) p. 139.
21-L. J. M acfarlane, The Theory and Practice of Human Rights (London: 
M aurice Temple Smith, 1985) p. 113.
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that:
Work is a matter of honour for every citizen...able to
work.22
The security of jobs in the communist states was one of the basic 
targets to their policies. This does not mean in any case that 
unemployment did not exist in these countries. China, for instance,
suffered from unemployment and made it publicly known that there 
were shortages in work places.
Nevertheless, the situation, similar to that of the former USSR, 
could be considered to be better than cases in the U.S.A. or in the 
U .K .23 There is equality between men and women in recruitment for 
jobs on the one hand and in equality of pay on the other. Whereas, in 
the West, women are still fighting for that equality, receiving lower 
income than men.24
However, when one says that unemployment did not exist in the 
former communist countries, one must not understand it as such. It
may, and indeed did exist, under different forms such as "disguised 
unemployment" or "underemployment". It means that if the capacity
of a company is 60,000 workers for instance, it may employ a higher 
number than that to absorb the unemployed work force since its aim 
was not to make profits. Furthermore, there was no competition
22-R. R. Edwards, et al. (1986) op. cit. p. 68. Article 27 of the 1975 Constitution 
stated as well that: "...C itizens have the right to work and education...." F. E. 
Dowrick, ed., (1979) op. cit. p. 210.
23-"In Capitalist states no guarantee of a job can be given as the demand for 
jobs in the private sector will be determined by market forces." L. J. 
Macfarlane, (1985) op. cit p. 113.
2 4 -...However, as was brought out during a recent court hearing, women are 
paid 32 per cent less than men against the background of the widespread sex 
segregation of the work force....According to the May 19, 1984 issue of the S a n  
F rancisco  E xam iner  49 000 000 American females are regularly victims of 
wage discrimination. Novosti Press Agency, (1987) op. cit. pp. 39-40.
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among companies since they were all owned by the state.
In Yugoslavia, however, unemployment was a very heavy 
burden on the government's shoulders. It had not been able to cope 
with the different economic problems, if not crisis, the country has 
been facing over the years. Yugoslavia was one of the countries 
which realized the lowest economic growth among the communist 
states. Therefore, it would not be a surprise to see thousands of 
jobless citizens.
In general, there were some variations among them in providing 
jobs for their citizens, but, what was generally achieved was the right 
of workers to participate in the management of their companies. 
Article 8 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution speaks about the "right of 
workers to participate in decision making process of their collective". 
This was widely followed in Yugoslavia through a system known as 
"self-m anagem ent."
2-2: The right to health care
One measure upon which one can judge how developed a 
country is through the ratio of doctors and hospital beds to the
population, life expectancy and the percentage of infant mortality. 
Health care received special attention in the former communist 
countries, and in general these countries have made significant leaps 
forward in the area of health. A comparison between western and
communist countries in the area of medical care could have been
absurd five or six decades ago.
Both the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Social Rights 
have provisions concerning the right to health care. The former, for
4 8
instance, states in article 25 (1) that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.25
To say that in the capitalist world this right is not provided for 
would be wrong, nonetheless, the quality of health protection 
depends very much on how much the person is able to pay.
In the former USSR, for instance, this right was secured through
the 1977 Constitution from which article 42 stated that:
Citizens of the USSR have the right to health protection.
This right is secured by free, qualified medical care 
provided by the state health institutions; by extension
of the network of therapeutic and health-building 
institutions; by the development and improvement of 
safety and hygiene in industry; by carrying out broad 
prophylactic measures; by measures to improve the
environment; by special care for the health of rising
generation, including prohibition of child labour, 
excluding the work done by children as part of the 
school curriculum; and by developing research to 
prevent and reduce the incidence of disease and ensure 
citizens a long and active life.26
When the communists came to power in 1917, levels of disease 
and life expectancy were low (life expectancy, for example, was just
30 years in 1900, compared to 47 in the U.S.) and infant mortality
was very high.
25-1. Brownlie, ed., (1967) op. cit p. 136. Article 12 (1) of the I.C.E.S.C.R. reads as 
follow: The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health." Ibid., p. 144.
26-F. E. Dowrick, ed., (1979) op. cit p. 206.
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There have been enormous efforts and huge investment by the 
former Soviet Union (for instance, it was the first country to
introduce free medical services) to bring about different changes and
to improve medical services together with different aspects of the
daily life. According to Szymanski:
In the 1969-78 period, the USSR increased the share of 
GNP spent on health, as well as its spending per capita.
In 1969 2.3% of its GNP was spent on health (and 13.6% 
on military activities); in 1978 2.4% was spent on health 
(and 12.2% on military activities). This corresponded to 
a 59% increase in a b s o l u t e  resources allocated to 
health.27
The efforts resulted in tremendous changes in the Soviet society, 
and indeed did challenge the most developed capitalist countries 
when it came to the ratio of qualified doctors per population or the
availability of hospital beds as indicated in the table below, which is
based on 1977 statistics:28
Table (2) I: The ratio of doctors and hospital beds to the 
population in the former USSR, the USA and the UK.
C o u n try  Doctors per 10,000 H ospital beds per





Furthermore, in a more recent publication (1986), the Novosti
Press Agency in Moscow stated that:
According to the World Health Organization the optimal 
proportion is 280 doctors for 100,000 of the population.
In the U.S.S.R. this proportion has been exceeded -there
27-A. Szymanski (1984) op. cit. p. 136.
2 8 -Ib id .,
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are 412 doctors for every 100,000 of the population.
The U.S.A. has 233, the Federal Republic of Germany 
299, France 208 and Great Britain 183.29
If one does not argue about the quality of medical care, then 
there is no doubt that the former USSR had higher standards 
compared to western countries. Only the former West Germany 
exceeded the optimal proportion of doctors put forward by the World 
Health Organization. Moreover, what matters more is that in the 
communist countries treatment was free and available for all,3 0 
whereas in the U.S., for instance, according to official data, the cost of 
medical services went up by 43% between 1981 and 1984.31
Medical care in China improved substantially after the 
communists consolidated power. There had been many kinds of 
diseases which threatened the society, and an urge to develop this
29-Novosti Press Agency, (1986) op. cit. p. 34.
30-It should be born in mind that the top party or army officials are 
privileged in the USSR. Macfarlane points to the existence of special top level 
facilities for elite members of Soviet society. He stated that: "What is 
objectionable about the Soviet set-up is less that the top people secure the best 
service than that the existence and nature of the privileged service is not 
allowed to be mentioned precisely because it conflicts with the elite-promoted 
image of an egalitarian society." L. J. Macfarlane (1985) op. cit. p. 124.
31-Novosti Press Agency,(1986) op. cit. p. 35. Moreover Macfarlane sees that: 
"It would be wrong, however, to think that the maintenance of a high standard 
of health for a people is simply a matter of economic resources. The United 
States of America provides a shameful example of the working in a rich society 
of J. T. Hart's "Inverse Care Law". That Law states "The availability of good 
medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population 
served. This operates more completely where medical care is most exposed to 
market forces and less so where it is reduced." The bottom black neighborhood 
area in Detroit, for example, had in the early seventies an infant mortality rate 
as high as San Salvador and over three times the United States average, while 
in Los Angeles slums centered on Wall's the effective rates of physicians to 
population was one to three thousands, compared with national average of one 
to six hundred." L. J. Macfarlane (1985) op. cit. p. 122.
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system. China is a huge country and by far the most populous which 
made the task very difficult for the government. There was the
privileged city and the deprived countryside. The situation
persuaded Mao that the system as a whole, including medical
education, must be reformed. He stated:
Tell the Ministry of Public Health that it only works 
from 15% of the entire population. Furthermore, this 
15% is made up of privileged. The broad ranks of 
peasants cannot obtain medical treatment and also do
not receive m edicine...M edical education must be
reformed. It is basically useless to study so much...Three 
years is enough. The important thing is that they study 
while practicing.(We should)...devote greater amount of
men and materials to solving the urgent problems of
masses.32
To finish with the social and economic rights, and how they were 
provided for in the communist states, the table provided by White et 
al, gives general information about some indicators on social welfare 
and offers the possibility of a comparison between the communist
and the western countries examined.
Table (2) 2: Comparison of some communist countries and 
non-communist countries on selected social indicators.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
UK 43 18.2 9 75 3256 112
USA 60 25.7 10 75 3645 257
In d ia n.a. n.a. 99 58 2238 58
USSR 78 43.3 25 69 3399 177
China n.a. 13.6 32 69 2630 1 8
GDR 66 31.9 9 73 3814 79
32-A. Pollis, and P. Schwab, eds., Human Rights. Cultural and Ideological 
P erspectives  (New York: Praeger, 1979) pp. 77-8.
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Kevs to the above table:
1= Countries.
2= Housing units completed per 10,000 population, 1988.
3= Doctors per 10,000 population, c.1987.
4= Infant mortality rate per 1000 births, 1988.
5= Life expectancy at birth, 1987.
6= Daily calorie supply, 1986.
7= Students in education per 10,000 population 1988.
S o u rc e : S. White, et al, com m unist and Post-communist Political 
Systems. 3 rd edition, (London: Macmillan Education, 1990) p. 327
What should be born in mind when one makes such comparisons 
and says for instance, that communist countries were ahead of 
capitalist ones in terms of economic and social rights, one is speaking 
about an overall distinction between communist countries on the one 
hand and capitalist ones on the other. One may find some countries 
which are capitalist and provide better social and economic rights 
than socialist ones as in the cases of the United Kingdom, for instance, 
and Yugoslavia.
Section th ree : Changes and new developm ents:
However, and as pointed out earlier, although communist 
countries had always taken pride in their achievements and claimed 
that human rights were best provided for in their countries, the 
changes brought about in these countries suggested the opposite. The 
East has shifted more towards the West,and civil and political rights 
have been given greater attention.33
The reader should bear in mind that the discussion that follows
33-A. Trehub, "Human Rights in the Soviet Union: Recent Development." 
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 32nd year, no 8 (3473) 
February 24, 1988. p. 5.
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will not be limited only to the aspects of human rights discussed 
earlier. It will accordingly be on g en e ra l aspects that have been 
affected by the changes in the former Eastern Europe with direct 
implication for human rights. Perhaps the most significant of all the 
improvements in terms of traditional rights was the reforms of 
electoral laws that were introduced. Such reforms have led to some 
of these countries experiencing their first genuine elections where 
citizens had to choose between more candidates than the number of 
seats available for contestation. This in turn has led to non­
communists being elected to government, while some countries saw 
the end of communist rule. The former Soviet Union, for instance, 
saw the first genuine elections in March 1989 to the Congress of 
People's Deputies where even senior communist Party and 
Government officials failed to secure election.34
Similar elections took place in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland. In Poland, for instance, general elections were held in June 
1989, and Solidarity, the once banned trade union, was free to 
contest and emerged as the victor in these elections. Solidarity won 
99 of the 100 seats contested in the upper house of parliament. 
However, since the Polish Law reserved two-thirds of the lower 
house to the Communist Party and other groups, Solidarity was only 
allowed to contest the remaining one-third of the seats, all of which 
it won.35 Such elections have put an end to a forty year power 
monopoly by the Communist Party.36 Likewise, the Communist
34-The Guardian. Monday, April 10, 1989.
35-M. K. Addo, "Are Human Rights Pass6 in East-West Relations?" C oex is tence  
Vol. 27. 1990. p. 90
36-"Poland's, new Prime Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, yesterday declared 
an end to more than 40 years o f communist rule." The Guardian. Wednesday, 
Septem ber 13, 1989. "Hungary," Racz argues, "passed as important milestone in 
the Spring of 1990. The elections which brought the democratic forces into
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government in Prague saw the end of communist rule as well in 
December 1989, and a non-communist being elected to the post of 
president.
However, apart from the reforms in electoral laws, different 
changes have had a strong impact on human rights. The observance 
of law and reforms in the criminal laws of some these countries is a 
very significant step forward to curtail the general practices that 
communist countries were notorious for. In China, for instance, one of 
the major steps taken by the new Chinese leadership was its concern 
with the prisoners that were subjected to civil prosecution. 
Thousands of people were imprisoned under different charges, 
mainly what was known as "rightists" or "counter-revolutionaries". 
In June 1979, there were reportedly some 11,000 persons who had 
been detained since 1957.37 Their cases had been dealt with, and 
more criticism has been voiced against Mao and his policy of creating 
a state of "lawlessness" and "feudal fascism".
Within this framework the Ministry of Justice was restored in 
1979, and the judges and the police were given strict orders not to 
use torture or threats to extort confessions. Furthermore, many law 
departments in Chinese universities have been opening again. Copper
et al state that:
By 1981 there were 6,800 lawyers in China of whom all 
but 5000 were employed full-time. Law departments in 
the universities began to reopen and army officers 
began to receive judicial training. A mass legal 
education campaign was launched and legal research
pow er completed an unprecedented peaceful systematic change from Marxist- 
Leninist one-party rule to a plural system of governance." Baranbas Racz, 
"Political Pluralism in Hungary: The 1990 Elections." Soviet Studies , Vol. 43 
Number 1, 1991.
37-S. C. Leng, "C rim inal Justice in Post-M ao China: Some Prelininary
Observations." In China Quarterly, No. 87.September, 1981. p. 442.
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was encouraged by the government, including the 
publication of several law journals.38
However, the situation has not changed much. Different reports 
by specialized agencies, such as Amnesty International, suggest that 
there is still a great deal of human rights violations. The Chinese 
perception of human rights remains the same; there is a heavy 
emphasis on economic and social rights, especially the right to 
subsistence and the principle of non-intervention since the issue of 
human rights is held to be an internal matter.39
In the former Soviet Union, in expressing his views about 
Perestroika and democracy, Gorbachev, a lawyer by training, 
stressed the importance of law as a major condition for his policy to
succeed. He said that:
There can be no observance of law without democracy.
At the same time, democracy cannot exist and develop 
without the rule of the law, because law is designed to 
protect society from abuses of powers and guarantee 
citizens and their organisations and work collectives 
their rights and freedoms.40
Therefore, there was a commitment on the part of the new 
Soviet leadership to put an end to the practices the country had
38-J. F. Copper, et al, Human Rights in Post-Mao China (Boulder: W estview,
1985) p. 46.
39-It should be pointed out that China has published the White Paper on 
Human Rights in which it explains its position on the issue. It is an attempt by 
the Chinese leadership to explain the priorities taken and how China sees the 
issue. It stresses further its traditional stand. An interview with Zhu Muzhi, 
D irector of the Information Office of the State Council, provides further 
information. Beijing Review , Vol. 34, no. 45, November 11-17, 1991.
40-M . Gorbachev, P eres tro ik a  (London: Collins, 1987) p. 105. Moreover, White 
reports that: "Legislation on the courts, introduced in 1989, established for the 
first time the principle of presumption of innocence of the accused." S. White, 
G orbachev and After 1992 edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992) p. 43
5 6
been experiencing. The most significant of all, perhaps, was the
recognition that there were some shortcomings within the Soviet
laws. Veniamin Yakovlev, for instance, the Deputy Head of Public
Commission on Humanitarian Questions and Human Rights, told a
press conference on 4 February, 1988 in Venice that:
The RSFSR criminal code is being reviewed and that the 
infamous article 70 may be eliminated or changed.41
Indeed, the new Fundamentals of Criminal Law, 1991, ended
article 70 and the concept of ’anti Soviet agitation and propaganda’.
Furthermore, the Soviet leader did in fact recognise that there had
been ill treatment of dissidents and he acknowledged that there had
been an extensive use of psychiatric hospitals to punish dissidents.
In 1987, he publicly stated that such practices would no longer be
carried out in the Soviet Union.42
Although the exact number of political prisoners in the
communist countries was never publicly known, nonetheless, the
general impression one gets it that it has decreased considerably.43
The notorious use of psychiatric hospitals to deal with political
dissidents has decreased dramatically, if not been entirely abolished.
Eighteen psychiatric hospitals which were formerly under police
41-A. Trehub, A. op. cit. p. 4.
42-"Psychiatric measures should not be used against political or religious 
dissidents, and all those interned should be released." The T im es. M onday, 
Septem ber 12th, 1988.
43-'T t has been reported that of nearly 600 political prisoners in the Soviet 
Union in 1985, more than half had been released in 1988." P. R. Baehr, "Human 
R ights: A Change in Perform ance." In R. J. Hill, and J. Zielonka, eds., 
R estructuring Eastern Europe (Aldershot, Hants: Elgar, 1990) p. 190. The cases 
o f people who were detained in China have been reconsidered, and different 
reports of the specialized agencies suggest that there has been improvement 
on this front.
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control were transferred to the Ministry of Health in January 
1988.44
As for freedom of movement, this right is enjoyed more than 
ever before in these countries. In the former Soviet Union, for 
instance, although it is not still recognized as a right, the number of 
people to whom exit visas were granted suggests that there has been 
a relaxation on the part of the Soviet government.4 5
In Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia citizens have the right 
to travel abroad. Although, these countries saw the relaxation of 
their border controls, nonetheless, this right is quite limited by the 
need to provide the necessary hard currency. Now, many citizens of 
the communist countries, such as the Chinese for instance, are in the 
West for study or different training programmes.
Freedom of expression has considerably increased. Things 
which were unthinkable a decade ago have become daily practice. 
Banned materials have found their ways to libraries and book shops' 
shelves. Newspapers are no longer concerned with the achievements 
of the socialist society, but are more concerned with current national 
and international issues, and tackle different aspects that they were
44-Ibid., p. 192. Furthermore, the "World Psychiatric Association decided in 
O ctober 1989 to readm it the Soviet organization , along with those of 
C zechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In 1983 the Soviet Psychiatrists Association 
resigned from the World Psychiatric Association rather than face expulsion as 
a result of a report on the use of mental hospitals to imprison dissidents." Ibid.,
45-The practice of the Soviet government suggests that there was a leniency 
towards the attribution of exit visas. The number of the Soviet Jews to whom 
exit visas was granted was increasing. According to The Guardian, in June 1989 
alone, permission was granted to about 4000 Soviet Jews to emigrate. This 
figure alone exceeds that of the whole of 1988 put together. The Guardian July 
15, 1989. In describing the situation in the Soviet Union, White states that: 
"some, unable to bear these difficulties any further, applied to emigrate: only 
8,000 had emigrated in 1986, according to official figures, but 235,000 left in 
1989, and more than twice as many left in 1990." S. White, (1991) op. cit. p. 133.
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not allowed to tackle before. More critical pieces appear in the press. 
Censorship has d im in ished .46 This has been the result of the 
adoption in 1990 of the USSR law "on the press and other news
media".47
In the former Soviet Union for example, an official in the 
Krasnopresensky constituency describing the turnout in the March 
1989 elections said that "interest was much greater than normal," he 
added "I doubt whether the 99 per cent turnout figures of the past 
were genuine."48 The famous secret speech of Nikita Khrushchev to 
the 20 th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 in which Stalin's 
atrocities were condemned was published in the Soviet Press in 
1989. The new situation there could perhaps not be better
summarized than by Korotich, former editor of the magazine
Ogonyok , when he states that:
For decades there were no problems of history, no 
planes crashed, no ships sank. Now, it is time for people 
calmly to read the papers and accept them as positive 
version of the truth.49
46-"The law does not allow censorship of news or interference in the activity 
of the news media by officials of state and public agencies. At the same time, it 
forbids the use of news media to divulge information that constitute a state 
secret or some other secrets specially protected by law." Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press Vol., XLII, no., 31, 1990.
4 7 -Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol., XLII, no. 31, 1990. "The press is now
a m ultiparty press- it w ill be in the hands of public and cooperative
organizations." Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol., XLII, no. 23,. 1990. 
Furthermore it saw the end of news monopoly. According to the Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press "Gorbachev decree lets local Soviet open station, allocate 
airtime channels, state media to be free of party bias; no party group can have 
airtime monopoly." Vol., XLII, no. 28, 1990.
4 8 -The Guardian. Monday, March 27, 1989.
49-"On the eve of last summer's extraordinary party conference in Moscow, 
investigators approached Ogonyek saying they had arrested a group of corrupt 
leaders in Uzbekistan who had named four people in Moscow involved with 
them. "If you want to investigate a member of the Supreme Soviet or the Party 
Central Committee, the same bodies have to give permission to do so. It' s
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The death penalty, although still carried out, was reduced 
greatly, and steps were taken to restore freedom of conscience for
the first time since 1917.50
Up to now, the reader may have realized that no mention 
whatsoever has been made of the former "East Germany". Perhaps,
the most significant change is what happened in this country. The
demolition of the Berlin Wall was not only a step towards the
relaxation of the borders of "East Germany" and its eventual union 
with the former "West Germany". It was as well a significant step
towards an East-West rapprochement. Now, the citizens of what was 
once "East Germany" are enjoying the civil and political rights that 
the rest of the "East European countries" are trying to achieve.
It should be pointed out, however, that the discussion is general. 
There are still some countries in which dramatic changes, or at least 
some changes, have yet to take place. Little information is available 
about countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. Nor are there any
im possible. The Soviet Attorney General sent letters to the Supreme Soviet and 
the Central Committee, but no answer-silence! so I took the risk and published 
the artic le  anyway illegally. I admit, saying that some of the Conference 
delegates were thieves and criminals, and our Attorney gave me the files on 
th e m .”
The article produced a furore at the Conference. I gave all the files to 
Gorbachev, saying "if I'm guilty, I'm ready for anything. If not, punish them. 
I want an open investigation. And in six months, they'd all been charged! Five 
years ago, it could have been me who was charged." Ibid., Moreover, ”[T]he
m edia began to d iscuss social problem s, such as drug abuse and child
pornography , the very existence of which had been denied previously."
Anthony Marcham, (1992) op. cit. p.27.
50-"A great step forward is taken with respect to individual freedoms. Granted 
provisions regarding the rights to emigrate and freedom of conscience, for 
exam ple, have been drawn up within the framework o f the Helsinki process."
Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol., XLII, no., 27, 1990.
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signs, as yet, from Cuba to suggest that the Castro regime is to 
embark in a series of reforms along with the rest.
The East's shift towards the West's perception of human rights 
may be better seen in the next part of this dissertation. Different 
political scientists, non-governmental organization and bodies which 
monitor human rights have tended to condemn, or give lower scores 
to the former Eastern countries, mainly because the criteria used are 
those of civil and political rights. In this respect see the ranking of 
Charles Humana, Dahl, Bollen in the next part, as well as those of 
Freedom House before these changes took place.
However, in the late 1980s there was a shift in these countries' 
policies. More attention was given to individual rights, as the ranking 
by Freedom House of countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia testifies (see chapter eight), more cooperation took place 
with international monitoring bodies, and less use was made of 
national sovereignty as an excuse to their non-compliance of 
obligations (see chapter five on the Human Rights Committee).5 1 
Nonetheless, these countries are unable to provide materially what 
they used to. The last decade has witnessed an increase in civil and 
political rights, conversely, economic and social rights have decreased 
sharply .
However, one sees that this chapter was concerned with the 
differences between these two ideologies in terms of human rights. I 
have tried to avoid the inclusion of the Third World on different 
grounds. Mainly, because the majority of such countries are newly 
independent and did not have a strong impact on the shaping of the
51-It should be pointed out further in the case of the former Soviet Union, for 
instance, that "Deputy Foreign M inister says compliance with international 
human rights standards is a Soviet priority." Current Digest of the Soviet Press 
Vol., XLII, no. 27, 1990.
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idea of human rights. Then, because they themselves have no 
homogeneous vision. They have either adopted one or the other 
ideology. Moreover, it is quite difficult to channel this vision under 
just one approach. As was clearly pointed out in the previous 
chap ter, Muslim countries, for instance, believe that human rights 
are best provided for under Islam. The teaching of the Koran, some 
fourteen centuries ago, has within it the aspects that human rights 
try to protect. Moreover, since the majority of Third World countries 
are totalitarian, their policies are not really based on a given 
ideology, as much as on the vision of the leader.
Nonetheless, in the early 1970s there has been a new voice of 
the Third World in the North- South dialogue in which these 
countries tried to enter the debate on human rights. At the same 
time, with the different changes that have been occurring around the 
world, different new aspects have emerged and claim themselves as 
human rights. I shall discuss this point in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three 
A New order and a third generation of human rights
It has been suggested in the previous chapters that human rights 
may be divided into three distinct categories on the basis of the 
slogans put forward by the French Revolution in 1789. The first 
refers to civil and political rights, and the second to economic, social 
and cultural rights. The 'third generation', is the result of many Third 
World countries achieving independence and the challenges that the 
world has witnessed over the past three decades, is usually referred 
to as rights of solidarity.1
It should be pointed out from the beginning that a clear-cut 
definition of what the Third World means is yet to be achieved. This, 
in turn, makes a homogeneous stand towards the question of human 
rights difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, since the 
majority are newly independent countries suffering from poverty, 
illiteracy and neo-colonialism coupled with their role within the 
United Nations, they have tended to press the debate on human 
rights to embrace different new aspects apart from ones already 
a c k n o w le d g e d .2 They felt that they did not have any say in the
1-K. Vasak, "A 30-Year Struggle. The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The UNESCO Courier, November 
1979 p. 29. "The international community is now embarking upon a third
generation of human rights which may be called 'rights of solidarity'".
2 -"A fter 1965, however, the situation has changed. The principal reason was 
the large increase in Afro-Asian members of the United Nations and the 
inc rease  in the membership of the Com m ission on Human Rights. The 
enlargem ent of the Commission was intended to encourage the participation of 
new members who were particularly concerned with such problems as racial 
d iscrim ination  and apartheid, colonialism  and underdevelopm ent." A. H. 
R obertson  and J. G. M errilles, Human rights in the W orld 3rd edition,
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formulation of human rights, and that the time has come for them to 
express their concern.
In this chapter, I shall attempt to address these 'new generation' 
rights and consider how valid they are. The reader should bear in 
mind, however, that the discussion will be brief, mainly to highlight 
the fact that new elements have emerged in the human rights 
debate. A deep reflection on the subject is certainly beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. Furthermore, the rights that have emerged are 
not only a result of many Third World countries achieving 
independence, but a result of many threats to mankind as well.
Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of these new 'new 
rights', and then moves on to discuss their authenticity. In other 
words, are they generally accepted as human rights? And finally, can 
they be measured and applied on a cross-national basis?
I: What are these rights?
Karel Vasak identifies the 'third generation' of human rights to
include four rights. He argues that:
Such rights include the right to development, the right 
to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, 
the right to peace, and the right to ownership of the 
common heritage of mankind.3
(M anchester: M anchester University Press, 1992) p.74
3 - Ibid., See also R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in In ternational R elations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p.82. "The third generation was 
com posed or 'rights of solidarity ', including the right to development, the 
right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to peace 
and the right to ownership of the common heritage of mankind." It should be
pointed out further that, although these 'new rights' are generally agreed
upon, there are some other 'rights' that can be included in this 'third 
generation '. Alston reports that: "In the framework of the 'Armand Hammer
C onference ', proposals for a third in ternational human rights covenant
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The rights included in the above list could be divided into two 
broad categories: the first includes the right to development and to 
the ownership of the common heritage of mankind; the second 
includes the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment 
and to the right peace. The former category could be identified with 
the demands of Third World countries, given their historical
circumstances. The latter are of a general character and of a genuine 
importance to everybody and to every country no matter what its
level of development may be. It is perhaps not by chance that the
first three 'rights' (development, peace and environment) in the 
quotation above have been the subject of articles 22, 23 and 24 
respectively of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 
1981.
However, before going in depth into the analysis of the above 
rights, it may perhaps be appropriate to discuss, at least briefly, a
significant right associated with Third World countries: the right to 
self-determination as well as their constant search for a better deal 
in the international economic system usually referred to as the New 
International Economic Order.
1-1: The right to self-determination
This right was the subject of the first articles in both Covenant
fea tu ring  a range o f "third generation of solidarity rights" have been 
strongly advocated. This group of rights has been said to include: the right to 
development, the right to peace, the right to a healthy environment, the right 
to com m unicate, the right to be different, the right to benefit from the 
com m on heritage of mankind, and the right to hum anitarian assistance." 
Philip  A lston, "Conjuring up New Human Rights. A Proposal for Quality 
Control", in American Journal o f  International Law , (78) 1984 pp.610-1.
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and article 20 of the African Charter. It is of a different nature from
those considered in the previous chapters. Jenks argues that:
The right to self-determination is of a wholly different 
nature from civil liberties in that it cannot be made 
effective by legal process, and also from economic and 
social rights in that it is not a guiding principle of 
national policy to be made effective progressively by 
legislation and administration.4
However, the applicability of this right is also different. It could 
be applied not only to countries which are under foreign domination, 
but to different peoples within independent states such as, for
instance, the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. Nonetheless, for present 
purposes, reference will be made only to how Third World countries 
are concerned since they see self-determination as a form of
decolonisation.
With the majority of these countries achieving their independence 
and entering the debate on human rights, the stress has grown 
within the United Nations on different situations where people are 
still suffering external domination. The denial of human rights in a 
number of countries is mainly due, among other things, to such
people being denied the right to self-determination and racist
po lic ies such as apartheid .5 This linkage between self-
determination and colonial moves was stressed further at Algiers in 
1976, and particularly in United Nations Resolution 32/1977.
Principle "e" of this Resolution reads:
In approaching human rights questions within the 
United Nations system, the international community
should accord, or continue to accord, priority to the
4- J. A. Joyes, The New Politics of Human Rights (London: Macmillan, 1978) 
p .156.
5-See the Preamble of the Declaration of Teheran, Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1968 (New York: Office of Public Information, 1971) pp.538-40
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search for solutions to the mass and flagrant violations 
of human rights of peoples and persons affected by
situations such as those resulting from a p a r t h e i d ,  
from all forms of racial discrim ination, from 
colonialism, from foreign domination and occupation 
and threats against sovereignty, national unity and
territorial integrity, as well as to recognize the
fundamental rights of peoples to self-determination 
and every nation to the exercise of sovereignty and
national resources.6
There is no doubt about the influence of foreign domination on the 
observance of human rights. Being subjected to such a domination 
hinders, if it does not eliminate, any chances the people might have 
in choosing their form of government. Therefore, this right is a pre­
requisite for any attempt to observe human rights. The reader 
should bear in mind, however, that self-determ ination or 
independence does not automatically lead to a better human rights 
record. It offers, at least in principle, a favourable environment in 
which individuals or peoples can freely choose their political status 
and economic policies. So a call on colonial powers to take every step 
to ensure that peoples are free to pursue their choices. It should be 
stated further that self-determination and sovereignty do not mean 
political freedom or independence only, but the economic aspects of 
the right as well.7 All peoples may freely dispose of their national 
wealth and resources in order to enhance their human dignity.
Apart from the denials of human rights being linked to the issues 
of self-determ ination and armed conflict in accordance with
6-S. P. Marks, "Emerging Human Rights. A New Generation for the 1980s." 
R u tg ers  Law Review , 33 (2) 1981 p.440.
7-R esolution 2581 (XXI) of 25 November, 1966 "Reaffirms the inalienable 
righ t of all countries to exercise perm anent sovereignty over their natural 
resources." Y earb o o k  o f the United Nations 1968 (New York: Office of Public 
Inform ation, 1968) p.334.
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resolution 32/130 of February 16, 1977,8 Third World countries
further stress the interdependence and indivisibility of civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other. Moreover, they called for the question to be 
looked at on a more global level. Thus, the New International 
Economic Order is of paramount importance to the effective
promotion of human rights and to decrease the gap between 
developed and developing countries.9
1-2: The right to development
After a full discussion within the United Nations (it was first 
proclaimed by the Commission on Human Rights in 1977), and other 
international bodies that are concerned with the development of 
Third World countries and the best ways whereby it could be 
achieved (these include, for instance, the UNDP and the UNCTAD), the 
General Assembly of the United Nations eventually adopted on 4 
December, 1986 Resolution 41/128 in which it confirmed the right to
development as an inalienable human right.10 The first article reads:
The right to development is an inalienable human 
right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to,
8 - Yearbook o f the U nited N ations 1977 (New York: Office of Public
Information, 1980) pp.734-5.
9-"It [the group o f non-aligned developing countries] has been pressing 
vigorously for concerted new measures to redress the existing inequalities 
between the richer and poorer nations, and for this purpose adopted as its 
slogan the concept of a "new international econom ic order" ...It has been 
claimed that the establishment of the new economic order is a pre-condition of 
respect for human rights in many countries." A. H. Robertson, and J. G. 
Merrilles (1992) op. cit. pp.256-7.
1 0 - Y earbook o f the United Nations 1986 (New York: Office of Public 
Information, 1990) p .717.
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and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
developm ent, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.11
Because of historical reasons, mainly being subjected to foreign 
domination and the increase in the gap between the developed and 
developing countries, Third World states have stressed that the 
denial of human rights is mainly due to these reasons.12 Although 
they stress the indivisibility of human rights as suggested earlier, 
they nonetheless believe that civil and political rights depend on 
economic and social rights. Thus, it is imperative for them to provide 
for economic and social rights before civil and political rights can be 
realized.13
This has polarized the debate on human rights between what has 
come to be known as the North and South. The South refers to 
developing countries, and the North to developed ones -the Eastern 
bloc did not enter the debate because it claimed it was not 
responsible for the situation in Third World states. Most of the 
criticism Third World states are subjected to is that they fail to
11 -Ib id .,
12-M r Kaba M 'baye, Senegal, a form er President of the United Nations 
Com m ission on Human Rights, "recognizes that in many African countries 
governm ents are struggling to combat famine, illness and ignorance tend to 
overlook the classic liberties....H e deduces a "right to development" as a 
necessary corollary of other fundam ental rights recognized in international 
texts." A. H. Robertson and J.G. Merrilles (1992) op. cit. p.13.
13-"A great majority of the Third World countries affirm that the solving of 
the essential problems of food, health, housing, clothing and education holds 
priority  over the question of 'form al' rights, which are an unknown factor 
and are practically without interest to the ignorant and hungry masses which 
inhabit many of these countries." H. Grosespiell, "The Evolving Concept of 
Human Rights: W estern, Socialist and Third World Approaches," in B. G. 
Ram charan, ed., Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration 
O f Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) p.64.
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provide for the freedoms most treasured in the West, which in turns, 
fails, according to Third World viewpoint, to take account of their 
internal situations. This has led to a two-way argument: the North 
argues that the South uses underdevelopment as a pretext for not
providing for civil and political rights, while the South insists that the 
North's stress on civil and political rights hampers the indivisibility 
of rights and hinders the chances of any help to improve their 
situation.
No one would disagree that human rights do not function in a 
vacuum. The political, economic,social and cultural context, or 
situation  in which they develop, are key factors in their 
e x p la n a t io n .14 Given the appalling conditions and problems that 
Third World countries face, it would be difficult to imagine a proper 
respect for human rights. However, Third World states, in general,
have tended to overstretch the importance of economic and social 
rights to the total observance of human rights. Certainly one 
understands the priorities and tendencies on the part of these 
governments to provide for these rights, but abuses of human rights 
that some of these countries have been experiencing have nothing to 
do with whether economic and social rights are provided for or not. 
The fact that country A, for instance, sets its sight on providing social 
and economic rights does not explain torture, detention without trial 
and large -scale killing. It would be absurd to try to justify these acts 
in terms of economic circumstances. The argument is not whether 
development policies generate respect for human rights or not,15 as
14-"It is an undeniable fact that human rights do not function in isolation.
They cannot be fully and properly assessed without taking into account the
political, economic, social and cultural context of particular situation." T. Van 
Boven, "Human Rights and Development. The UN Experience," in D. P. Forsythe, 
ed., Human Rights and D evelopm ent (London: Macmillan, 1989) p. 127.
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much as it is for an urgent international cooperation in the field of 
human rights. Third World countries are suffering from malnutrition, 
and starvation in some cases, whereas the developed world suffers 
overproduction. This example and others suggest that an overall 
concern is needed.16
However, development in this context means not only economic 
growth, but human development itself. The International Commission 
of Jurists defined it as "the right of all people all over the world and 
of every citizen to enjoy human rights".17 The human person, in this 
view, is the centre of development.
This right is linked with different rights, particularly the right to 
self-determination and full sovereignty over natural wealth and 
re s o u rc e s .18 It is linked further to different new rights such as the 
rights to peace, to healthy and ecologically balanced environment. 
The United Nations has stressed the need for a sustainable 
development: in other words, development policies should take into 
account their effects on the environment and the needs of the future 
generations. I shall return to this point later.
15-"For the past two decades ’development’ has been the main item on the 
political agenda of Third World societies. But development policies do not 
necessarily  resu lt in better im plem entation of e ither c iv il/po litica l or 
econom ic rights." R. E. Howard, Human Rights , Development and Foreign 
Policy," in ibid., p.213.
16-"The achievem ent of the right to development requires a concentrated 
national and international effort to elim inate economic deprivation, hunger 
and disease in all parts of the world without discrimination." United N ations 
Yearbook 1986 op. cit. p.721.
17-Quoted from R. E. Howard (1989) op. cit. p.215.
18-" Keba M ’baye sees it [the right to developm ent] as the natural 
consequence of the right to self-determination and the rights of all peoples to 
freely  dispose of their national wealth, and resources -rights which are 
proclaimed in both the UN Covenants." A. J. Robertson and J. G. Merrills (1992) 
op. cit. p. 13.
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1-3: The right to a healthy and ecologically balanced
en v iro n m en t
Perhaps one of, if not the most challenging threats to mankind is 
the achievement of a healthy and sound environment. There has 
been growing awareness of the fact that there has been a population 
explosion coupled with an increase in the use of resources and its 
different effects on climate change. The increase in the already high 
levels of water and air pollution and the steady decrease of forests 
are in fact alarming signals to the international community. 
Moreover, the arms race and the huge stocks of weapons of mass 
destruction add to these difficulties.
Willy Brandt, in the 'Brandt Report', stressed that "the quality of 
life is meaningless without health, which depends on proper 
nu trition  and a healthy environm ent."19 Such a healthy 
environment is not only the responsibility of each state but of the 
international community as well. In this context, the United Nations' 
Social and Economic Council adopted a resolution on 30 July, 1968 in 
which it
took note of the continuing impairment of the quality 
of the human environment caused by such factors as 
air and water pollution, erosion and the forms of soil 
deterioration, secondary effects of biocides, wastes and 
noise. Concerned with the consequent effect thereof on 
the condition of man, his physical and mental well 
being, his dignity and his enjoyment of basic human 
rights in developing as well as developed countries, 
the Council was convinced of the urgent need for 
intensified national and international action to meet 
the situation.20
19-W. Brandt, North-South Dialogue. A Programme for Survival (London: Pan
Books, 1980) p. 16.
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Each epoch has had its challenges; this amongst others to ensure a 
successful transition from the age of wasteful consumerism to that of 
a sustainable world in which human beings enjoy a sound 
environment. The United Nations and other organizations have 
recognized the difficulties towards which the planet is heading. The 
United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm 
in 1972, the Brundtland Report and the Earth Summit which took 
place in June 1992 in Rio are examples of the importance o f the 
issue. The Stockholm Conference played a significant role not only in 
increasing the popular awareness of the dangers that mankind faced, 
but marked the date when when 'the right to a healthy environment'
was recognized in the work of the United Nations. The Conference's
Secretary-General stated that: "the Conference was launching a new 
liberation movement to free men from the threat of their thraldom 
to environment perils of their own making."21 Principle I of the 
Declaration reads:
2 0 - Yearbook of the United Nations 1968 op. cit. p.473. Furtherm ore, the
environm ent was the subject of a report published on 26 May, 1969 by the 
then Secretary General U Thant entitled "Man and his Environm ent", the 
in troduction of w hich stated that: "For the first time in the h istory  of
humanity a crisis of world wide scope has come into existence, including both 
the developed as well as developing countries -concerning the relation o f man 
to his environment. Threatening signs were visible long ago: the demographic 
exp losion , the inadequate  in tegration o f pow erful technology with the 
req u irem en t of environm ent, the destruc tion  o f cu ltivated  lands, the
unplanned development of urban areas, the dim inishing of open spaces; and 
the ever growing danger of the extension of many forms of animal and plant 
life. There is no doubt that if this process continues- future life on earth will 
be threatened." E. J. Osmanczyk, Encyclopedia o f the United Nations and 
In te rn a tio n a l A greem ents ( Philadelphia/ London: Taylor and Francis, 1985)
p .610.
2 1 - Y earbook of the United Nations 1972 (New York: Office of Public 
Information, 1975) p. 319.
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Man had the fundamental right to freedom, equality 
and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
quality that permitted a life of dignity and well-being, 
and he bore a solemn responsibility to protect and 
improve the environment for present and future 
generations.22
The right to a healthy environment is of a general character on 
the one hand, and as a result of the special circumstances of every 
country on the other. It is of a general character in a way that 
everybody in every country may be affected by it. A need for urgent 
and coordinated action at the local, regional and international levels 
is of paramount importance. The effects of the environment may be 
as devastating as the results of wars and armed conflicts.23 It is also 
a result of the special circumstances that a particular country, 
w hether developed or developing, may be experiencing.
Environmental problems are a result of both underdevelopment and 
d e v e lo p m e n t.24 The advanced levels of technology developed 
countries have achieved certainly did not come at a low cost. The 
intolerably high levels of air and water pollution, the increase in the
22-Ibid.,
23-"A ctivities in this category [environment] remain a limbo. The grounds
for concerted action seem clearest when the causation is clear. If country X 
impairs health, destroys life, or harms the environment in country Y and Z, or
more widely, in a region, the oceans, or the globe as a whole, then it is
obviously at fault. If  evidence mounts that cancer arises from increased 
rad ia tio n  and a particu la r governm ent engages in rad ia tion -p roducing  
activities, then it is 'ecological aggression'." R. Falk, "Responding to Severe 
Violations," in J. I. Dominguez et al., Enhancing Global Human R ig h ts  (New 
York: McGraw-hill , 1979) p.243.
24-"The United Nations Conference on Human Environment "affirmed, among 
other things, that in developing countries most environm ental problems were 
caused by under-developm ent, whereas in the industrialized countries they 
w ere generally related to industrialization and technological developm ent." 
Y earbook of the United Nations 1972 op. cit. p.319.
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number of cars, factories and technological accidents undoubtedly led 
to more damage. Developing countries in general lack the means 
whereby to tackle these problems. Thus, it should be looked at from 
a general viewpoint. Developed countries ought to help in the
transfer of environmentally sound technology and update the
infrastructure of Third World countries to meet these new
challenges.
It should be borne in mind that the problems of environment and 
ecology should not be looked at in isolation of other factors. They are
very much linked to issues of development and the arms race. A
development activity may have disastrous effects on the country or 
the region if the environment is not taken into account.25 Such
measures have been adopted, but there is still a need for
international unified ones as some countries have tended to set lower 
standards to attract investment and create jobs.26 It is further 
linked to the issue of the arms race as the use of these weapons 
could have fatal consequences on the environment and mankind in 
general.
It is therefore not a surprise to see the great deal of attention this
issue has received both at the regional27 and the international level.
Moreover, such importance has led some to suggest that it should be
given still more weight. Richard Falk, for instance, argues that: 
Environmentalists and NGOs can build a greater
2 5 - ,,E nv ironm en ta l im pact assessm ent shou ld  be undertaken  w henever 
investm en ts  or developm ent activ ities may have adverse environm ental 
c o n se q u e n c e s  w hether w ith n a tio n a l te rr i to ry  co ncerned , fo r the 
environm ent of neighbouring countries or for the global commons.' W. Brandt
(1980) op. cit. p. 115.
26-Ibid., p. 114.
27-"A n interparliam entary conference on the environm ent held in Bonn in 
1971 resolved that mankind has a right to a healthy environment." S. P. Marks
(1981) op. cit. p.443
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understanding of environmental rights as a key sector
of human rights and generate pressures to translate 
this understanding into a revised Universal Declaration 
of Human R ights and a new Covenant on 
Environmental and Ecological Rights.28
1-4: The right to peace
Peace is the most fertile ground in which respect for and
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms can grow. 
Most human rights violations occur during times of war. They are a 
threat to the basic right of life, without which other rights are 
m eaningless.
However, what one has to bear in mind is that the right to peace
does not only involve refraining from wars -although a very
important factor- but it also involves the solving of many other 
serious problems such as poverty and hunger.29 In his introduction
to the Medium-Term Plan of the UNESCO, the Director-General stated:
Peace is more than simply a matter of refraining from 
war; there can be no lasting peace if individuals are 
deprived of their rights and liberties, if people are
oppressed by other peoples, if populations are beset
by poverty and suffering from malnutrition or
sickness.30
28-R. Falk (1979) op. cit. p.244.
29-Brandt argues that: "This not only raises the traditional questions of peace 
and war, but how to overcom e world hunger, mass misery and alarming 
disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor." W. Brandt (1980) 
op. cit. p. 13.
30-S. P. Marks, "The Peace-Human Rights-Development Dialectic." B u l le t in  
f o r  Peace P ro p o sa ls ,  11 (4) 1980 p. 341. Moreover, Brandt argues that: "While 
hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban 
poverty. Morally it makes no difference whether a human being is killed in 
w ar or is condemned to starve to death because of the indifference of others."
W. Brandt (1980) op. cit. p. 16.
7 6
Although there is an apparent danger to the right to peace, 
because of the violations of human rights discussed in the quotation 
above, wars, however, remain the most significant ones. The right to 
peace was first suggested in this connection by the Commission on 
Human Rights in February 1977. Nonetheless, some steps were taken 
before that in the area of disarmament.3 1
After the Second World War, the world embarked on a rapid and 
massive arms race, encouraged in that by the peak of the Cold War in 
the 1950s. Weapons of mass destruction became the biggest threat to 
the existence of mankind. The creation of troublesome areas around 
the world has meant that this industry has grown more than ever 
before. Different issues such as national security and territorial 
integrity have come to play significant roles in the decisions made.
In a word, it is the right to everybody to take part in the efforts 
aimed at peace: the individual by refusing to be part of any military 
activities, and the states by committing themselves to the non-use of 
force or external aggression and to the peaceful settlement of 
international affairs. Different steps were taken to ensure the right to 
p eace .32 The Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, for instance, 
and the consideration by the "Commission of Human Rights in March 
1971 whether conscientious objection to military service should be 
declared officially a human right",33 are examples of such efforts. 
Further on 15 December, 1978 the General Assembly adopted
31-"A basic instrum ent of the maintenance of peace is the elimination of the 
threat inherent in the arms race, as well as efforts towards general and 
complete disarmament." E. J. Osmanczyk (1985) op. cit. p.610.
32-"The General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibitation of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin america proclaimed the right to peace as a human right in a 
resolution adopted on April 27, 1979." S. P. Marks (1981) op. cit. p.446.
33-J. A. Joyce (1979) op. cit. p.233.
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Resolution 33/73 in which it "reaffirmed the rights of individuals, 
states and all mankind to life in peace." Principle 1 of the Resolution 
reads:
Every nation and every human being, regardless of 
race, conscience, language or sex, has the inherent
right to life in peace. Respect of that right, as well as 
for the other human rights, is in the common interest 
of all mankind and an indispensable condition of 
advancement of all nations, large and small, in all 
fields.34
There is a close link between the right to peace and different
aspects apart from disarmament. To ensure a long lasting peace,
people should have their civil and political liberties and their social 
and economic needs met. Military expenditure, both in developed
and developing countries could certainly overcome many of the 
problems that planet earth is facing today. Diseases, inadequate 
housing and environmental problems could be more readily tackled
if resources were channelled towards them.
1-5: The right to the common heritage of mankind
This right was suggested to be part of the third generation of
human rights. It was first applied to the sea-bed in a declaration by
the United Nations' General Assembly on 17 December 1970 which 
proclaim ed that: "the sea-bed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction is part of the common heritage of mankind."35 Its scope 
has widened to include different areas such as the oceans, space, the 
Antarctic and different cultural monuments.
34-E. J. Osmanczyk (1985) op. cit. p.610
35-S. P. Marks (1981) op. cit. p.447.
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II: Are they human rights?
Having identified the rights of the third generation or the rights of 
solidarity, the most fundamental question remains: can they be 
accepted as human rights? In other words, how valid is it to include 
them in the category of human rights?
There is little doubt that the emergence of such right has added to 
the already controversial question of what human rights really are. 
It was pointed out in the first chapter that economic, social and 
cultural rights were not accepted, at least by some scholars, to be 
human rights, and the stress has always been on the traditional set 
of rights. The inclusion of such new rights has added to these 
difficulties.
It was suggested in the first chapter that our approach to human 
rights would be evolutionary and dynamic. While the two sets of 
rights discussed above were the product of the French, American and 
Russian revolutions, the rights of solidarity are prompted by the 
experience of Third World countries and the new challenges mankind 
is facing. In a word, these new challenges have certainly opened the 
debate on the possibility of considering additional human rights. 
Thus the scope of these rights is different, and their achievement 
requires the efforts of everybody. In this respect, Karel Vasak, in his 
inaugural lecture to the Tenth Session of the International Institute
of Human Rights, Strasbourg, July 1979, stated that they:
are [the third generation of human rights] new in the 
aspirations they express, are new from the point of 
view of human rights in that they seek to infuse the 
human dimension into areas where it has all too often 
been missing, having been left to the State or 
States...[T]hey are new in that they may be invoked
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against the State and demanded of it; but above all 
(and herein lies their essential characteristic) they can 
be realized only through the concentrated efforts of all 
actors on the social sense: the individual, the state, 
public and private bodies and the international 
com m unity.36
Not only these rights are new, in terms that they address new 
dimensions, but their reference is very vague as well. The 
beneficiaries of these rights and upon which the claims can be made 
are quite difficult to determine. While civil and political rights deal 
with the integrity of the person, not to be tortured and to participate, 
to name just a few; social and economic rights refer to the 
satisfaction of goods and needs, the rights of solidarity refer to 
something vague and sometimes ambiguous. This is especially true 
when it comes to the right to the common heritage of mankind. 
Moreover, it seems that with Third World countries entering the 
debate on human rights, these rights more or less benefit them. One 
bears in mind that the rights to a clean environment and to peace are 
for the best of mankind, nonetheless, they -rights of solidarity- seem 
to represent the rights of Third World countries on the developed 
world. Self-determination, in the sense of independence, and 
development are a call on colonial powers to end their domination 
and to take steps forwards developing this part of the world. 
Likewise the rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment and to peace, although they are for the good of the 
planet, are a call on the developed world, which has the technology 
and the know how to deal with environmental problems and help 
Third World countries overcoming them.
However, can one say that a person is denied human rights if that
36-Ibid., p.441.
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person is denied the right to development or is living in an
imbalanced environment, in the same sense that one is tortured, or 
denied the right to take part in the government?
As far as the author is aware, only the right to development has 
been recognized as an inalienable human right by the United Nations 
in 1986. There is enough ground upon which one may argue that the
right to peace and the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced
environment could be considered as such. The United Nations is 
aware of the importance of these factors and many steps were taken, 
as discussed above, to reduce the threats to the environment and of 
wars and set standards for achievement. If the reader recalls the
definition of human rights Jack Donnelly suggested in the first 
chapter, that "they are rights one has by the mere fact of being a
human being", and the conclusion Maurice Cranston reached that 
they are "the moral_rights of all people in all situations," then it
becomes apparent that the rights to peace and to a healthy 
environment fall within this category.37 From a moral point of view, 
it makes little, if any, difference if a human being is killed or being 
exposed to radiation or other diseases that may result from an 
unhealthy environm ent. Life itself is at stake under such 
circumstances. However, who is to blame remains the most difficult 
question to answer.
As far as the first two generations are concerned, governments 
are responsible for the denial of such rights. Although it depends on
how wealthy a country is, in the case of economic and social rights,
still the task is much easier to determine how far these rights are
37-"If advocates of the "new human rights" assert that we have a moral right 
to peace, to the environment, and so on, then many will be inclined to agree." 
P. Alston (1984) op. cit. p.259.
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violated. In the case of the 'third generation', however, the task is 
difficult, if not impossible. A need for international cooperation is 
urgent and the relationship between these rights is greater. Van
Boven reminds us that:
It is absolute ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  that in an era of explosive 
population growth, exhaustion of natural resources, 
immense stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction 
and so-called conventional weapons, international 
coopera tion  in such areas as disarm am ent, 
development, ecology and human rights is a sine-qua  
non for survival.38
In this respect the United Nations has been organizing different 
programmes to respond to the challenges of the major current isues. 
The 29th Graduate Study Programme held in Geneva, July 1991 
under the title "United Nations: International Response to Global 
Issues", which the author attended, discussed development, 
disarmament, environment and human rights as the major issues and 
their interdependence.
Undoubtedly, the rights of the 'third generation' have created 
more ambiguity surrounding the concept of human rights and 
widened its scope. It goes without saying that from a moral point of 
view they can be claimed as human rights, but they are too vague in
scope and application. Stephen Marks stresses that:
It is frequently said that the rights of the new 
generation are too vague to be justifiable and are no 
more than slogans, at best for advancing laudable 
goals of the UN, at worst useful for the propaganda of 
certain countries.39
Whether they are slogans for propaganda, or to advance the
38-T. Van Boven (1989) op. cit. pp. 133-4.
39-S. P. Marks (1981) op. cit. p.451.
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debate within the United Nations, one cannot deny their challenges 
and their threats to the human person. Mankind is faced more than 
ever before with the prospect of self-extinction. The time has come 
for human rights to be looked at from a global point of view, and 
efforts should be joined together to face up to these challenges. That 
is what the rights of the 'third generation' try to address.40
Ill: The third generation of human rights on a cross­
national basis
One might suggest that the comparative study of human rights
might include these rights. If one is to select a list of variables in 
terms of which a comprehensive study of human rights is to be 
attempted, it has to include rights from the 'third generation', or may 
face some arbitrary exclusions.
However, before trying to conduct such a comparison, it would 
perhaps be appropriate to consider the quantification of these rights. 
Can one measure such rights? How does one apply these measures on 
a cross-national basis? Moreover, have they been used, especially in 
connection with the case studies undertaken in the next part of this 
dissertation, in the comparative study of human rights?
The rights of the 'third generation' are relatively easy to quantify. 
An exception must be made for the right to the common heritage of
mankind, and to a lesser extent the right to development. There are
40-It was pointed out earlier that apart from the right to development, other 
'rights' are ju st moral claims. There is enough ground to push the debate 
within the United Nations to take further steps in securing these Tights', 
however, as Philip Alston puts it: "Until the process of law-making has taken 
place, "new human rights" must remain in the realm of speculation." Philip 
Alston (1984) op. cit. p.259
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scientific methods whereby one can obtain precise statistics about 
the levels of air and water pollution. This will lead to the setting up
of minimum standards of achievement below which no country is
permitted to fall. It leaves no room for argument that historical and 
religious reasons, for instance, as is the case with the previous set of 
rights, play a significant role in determining this right. It does not 
take a lot to convince anybody that particular levels of pollution are 
intolerable and that the health of the people is at stake.
Therefore, in principle, it makes a comparative study of human
rights on a cross-national basis quite an easy task. Whichever 
country is less polluted, the healthier and ecologically more balanced 
its environment is, the better its human rights are. Nevertheless, the 
question is not as simple as might be seen for several reasons. First, 
some countries may set lower standards than others to attract
investment. As long as the minimum standard is achieved, they 
would not look far beyond that. Second, environmental problems that 
industrialised countries face are simply due to the levels of 
technology they reached, developing countries simply do not have 
the means to decrease the danger. Further, protection of the 
environment requires a well-informed population aware that every 
action has its consequences on the environment. This awareness is 
yet to reach the agenda of many Third World countries where 
poverty, illiteracy and hunger still prevail. Finally, and perhaps the 
most important of all, pollution of some countries may not be the 
fault of their own. It may be a result of natural disasters, or the 
actions of its neighbours. Switzerland provides the best example, 
where pollution is caused by neighbouring countries. Moreover, 
rivers crossing different countries add to this problem.
Given these circumstances, although it is plausible to imagine a
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ranking of countries on such grounds, it is doubtful if it could yield 
genuine and convincing results. Why should country A, for instance, 
be ranked below Y or Z at a time when the latter had high levels of 
pollution for reasons beyond their control? Further, a country lacking 
the technology to recycle and preserve the environment is bound to 
be near the bottom of the ladder.
One would apply the same measures to the right to peace as it is 
understood to focus only on the arms race and disarmament. Is it fair 
to suggest that the more a country produces arms, the less it 
observes human rights? There is no doubt about the relationship 
between armament and the right to peace, nonetheless, this would 
leave many of Third World countries outside the scope of 
comparison, and therefore they would benefit from such an exercise.
It goes without saying that every country violates human rights in 
term s of polluting the environm ent and producing arms. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the latter, only a handful of countries are 
capable of producing weapons of mass destruction. On what scale can 
one judge these countries? Furthermore, would not every country 
produce the same weapons if it had the means? While the most 
important question remains: is there enough information on this 
delicate issue to carry out a valid comparative study?
The aim of the foregoing discussion is not to deny how important 
such issues are in terms of human rights. Whether they are 
inalienable human rights or not is still a debatable question. What is 
certain is that they constitute very significant moral claims to be 
considered as such. However, applying them on a cross-national basis 
poses a lot of difficulties. How to obtain a ranking of countries? And 
upon what basis should the placing of these countries take place?
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It relatively easy to compare countries on the dimensions 
discussed above. The right to the common heritage of mankind poses 
some problems. However, these Tights' have yet to be combined and 
used to compare countries in terms of human rights. As far as the 
present author is aware, some of these have indeed been used, 
explicitly or implicitly, in different attempts to quantify human 
rights on a cross-national basis. I shall particularly look at this in 
connection with the different attempts discussed in the next part of 
this dissertation.
IV: Universaiism, relativism and human rights
As pointed out in the above discussion, it has been the general 
practice among scholars of human rights to group them into three 
competing perceptions: those of western, socialist and third world 
countries. Each perception is associated with one of the three 
generations of human rights. The western perception is associated 
with civil and political rights as is referred to as the first generation; 
the second generation includes economic, social and cultural rights 
and is associated with the socialist idea of human rights, and the 
third generation is associated with the perception of third world 
countries. It is usually argued that the idea of human rights is 
derived from the western liberal democratic heritage which have 
little, if any, relevance to other parts of the world. Others suggest 
that human rights should applicable anywhere regardless of place or 
tim e.
There are two major competing schools of thought in the ongoing 
debate on human rights: universalist and relativist.41 The former
41 -For a careful discussion see Douglas Lee Donoho, 'Relativism Versus
8 6
emphasizes the Universality of human rights and their applicability 
everyw here .
There is an emerging widespread consensus regarding definitions 
of human rights. This can be partly explained by the finding of 
anthropologists who suggested that some values can travel cross- 
culturally. Some practices such as torture and killings are condemned 
almost everywhere. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) has come to be accepted universally, and the rights it 
embodied should respected. Furthermore, the fact that the two 
International Covenant (1966) have been ratified by a growing 
number of countries suggests that the universality of human rights is 
an actuality. The preambles to these documents cite 'the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family' as the basis for human rights. In addition to these, the 
'socialist' concept of human rights, discussed in the second chapter, 
had begun, even before the end of communist rule, to incorporate 
much of the 'liberal' definition. They have come to accept the
western perception of human rights and steps have been taken to 
ensure the respect of many of the civil and political rights formerly 
denied. This undoubtedly led to a greater consensus on human rights 
and a more universal view.
However, relativist theorists (Renteln, 1990) argue that human 
rights are a social and historical phenomenon and therefore cannot
U niversalism  in Human Rights: The Search for M eaningful S tandards',
Standaford Journal o f  International Law , Vol. 27, No2, 1991 pp.345-91; Alison 
D. Renteln, In terna tional Human Rights. U niversalism  versus R elativ ism  
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1990); Jack Donnelly, 'Cultural Relativism and Human 
Rights' Human Rights Quarterly ; and Bogdan Denitch, After the Flood: World
P olitics and Democracy in the Wake of Communism (Hanover and London:
W esleyan University Press, 1992) pp.94-8.
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be explained outside their specific environment. If one recalls 
Cranston's test to judge the authenticity of human rights, he stressed 
that they should be universal , and concluded that 'human rights are 
moral rights of all people in every situation',42 then the universality 
stand can no longer stand. Morality is a practice that can be accepted, 
explained and justified in a given culture or society, which does not 
necessarily mean acceptance in another. Ruth Benedict, an American 
anthropologist, rightly concluded after observing the diversity of 
customs that 'morality differs in very society and is a convenient 
term for socially approved habits.’43 Anthropologists have long 
shown that some practices which cannot be accepted in some 
societies are followed in others. The diversity of cultural and political 
traditions between societies results in a diversity of values and 
positions vis-a-vis particular social practices. It goes without saying 
that some of the practices carried out in an Islamic state, for 
example, might be seen as barbaric in another country. However, 
they be accepted in the society in which they occur. 'Relativists 
suggest that the specific content depends upon the cultural, political 
and social characteristics of each country'.44 Moreover, the wording 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
as a matter of fact, suggests the relativist idea of human rights. The 
Covenant addresses states party to it with reference to their national 
economy, which may influence the extend to which they would 
guarantee the rights recognised in the Covenant. Moreover, the fact 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had 
provided, in article 4, for the states party to the Covenant to 'take
42-M aurice Cranston, 'Human Rights Real and Supposed' in D. D. Raphael (ed.) 
Political Theory and the Rights of Man. (London: Macmillan, 1967) pp.47-9.
43-A. D. Renteln, (1990) op.cit. p.66
44-D. L. Donoho, (1991) op. cit. p.368
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measures derogating from their obligations' is another argument in 
favour of the relativity of human rights.
In any case it is very difficult to take either side of the debate, as 
each approach has its strong arguments. What is clear however, is 
that most, if not, all, countries in the third world have come to take 
the relativist approach to human rights, sometimes it must be 
acknowledged as an excuse to violate these rights. The difficult 
economic and social conditions of these countries have a bearing on 
their economic records. On e may sympathise with these countries 
that because of practical difficulties some of the human rights are not 
provided for, however, poverty does not justify torture or extra­
judicial killings. On the other hand, by arguing that mankind is one 
and taking the inversalist approach one is bound to overlook the 
social, economic, religious and cultural factors which shape the 
conduct and morals of peoples in a given society.
Human rights, as we have seen, involve disputes about their 
proper uses and contents. It is an 'essentially contested concept'.45 
It is commonly used, for rhetorical and legitimation purposes, but 
still poorly understood. It can mean different things to different 
people, although it is very much associated with particular freedoms 
and needs. It does not describe something in particular, but refers to 
certain norms and values. In the next part of this dissertation, I shall 
conceive of the concept of human rights in normative terms. 
However, even though there are some values shared by different 
cultures, the approach leans more towards relativism  than 
universalism .
45-For a general discussion on this see William E. Connolly, The Term s of 
Political D iscourse, second edition, (oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983) pp.9-45.
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Introduction to part two
After a general discussion of the definitions and development of 
human rights, this part deals with some of the attempts that have 
been made to measure human rights, freedom and democracy on a 
cross-national basis. It should be pointed out at the beginning that 
two of these case studies have refrained from such a directly
comparative exercise: Amnesty International and the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee. For them this phenomenon cannot be
measured and they accordingly abstain from any attempt to do so.
Amnesty’s role is to publicise cases and pressurise governments to 
treat their citizens fairly. The Human Rights Committee, on the other 
hand, deals only with the states party to the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, under which the Committee was established. These 
states have accepted the rights of the Committee to examine their 
reports on compliance with the provisions of the Covenant, and to 
seek expert advice whenever it is needed.
Others, despite difficulties which will be discussed at a later
stage, have developed frameworks within which the measurement 
and therefore ranking of countries in terms of human rights, 
democracy and freedom on a cross-national national, and sometimes 
continuous, basis can be achieved. These include the work of Charles 
Humana, Robert Dahl, Kenneth Bollen, and Freedom House, each of 
which will be discussed in the second part of this dissertation.
The choice of these particular case studies has been made on 
several grounds: first of all they serve the purpose of this work -to 
assess the different attempts to measure human rights. Secondly, 
they are among the leading authorities on the subject: for instance,
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Amnesty’s reputation for impartiality is second to none, and Humana 
had, before his recent death, become an international authority on 
human rights whose work was adopted for its own purposes by the 
United Nations Development Program. Thirdly, they have different 
approaches to the subject: while some produce tables of rankings, 
others just publicise cases or help countries to comply with 
internationally binding documents. This is turn, enables to establish 
the most effective way in which the human rights situation in the 
world can be improved. Fourthly, the availability of information and 
especially primary material, and access to people involved with these 
case studies such as Professor Rosalyn Higgins, a member of the 
Human Rights Committee at the London School of Economics and 
Political science or the Director of the British Section of Amnesty 
International, dictated the selection of these cases rather than others.
Within these case studies I look at a number of countries: 
different countries in each case study. One may object to this and 
prefer the inclusion of the same countries in each case to assess the 
extent of differences, if any, within these case studies when dealing 
with the same country. This is a plausible option, however, the choice 
of different countries in each case study has been ,made for practical 
reasons. First, some countries, the United States of America to name 
just one, have not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and therefore cannot be included when looking at the 
work of the Human Rights Committee. Moreover, the first (1983) and 
the second (1986) edition of Charles Humana's study dealt with only 
75 and 89 countries respectively, and the choice of countries can 
only be taken from the countries he considered. Thirdly, the 
countries in question were chosen to redress the shortcomings from
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which any individual case study may suffer.
By taking these case studies and the different countries included 
in each, the aim is to demonstrate the limits attendant upon any 
exercise seeking to measure human rights on a cross-national basis. 
The differences in the approaches taken in the case studies help to 
establish the most effective way to achieve an overall improvement 
in the realisation of human rights, and finally, to draw attention to 
the lessons that can be learned from each of the case studies for 




In this chapter an attempt will be made to evaluate the work of 
Amnesty International and how useful it is in comparative politics. 
In other words, does Amnesty International offer a broad basis upon 
which it is possible to compare political systems in terms of human 
rights on a cross-national basis? And if it does not, how can one 
make the best use of the information provided by Amnesty 
International to compare political systems?
To answer these questions this chapter will be divided into four 
main sections. The first section deals with the origins of Amnesty 
International as well as its structure, with a view to determining 
whether the organization is really independent as it claims. Then, I 
discuss the mandate or the basis upon which its work is carried out, 
pointing out the difficulties that may arise whenever an issue is 
raised depending on the political culture and circumstances of each 
country. This is done in order to help the reader to better understand 
if the work of Amnesty is widely applicable. This will be seen in the 
third section when the case studies are considered. China, Nicaragua 
and the Middle East are examples of countries where it is difficult to 
apply Amnesty International criteria. In other words, they offer a 
real challenge to the work of Amnesty. The chapter concludes with 
an overview of the discussion from the perspective of comparative 
politics and the difficulties that will face the comparativist in 
conducting research and how the best possible use can be made of 
Amnesty's work.
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I: The origins and structure of Amnesty International
1-1: The origins of Amnesty International
Amnesty International is a worldwide, non-governm ental 
organization aiming to defend human rights. It was awarded the
Nobel Prize in 1977, for its work in this field. Amnesty International 
arose under the original name of "Appeal for amnesty 1961" in 
1961.1 The idea originated from a prominent lawyer named Peter
Benenson, who was very active in this cause. People were 
imprisoned, tortured or even killed because of the very simple
reason that they held different opinions from those of the state, at a 
time when there was not a treaty which curtailed or prohibited 
governments from carrying out such barbarous acts.^ It was an 
incident that took place in Portugal, during the days of Salazar's
dictatorship, that inspired Benenson to launch his appeal. Two 
students were arrested and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment 
solely for raising their glasses for freedom. Such incidents were, and 
indeed are, very common in many countries. Benenson protested 
outside the Portuguese Embassy in London, and decided to launch a 
campaign which aimed at pointing out the injustices occurring in the 
world. With the help of friends, "Appeal for amnesty 1961" was
1-Power suggests that "1961 seemed a good year to launch his effort. It was 
the centenary of the freeing of the slaves in the United States and the Serfs in 
Russia." J. Power, A m n es ty  International. The Human Rights Storv (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1983) p. 10.
2 -”W hen Amnesty International was launched in 1961, apart from the Geneva 
conventions that apply in time of war, there was not a single universal treaty 
obliging states to give fair trials to their citizens or prohibiting torture or 
protecting the very right of life." Amnesty International Report 1986 (London: 
Amnesty International, 1986) p. 1.
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launched, after an article was published in the Sunday newspaper 
"The Observer" in May, 1961 entitled "the forgotten prisoners". In 
this article Benenson highlighted the cases of eight people from 
different countries who had been imprisoned because of their 
political opinions. It was an amazing idea that worked; a prisoner 
could be released by writing letters and applying pressure on the 
government involved. In part, this tactic was chosen because of the
British traditions in which Amnesty was born.
The civil protest of Benenson was in part of a ce rta in  
British jud ic ia l trad ition , where a long and 
consolidated practice of individual rights had received 
a definitive acceptance by the collective consciousness
of the people.^
Nevertheless, what began as a one year campaign, based on 
moral values, to put an end to such practices and publicize them 
whenever they existed, soon developed into an organization after the 
general international concern and attention it received. Soon 
different Amnesty International sections had spread throughout 
Europe, beginning in what was then West Germany. Moreover, after 
only eight weeks since its official birth, delegates from Western 
Europe and North America^ met in Luxembourg to decide about 
the future of their movement. They realised that the movement 
should not be limited to a one year campaign but had to develop into 
a permanent movement, bringing injustices to the attention of people 
and working on behalf of those wrongly imprisoned. Moreover, it had 
to change its name to Amnesty International^ in order to reflect
3-Speciale La STAMPA Anno 122 Suppl. redaz. de LA STAMPA n. 196, 8 Settembre 
1988.
4-This includes Britain, France, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and the United 
States of America.
5-"The appeal quickly attracted international support and within a few short
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its new status. By the end of that year, there were Amnesty sections 
in different countries with their headquarters in London.
The organization passed through different crises and tensions in 
the mid 1960s which could have had fatal consequences for its 
future. For example, the black African leader Nelson Mandela was 
imprisoned in 1962 and adopted by Amnesty as a "prisoner of 
conscience". However, two years later, when he was charged with 
sabotage, Amnesty decided not to adopt him as a "prisoner of 
conscience" in order to safeguard this term. He advocated violence 
and, according to Amnesty standards, did not have the right of 
adoption. However, it had to make sure that he would have a fair 
trial.
The discovery of the involvement of the British government in 
helping the organization financially could have killed the movement. 
Peter Benenson became very suspicious of his friends, thinking they
were part of British Intelligence who were infiltrating the
o rg an iza tio n .^  This had negative effects on the work of Amnesty 
as its leadership split. At the same time there was tension in the 
relations between Amnesty and the Foreign Office over Amnesty's 
report on a former British colony, Aden.
This led to a meeting in Denmark in March 1967, in which the 
executive accepted the resignation of Peter Benenson, although he 
did not attend because of his involvement in the arrangement 
between Amnesty and the British government. The post of president 
which had been occupied by Benenson was abolished, and the new
m onths the ground work was laid for a perm anent organization that
eventually  became known as Amnesty International." A m n e s ty  International 
1961-1976. A Chronology (London: Amnesty International, 1976) p.2.
6-J. Power (1983) op cit. pp. 16-17.
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post of Director-General (later changed to Secretary-General) was 
created.^
Nevertheless, the organization survived these challenges and 
grew and expanded over the years, especially in the mid 1970s due 
largely to the protest associated with the Vietnam War. The ill-
treatment reported in different countries made thousands of people 
believe in the goals of Amnesty and they joined its campaign. This, in 
turn, led to the expansion of the fields or countries investigated, such 
as China or Nicaragua, where the first missions and reports were 
carried out in the mid 1970s.^
What began as a small movement became an organization of 
more than 700,000 members, subscribers and supporters in almost
every country. This number increased over time because of the
efforts made by the organization in raising peoples' consciousness 
about their rights. The International Rock Tour "Human Rights Now!" 
which began on 2 September, 1988 in London, which comprised 
different countries in the four corners of the world, was instrumental 
in raising many peoples' consciousness and won them over to
Amnesty's side. At each concert, the text of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was read and distributed. Moreover, Amnesty
International has established sections and local groups throughout 
the world. In May 1991, for instance, Amnesty was authorized to
open an office in M o sco w .^ Different groups are working on behalf 
of prisoners from different ideological and geographical backgrounds. 
Amnesty does not recognise any boundaries while carrying out its
7-Ibid., p. 17.
8-Interview  o f the author with M arie Staunton, D irector of the British 
section, Amnesty International, London. Monday, 24 April 1989.
9-David W. Benn, From Glasnost to Freedom of Expression. Russian Openess




A m nesty In ternational has developed into a complex 
organization which continues its battle against human rights 
violations. This complexity can be seen in the organization's 
struc tu re .
1-2: The structure of Amnesty
Diagram (4) 1 provides a concise summary of Amnesty's
structure. It consists of the following:
1-2-1: Amnesty International's sections and groups
At the bottom of the structural hierarchy of the organization are 
Amnesty International's sections and groups which are recognized by 
the International Executive Committee. However, it should be pointed 
out that there are some local groups even in countries where there 
are no sections. These groups can be set up by applying for further 
information from either the Amnesty International section or from 
the International Secretariat in London. There are more than 6000 
Amnesty groups in more than 70 countries. ^  They usually consist 
of 10 to 15 members whose main task is to work on behalf of
10-"A m nesty  In te rn a tio n a l acco rd ing ly  recogn izes no re s tric tio n s  or 
frontiers when working for the release of individual prisoners. It rejects 
charges that such action is 'interference in the international affairs' of that 
state in question, just as it rejects an attempted justification of torture and 
other form s of ill-treatment on the grounds of governmental expediency." M. 
G arling , The Human Rights Handbook: A Guide To British and American 
International Human Rights Organizations (London: Macmillan, 1979) p. 8.
11-A m n es ty  In te rn a tio n a l. A m nesty In terna tiona l R eport 1992 (London:
A m nesty International, 1992)
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individual prisoners. Their organizations differ from one group to 
another in a manner which they think will achieve better results, as 
long as the statutes and the goals of Amnesty International are 
observed.












1 J n  more than 40 countries A. I. membership is organized 
into sections with locally elected governing bodies.
2_Voting delegates from the sections meet at the Interna­
tional Council to decide the movement policy and budget. 
3_The International Executive Committee is elected by 
council. It governs the movement between council meetings. 
4_The Secretary-General is appointed by the Executive Com 
mittee to run the day-to-day afairs of A. I. and heads the In­
ternational Secretariat.
5_  The International Secretariat collects information about 
prisoners, coordinates worldwide publicity and campaings 
and advices the groups and members in their work.
Source, Amnesty International Handbook, 6th edition, Amnesty 
International Publications,1983, London.P.23.
Sections, however, as we have seen, now exist in more than 70 
countries. They are of great importance to the work of Amnesty. 
They publicize its goals, increase peoples' awareness and engage in 
fund-raising. Their size depends on the country in which they 
operate. They might have a central headquarters and different
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regional offices, or just a few m em bers.^  In carrying out their 
work, sections can appoint either one person or a group to act as 
country coordinators or coordination groups. Their main task is to 
coordinate efforts of the work in one specific country or one special 
part of the world. In other words, they play a key role between the 
Research Department in the International Secretariat, London, and 
different sections throughout the world to produce high quality and 
accurate reports about the countries that are chosen for 
investigation. Coordination is viewed as one of the major tasks of 
Amnesty's work. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that these 
sections and groups are not allowed to work on behalf of prisoners in 
their own countries. In this way, Amnesty attempts to make its work 
more "o b jec tiv e" .^  Moreover, professional groups such as doctors 
and lawyers may help these sections in working on behalf of 
different individual cases. Furthermore, these sections send delegates 
to the International Council.
1.2.2: The International Council
The International Council used to meet every year. However, 
from 1983 onwards it decided to meet every two years. About two to 
three hundred delegates or representatives of all the national 
sections attend the International Council, which is a democratically 
elected governing body and the only body which has the authority to
12-"All sections have an executive committee or national board elected by the 
m em bers. It is responsible, either d irectly  or through an o ffice , for 
coord inating  and adm inistrating the activities of the Amnesty International 
members and groups in that country or territory." Ibid., p. 25.
1 3 -"T hese groups of private individuals work on behalf of up to three 
political prisoners- always selected from contrasting backgrounds and never 
from the group's own country." M. Garling (1979) op.cit. p. 9.
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decide the movement's future policy. The International Council 
reviews the activities of the past two years, sets the plans for what is 
to be done for the next ones and approves the budget. Moreover, it 
elects eight members, including a treasurer, to the International 
Executive Committee.
1-2-3: The International Executive Committee
This Committee consists of nine elected persons, seven 
representing different Amnesty sections or countries, a treasurer, 
and a further member representing the staff of the International 
Secretariat. Apart from the latter who is only eligible for two years, 
all the others are eligible for two years renewable up to three 
m andates.
The Committee is the main governing body between two council 
meetings. It meets four or five times a y e a r .^  It is responsible for 
implementing decisions taken by the International Council, and for 
discussing missions, publications and how to approach governments. 
Among its members, it elects its senior staff. Therefore, elections 
have been seen as one of the major tools through which Amnesty 
tries to safeguard its independence and im partia lity .^  Moreover, 
since the mid 1960s, all Amnesty finances are carefully controlled 
and scrutinized to avoid any governmental in v o lv em en t.^  Its
14-"The International Executive Committee normally meets four times a year" 
A m nesty International Handbook (1983) op. cit. p. 26. See also J. Power (1983) 
op. cit. p. 24 when he states that:"It meets as often as necessary, usually four or 
five times."
15-Interview source, note 8 above. A sample of these elections could be seen 
in those who hold the post of General-Secretary. Up to 1981 there were: Irish, 
G erm an, Swede, Chilean.
16-"No government donations can be accepted by any part of the movement,
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budget is controlled either by the International Council or the 
International Executive Committee, and the treasurer is responsible 
for its expenditure. The records are always kept and are available for 
public inquiry.
The International Executive Committee can set up international 
specialist advisory committees to help it in carrying out its work, 
such as the financial control committee or the medical advisory 
board.
1-2-4: The International Secretariat
This is the headquarters of the movement based in London. It
began in Peter Benenson's office and developed into a complex 
secretariat with more than 250 paid staff from more than 40 
countries. There has been a lot of argument about moving it from 
London to a neutral country. Benenson, even after he retired, still 
believed that the Secretariat should not be based in London.
However, because of the wide range of activities that London offers, 
the Secretariat, it was thought, should remain there.
Although it seems that much of the work is carried out by the 
local groups throughout the world, nonetheless, it is the International 
Secretariat which makes the crucial decisions and keeps the 
international sections and local groups up to date when gathering 
inform ation, and gives directives to them. The International 
Secretariat is divided into different departments, which are
nor can governm ent money be sought for in terna tional budget...T he
International Executive Committee must be notified for all the donations to
sections that amount to more than five percent of their annual income." 
Amnesty International Handbook (1983) op. cit. p. 34.
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highlighted in the following table. Then, the roles performed by them 
will be briefly discussed.
1-2-4-1: Secretary-General Office
The Secretary-General and his deputy are responsible for the 
everyday activities of the organization. They are involved in making 
public statem ents, and give guidance on how to approach 
governments. The Secretary-General implements decisions of both 
the International Council and the International Executive Committee, 
and heads the International Secretariat. His office is involved in 
coordinating different departments within the Secretariat. In doing 
so, it benefits from the help of two specialized units: the legal office 
and the documentation centre.












The Structure of the International Secretariat.
Source: Amnesty International Handbook, op. cit. p.28.
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Legal Office:This gives advice about international human rights 
standards and different legal q u e s t i o n s ,  whether they concern 
Amnesty’s statute or the interpretation of the standards that the 
organization tries to safeguard.
The D ocum entation C entre: is the main point where all the 
information is kept. All Amnesty's work is based upon different 
information gathered about prisoners or countries, so that it can act 
on their behalf or confront governments with their findings. All 
information whether produced by the Secretariat itself or different 
sections and other organizations is kept in this centre. Different 
information is supplied whenever it is needed in the form of 
archives, video-tapes, or library references.
1-2-4-2: R esearch  D epartm en t
Research is crucial to the whole work of Amnesty. The Research 
Department, therefore, plays a significant role in enhancing the 
quality of the work produced since it is involved from the first act of 
collecting information to its publication. Great care is taken in 
analyzing and verifying the information obtained to distinguish 
between facts and allegations. All information presented about 
torture, ill-treatm ent and capital punishment is, according to 
Amnesty, ac cu ra te .^  From the information available it decides who 
can be named and adopted as a "prisoner of conscience", then passes 
it to different sections to work on the person’s behalf with the 
relevant instructions and guidance. The Research Department is 
divided into five sections or divisions (on a geographical base) and
17-Ibid., p. 29.
18-Interview source, note 8 above.
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each division covers a different part of the world. These include 
Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe and the Middle East. Each division 
is analysed through annual reports produced by Amnesty. This 
allows each division to work on a particular geographic area to 
produce more specialized and accurate accounts. The Research 
Department also has a wide-ranging network of contacts, as well as 
making proposals about the distribution of relief and helping 
prisoners and their families.
1-2-4-3: Campaign and Membership
This department has the task of liaising with different Amnesty 
International sections, groups and members worldwide to coordinate 
their actions or to ask for urgent action whenever it is needed. 
M oreover, it has the task of seeking support and increasing 
Amnesty’s membership in other parts of the world, apart from 
w estern  countries where its membership is overwhelm ingly 
concentrated .
1-2-4-4: Press and Publications Department
This Department is responsible for Amnesty's relations with the 
press and the distribution of Amnesty International’s Newsletter. It 
is in constant contact with different Amnesty sections to assist them 
in their efforts to publicize the work of the movement. Although the 
official languages of the movement are English, French and Spanish, 
this department is responsible for translating publications and 




This department has the task of managing the office and the 
financial procedures. It is responsible for training new personnel, 
and arranging travel when a mission is to be carried out.
The preceding structural explanation of Amnesty International's 
hierarchy is necessary to understand the work of this organization 
and the extent of its impartiality. The subject of the following section 
will be Amnesty International's mandate.
II: Amnesty International: The mandate
This section focuses on Amnesty International's mandate. In 
other words, on the basis upon which the organization operates in 
carrying out its work. One has to understand the mandate in order to 
better understand Amnesty International's work. Furthermore, this 
is necessary background to issues which will be raised later in this 
chapter.
Amnesty has limited itself to certain aspects of human rights 
violations worldwide, and works within these set limits. These 
aspects are as follows:
2-1: To free prisoners of conscience
In the early 1960s, when Peter Benenson wrote his article
entitled "the forgotten prisoners", he stated that:
Open your newspaper any day of the week, and you
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will find a report from somewhere in the world of 
someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed 
because his opinions or religion are unacceptable to his
government.* ^
Nevertheless, even today, more than three decades since 
Benenson wrote his article, the same abuses and kinds of reports are 
to be found daily. Moreover, such practices are likely to continue in 
the light of the different political, social and economic circumstances 
of different countries.
Amnesty, nonetheless, is trying to decrease this practice by 
demanding the unconditional release of all the prisoners it has 
characterized as "prisoners of conscience."
It should be pointed out from the beginning that there is not a 
generally agreed definition of "prisoners of conscience". Although 
Amnesty tries to define it, there remains some ambiguity. According 
to Amnesty International, "a prisoner of conscience" is someone who 
has been imprisoned because of holding opinions contrary to those of 
the state, providing that he/she did not advocate violence.
However, whether a person has advocated violence or not in 
expressing his/her thoughts is not the only determinant factor to 
judge whether a person should be considered "a prisoner of 
conscience". It is well understood that Amnesty tries to protects this 
concept by isolating it from any violent or criminal behaviour, so it 
can work on behalf of any person whenever it hears of anyone being 
imprisoned. If a person has advocated violence, he/she will be 
considered as "law breaker" or "criminal" by his/her government, 
and therefore, there will be no room for Amnesty to act since the
19-L. A. Sobel, Political Prisoners. A World Report. Facts on the File (New 
York: Amnesty International, 1978) pp. 1-2. See also F. E. Dowrick, ed., H u m an  
R ights, problems and perspectives and texts (Aldershot: Gower, 1979) p. 125.
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person is convicted and sentenced because of his violent acts. It is a 
question of heads you lose, tails I win on the part of these 
governments. One faces a situation where hundreds of people are 
jailed or tortured solely for expressing their views, whereas their 
governments claim that they did so because they are trouble makers, 
and different organizations, among them Amnesty, close their eyes in 
order to safeguard their image as respectable organizations which do 
not support "terrorist acts". However the minimum Amnesty claims 
that it will make sure that everybody has a fair trial. Nelson Mandela 
is an example par excellence of a prisoner who was not considered as 
a"prisoner of conscience" because he was convicted of sabotage in 
1964. At the same time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which Amnesty seeks to implement, does recognize the use of 
violence as a last resort.^ ®
Therefore, a prisoner of conscience, according to Amnesty 
International, is characterized by the non-use of violence and 
imprisoned because of his/her opinions. But is the definition 
adequate and can one rely on Amnesty's literature? In other words, 
are "prisoners of conscience" defined in this way only in Amnesty's 
publications? The answer of course is no. This term has been used to 
describe some people being captured, tortured by mistake, or 
because of their family ties with a genuine "prisoner of
20-A m ong its purposes "Amnesty International seeks observance throughout 
the world of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
UN Standard M inimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners." See Amnesty's 
C harter in its various publications. However, according to the preamble of the 
U niversal declaration of Human Rights, C. Desmond reminds us that the 
D eclaration "recognizes that if human rights are not protected by law, then 
men will be com pelled, as a last resort to rebel against repression and 
tyranny." C. Desmond, Persecution East and West. Human Rights. Political 
Prisoners and Amnesty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983) p. 48.
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conscience."Although Amnesty insists on not adopting or considering 
people imprisoned by mistake as "prisoners of conscience",^ * a 
very convincing example of that could be found in one of Amnesty's
publications itself, which states that:
In El Salvador, two married couples and their young 
children are staying in a friend's house while she is 
away, when uniformed members of the security forces 
burst in, demanding to know where the friend is. They 
tortured the adults in front of the children, then beat 
the screaming children-one aged five-before taking all 
to San Salvador's central barracks. Some days later the 
children are found in a juvenile reform center. The 
adults have "disappeared", they became prisoners of 
22consc ien ce .^
In this case, there is no indication of the political or ideological 
beliefs of the two adults. Nobody knows whether their opinions are 
opposed to the state or not, or even whether they have any political 
opinions at all. If one knows a wanted or a "suspicious" person then it 
does not follow that one shares their opinions. If the owner of the 
house, in the case above, could be classified as a "prisoner of 
conscience", this does not mean in any case that their friends would 
be. All it says is that they were at the wrong place at the wrong time 
and considered by Amnesty as "prisoners of conscience". In this 
example, their conscience has nothing to do with their being 
im prisoned.
In line with this analysis, the adoption of anybody imprisoned
solely because of his ideas without any use of violence could give rise
to different violations of human rights through the widespread
advocacy of racist ideas. An Amnesty spokesman has said that:
They would adopt as a prisoner of conscience a person
21-Interview  source, note 8 above
22-C. Desmond (1983), op. cit. p. 47.
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imprisoned for expressing racist views, provided only 
he/she had not advocated violence.^ 3
This could be a real threat to some other aspects of human rights
in today's world, especially in a European context, after the
reemergence of extreme right wing groups in Western Europe. What 
would have been the fate of hundreds of thousands of people in 
France, especially from North Africa, for instance, if a man like J. M. 
lePen, leader of the National Front, notorious because his racist ideas,
had won the presidential elections in France? Let us assume that he
was imprisoned at a time because of his racist ideas -although it is 
highly unlikely to happen in a country like France where freedom of 
expression is guaranteed. Further, he was adopted by Amnesty as a 
prisoner of conscience, since he fitted the standards and was then 
freed. As President he would have deported almost every immigrant 
worker under his famous slogan "La France pour les Fran^ais." Then 
the question to be asked here is, what would have been the position
of Amnesty International in regard of such violations? Once again,
one can find that there is an antagonism between the provisions of 
the Universal D eclaration of Human Rights and the other 
international instruments that Amnesty tries to implement on the 
one hand, and its work in practice on the other.
Not only is the term "prisoner of conscience" ambiguous and the 
criteria by which it is defined not clear cut or widely acceptable, but 
some political considerations could be involved in making such a 
judgement. Anybody who is in a psychiatric hospital in the West can 
be considered as just mad, but a similar patient in the former Soviet 
Union could have been considered as a "prisoner of conscience",24
23-Ibid., p. 50.
24-In terv iew  source, note 8 above. The Director of the British Section assured
1 1 1
regardless of the norms of the society or its laws25 and the 
historical, economic situation of the country.
Moreover, Amnesty seeks "the unconditional release of all 
prisoners of conscience" by publicizing their cases and working on 
their behalf,26 and it proclaimed 1977 "a prisoner of conscience
y ear."27 Nonetheless, such an unconditional release is considerably 
difficult to be achieved world wide since it depends on the will of 
governments themselves.
2-2: The death penalty
The death penalty is the very first violation of human rights, and
all other rights depend on the right to life. It would be absurd to
speak about the rights of the people, regardless if they were
the author that there have been some standards widely accepted, developed by 
the W orld Psychiatric Association. And it is these standards that Amnesty takes 
into consideration when dealing with cases.
2 5 - 'Under the Soviet law if you are said to have committed a crime and if at the 
same time that there is a reason to believe that you were not or are not in your 
right senses or were not at the same time of committing it, then your
psychiatric examination must be ordered." F. E. Dowrick ed., (1979). op. cit. p. 
130.
2 6 -A petition signed by more than one m illion people who called for the
release o f all prisoners of conscience held in any country, presented on 8 
D e c e m b e r ,  1983, by Amnesty International to General Assembly President
Jorge E. Illueca and United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
stated that: "Thousands of men and women are in prison throughout the world 
solely because of their political or religious beliefs. Others are held because of 
their colour or ethnic origin. These are prisoners of conscience-none has used 
or advocated violence.
None o f these people should be in prison. The fact that they have been 
arrested  and punished because of their beliefs or origins is an affront to
hum anity. They should be freed unconditionally." U.N. Chronicle Feb. 1984, 
Vol. xxi, Number 2. p.53.
27-L. A. Sobel (1978) op. cit. p .l.
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economic, social or political, if the right to life is threatened. 
Therefore, Amnesty International is totally opposed to it. Thomas
Hammarberg, a former director of the British Section, stated that:
Amnesty International is committed by its statute to 
oppose by all appropriate means the imposition and 
infiltration of the death penalty, on the ground that it 
violates the right to life and that it is the most cruel, 
inhuman and degrading of all forms of punishment.28
However, if Amnesty International does not believe in capital 
punishment and works for its total abolition, it does not offer an 
alternative that would be applicable. Some argue, among them 
Amnesty International, that the death penalty is a barbaric act and 
one of the most cruel punishment, however, others see that imposing 
it is sometimes the only punishment that meets the crime committed. 
Moreover, there is no genuine alternative punishment to it that 
satisfy both parties, i.e., Amnesty International on the one hand 
insists that the death penalty should no longer be carried out, and on 
the other hand society demands that the crime committed receives 
the appropriate punishment. This issue has been raised with 
Amnesty 29 and the organisation thinks that the outcome will very 
much depend on the situation and the country itself, though life 
imprisonment is a viable alternative. However, if the alternative docs 
depend on the country itself, the abolition or implementation of the 
death penalty depends as well on the situation of the country and its 
particularities whether inspired from its beliefs, because of the 
political instability and the general situation in which the sentence is 
imposed to be a threat to the others. To emphazise its total abolition
28-A m nesty  In ternational R eport, The Death Penalty (L ondon: Amnesty 
International, 1979) p .l.
29-Interview source, note 8 above.
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represents Amnesty’s viewpoint, but does not necessarily represent 
the views of different countries. Some leaders believe in its cruelty 
and their desire to abolish it, nonetheless it is recognised to be a
necessity in some instances. Amnesty states that:
Colonel Qaddafi called for the death penalty to be
abolished and replaced with life imprisonment. In
1985 he expressed his personal opposition to the 
death penalty as a cruel punishment but that it should 
be used in certain cases.30
To believe that life imprisonment is a genuine alternative to the 
death penalty is to create some controversies about the situation of 
the people im prisoned. Moreover, people sentenced to life
imprisonment might benefit from the general amnesties whenever 
presidential elections are won or a human rights day is celebrated.
There is much controversy about the use of the death penalty. A 
lot of errors can happen, and many people can be wrongly convicted. 
Some countries do implement the death penalty because of their
internal situations, others because of their traditions and beliefs, as 
will be seen later in the case studies.
Nevertheless, one should be objective in determining whether 
the death penalty is a violation of human rights or not. In other 
words, do countries which have abolished it have better human 
rights records than those which have not? Moreover, should it be
abolished in the first place or not?
Some think, among them Amnesty International, that the 
abolition of the death penalty is a very significant step in observing 
human rights. However, it would be better if it remained for some
cases. It is absurd that capital punishment is carried out in some
3 0 - A m n estv  I n te rn a t io n a l  Journal of the B ritish Section of Amnesty 
International No. 33, June/July 1988. p. 3.
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countries such as China, to name just one, for a wide range of 
offenses which do not deserve this sentence, but that it should 
remain in some cases as a warning for others to decrease the rate of 
crimes above all. It should not be carried out as mass killings such as 
in Iran or as rally killings in China. A mass killer does not deserve 
less than capital punishment for the crimes he/she committed 
regardless of whether Amnesty thinks that his/her country does not 
observe human rights. The right of the collective should come before 
the right of a person in this case. How important is his life compared 
to the lives of the collective? And to some extent this is the reason 
behind different opinions advocating the use of the death penalty.
2-3: A prompt and fair trial
It should be pointed out from the beginning that Amnesty 
International seeks a fair and prompt trial for all political prisoners, 
which in one way or another relates to the major area of freeing 
"prisoners of conscience."
Amnesty International distinguishes between a "prisoner of 
conscience" as discussed earlier and a political prisoner. The latter is 
someone who has been imprisoned because of his beliefs and 
opinions while advocating violence.31 If a person has advocated 
violence, Amnesty would not have the credibility to ask for his 
r e le a s e ,32 but only for fair a trial. The question is how can this 
fairness be achieved?
Amnesty believes that a prisoner should have a solicitor and be 
tried in public. It relies on the expertise of its representative through
31-Interview source, note 8 above.
3 2 -Ib id .
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missions. Missions are frequently sent to different countries to 
observe trials. They are always public since Amnesty does not 
believe in clandestine missions. The delegates are forbidden from 
talking to the press, and urged to declare themselves to the 
authorities and the judges in the courtroom.33 Such practices have 
proved very successful in ensuring fair trials.
Nevertheless, the differences between the criminal codes and 
their ambiguity make the task very difficult to state whether a trial 
was fair or not. A person convicted under article 70 of the R.S.F.S.R. 
criminal code,34 for instance, could be considered to have had a fair 
trial from the former Soviet point of view, but not from Amnesty’s. 
Then, the question to be asked is: "What are the main criteria upon 
which one might suggest that the trial was fair or not?"
There are acceptable general principles of fairness that can be 
applied generally, e.g., presumption of innocence, equality before the 
law and the right to a defence lawyer, upon which one can judge 
whether a trial was fair or not. However, what is fair is what can find 
its justification in the general opinion which believes in that practice, 
which, in turn, finds its acceptance rooted in the social system as a
33-"A m nesty  In ternational does not send secret m issions to trials and 
therefore a trial observer will be expected to declare his or her presence to the 
court and inform both prosecution and defense of Amnesty International's 
interest." Am nesty In ternational. Journal of the British Section, op. cit. p. 13.
34-Article 70, section 1 of the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R. stated (until 1991) 
that: "Agitation and propaganda carried out with the purpose of subverting or 
w eakening the Soviet regime or in order to commit particularly dangerous 
crim es against the State, the dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous 
inventions declamatory to the Soviet political or social system or production or 
harboring  for the said purposes and literature o f sim ilar content, are 
punishable by imprisonment for a period of from six months to seven years 
and with exile from two to five years, or without exile, or by exile from two to 
five years." D. Lane, State and Politics in the U.S.S.R (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1985) p. 273.
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whole. In other words, what is fair is what finds its acceptance and 
response from the public in a particular area in a given period of 
time. And, given the diversity of societies and cultures, what could 
be considered as fair in one country, cannot perhaps be considered as 
such from another point of view or in another country.
Ill:  Case studies
The choice of countries that are included as case studies has not 
been an easy task. The countries chosen should be from a different 
political and ideological background than that in which Amnesty 
International has developed. Although Amnesty claims to be 
independent and does not support any political or economic system, 
nonetheless, the choice of countries should help us to gain a better 
understanding of the work of this organization in a different context. 
First of all the choice of a Communist country should be unavoidable, 
because it has a different perception and priorities in terms of 
human rights than those which Amnesty tries to defend. In this 
context, the former U.S.S.R. could have been the most natural choice 
since it is the leading country in experiencing "communism", and a 
great deal of literature, especially Amnesty's publications, are 
available on its record. However, as pointed out in the previous 
sections, Amnesty International tries to implement the provisions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its work is based 
especially on pointing out the gulf between what countries commit 
themselves to do, and what they then do in reality. Garling states 
that:
By approaching governments from the angle of their 
own prior commitments, Amnesty International has a
1 17
moral leverage through which to press for the release 
of individuals or the redress of particular injustices.35
Since the former U.S.S.R. ratified the two International 
Covenants, China could offer, to some extent, the same characteristics 
but did not ratify either of the instruments. It is thus not legally 
bound to observe their provisions. Moreover, it has its own 
perception of human rights, and it is the most populous country in 
the world, which make its inclusion in this study desirable in itself.
The second country chosen is Nicaragua, the choice was made for 
political reasons, and most notably for the instability of the political 
system. Nicaragua has experienced a great deal of human rights 
violations under the dynasty of the Somoza family, and it would be 
interesting to see how the revolutionary government under 
president Daniel Ortega has tried to cope with the pressure.
The last case study will focus on the backward countries in the 
Middle East. These countries provide a unique environment in which 
Amnesty International works. The influence of Islam, especially on 
the death penalty, is of paramount importance and how a 
compromise between Amnesty's and Islam's view on the matter is 
reached will be discussed.
3-1: China
First of all, it should be pointed out that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to have a clear picture of the human rights situation in 
China, at least till the late 1970s. It was only after the death of 
Chairman Mao and the relaxation of Chinese politics through "the 
Beijing Spring", that Amnesty International produced its first full
35-M. Garling (1979) op.cit. p. 8.
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repo rt.
China was generally agreed to have had one of the worst records 
of human rights violations, especially during the decade of "the 
Cultural Revolution", about which little information was available at 
the time.36 The difficulties in assessing the human rights situation in 
China are practical. It is the most populous country in the world, and 
yet the flow of information is almost non-existent -though there has 
been some improvement in the 1980s as will be seen later. The 
diversity of the country and the issues to be analysed as well as the 
strict control on freedom of movement and granting visas to 
foreigners add to these difficulties. Moreover, China has its own 
perception of human rights and does not believe in international 
standards. To apply Amnesty International's standards to China was
therefore to invite discord. Roberta Cohen argues that:
Its [the Chinese] official conception of human rights 
markedly diverges from that of the West. Specifically 
it does not accept "western human rights standards"... 
China's own concept of human rights sharply differs 
from those in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights... its authorities have had to give precedence to 
food, shelter, health care and education over the other 
rights.37
Nevertheless, the situation in China began to change after the
36-A ccording to Fang Lizhi, the Chinese Sakharov, "[T]he true record of 
human rights in China has been hidden: the Chinese authorities have blocked 
any communication about it. Some have been misled into believing that China 
has been free of human rights violations." Fang Lizhi, "China is a World 
Problem ", Index on Censorship Vol 21 No 8 September 1992 p.2. However, the 
C hinese authorities acknowledged, in 1981, that "[A] total of 729,511 were 
fram ed and persecuted... of whom 34,800 were persecuted to death." A Great 
Trial in Chinese History (Beijing: New World Press, 1981) p.20
37-R. Cohen, "The Peoples Republic of China. The human rights exception" 
H u m a n  Rights Quarterly 9 (1987) p. 464.
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death of Mao. The dark years of the Cultural Revolution have been 
highlighted and different figures about the people who suffered have 
been offered. Thousands of people were granted retrials.3 8 
Moreover, there was a moment of relatively free expression during 
the "Beijing Spring", which unfortunately did not last for long.
What should be mentioned in this period is that the Chinese 
adopted two different constitutions (1978 and 1982) and more 
significantly changes occurred in the judicial apparatus. The adoption 
of a new criminal code in 1979, which came into effect on 1s t  
January, 1980 was seen as a significant step forward by the Chinese 
leadership in the building of a "socialist democracy". This criminal 
code was intended to increase the protection of citizens from 
persecution and arbitrary detention, in order to put an end to the 
years of "law lessness" that had characterized the Cultural 
R evolu tion .39 However, the question to be asked here is not whether 
the Chinese had developed measures to respect their citizens' rights, 
but how far did they go to respect the measures themselves? In 
other words, is there a gap between the official commitment of the
38-Jam es Seym our, "China" In J. D onnelly , and R. E. Howard, eds., 
International Handbook o f Human Rights (New York: Greenwood, 1987) states 
that: "By the end of 1981, 1.2 million criminal cases of Mao's era had been 
reviewed, and 326,000 people were granted retrials" p. 80. See also, Amnesty 
International report, Political Imprisonment In the People's Republic of China 
(London: Amnesty International, 1978) :"since 1977 the Chinese official press 
has published a number of cases where violations of human rights committed
in the People's Republic o f China (P.R.C.) during the past ten years have been
redressed" (p. ix).
39-A m nesty  In te rn a tio n a l R eport China: V io la tions o f Human Rights.
Prisoners of Conscience and the Death Penalty in the People's Republic of 
C h in a  (London: A m nesty International, 1984) states that: "Since 1979 the
People's Republic of China has adopted a number of laws in an effort both to
build up a legal system and to put an end to the"lawlessness" which had 
prevailed during the Cultural Revolution." p. 6.
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Chinese government, i.e. the constitution and the criminal law, and 
what is happening in reality? Did the old practices continue despite 
of the adoption of the new measures?
According to official policy and the official statements by the 
Chinese government, the question of human rights does not arise in 
the country. A Foreign Ministry spokesman questioned by foreign
journalists in Beijing reportedly said that:
The question of political prisoners and human rights 
violations did not arise in China as its constitution 
granted citizens the right to speak, to meet, to 
demonstrate and to publish.40
However, one should not only limit oneself to official statements 
or laws, but to what is happening in reality. Different international 
reports, especially those by Amnesty International, suggest that in 
China "plus ga change, plus c'est la meme chose",41 at least as far as 
the judicial system is concerned, which remains a major weakness in 
observing the rights of the Chinese people. The bloody events that 
Tienanmen Square witnessed in the first week of June 1989,4 2 
prove the Foreign Ministry spokesman wrong and show that China 
has a long way to go to secure such rights.
Equality of all the citizens before the law is stressed by the 
Constitution adopted in 1982,43 nonetheless, such rules do not exist
4 0 -A m nestv International Report (1986) p. 215.
41-Fang Lizhi states that: 'According to incomplete statistics, there are at least 
976 labour reform camps in China. It is hard to know exactly how many people 
are in them, but we do know that the inmates of certain camps in Xinjiang 
Province number between 50,000 and 80,000.” Fang Lizhi, (1992) op. cit. p.2
42-A ccording to Amnesty International ”[A]t least 1,000 people were killed 
and thousands injured in the capital, Beijing, in early June [1989] when troops 
fired  in to  crowds of unarmed protesters and bystanders to suppress pro- 
dem ocracy  pro tests.' Amnesty In ternational, A m n e s ty  International Report 
1990 (London: Amnesty International, 1990) p.65.
4 3 -China: Violations of Human Rights (1984) op. cit. p. 76.
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in the practices of the judicial system since political considerations
are always taken into account when dealing with individual cases.
According to Jonathan Power,
Political considerations have always been taken into 
account in the treatment of offenders, and this trend 
has been marked since the Cultural Revolution.44
This, of course, was inspired by Maoist teaching when the C P C 
Chairman declared that the concept of the people varied in different 
periods of time, and therefore, everyone could be subject to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat depending on the circumstances of that 
period of time.45 Those who are subject to the dictatorship are
deprived of their political and civil rights and therefore considered
as having a "bad political background" or "bad class origin". Such
labels are carefully scrutinized when investigations are going on. If a 
person had committed an offence, then the judgement would very 
much depend on his/her background. Thus, in its report on political 
imprisonment in the People's Republic of China (1978), Amnesty 
stated that:
...all cases are treated in the light of political 
considerations. For instance, petty offenders who have 
committed minor theft or engaged in speculation may 
be merely criticized if they have good political or good 
work records, and good class backgrounds.... On the 
other hand, the same offence may be punished
severely if  the offender’s social and political
background is "bad", in which case his or her "crimes"
will be considered to be of a political nature.46
This practice, of course, opposes the norms of a fair and prompt 
trial that Amnesty stresses. The role of the judiciary is clearly
44-J. Power, (1983) op. cit. p. 77.
4 5 -Political Imprisonment in The P.R.C. (1978) op. cit. p. 9.
46-Ibid., p. 13.
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defined, but it is heavily under the influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Although the Chinese Criminal Code stresses that 
nobody should be detained without any charges after 72 hours of 
detention, the evidence suggests that this rule is not respected.4 7 
Perhaps the most publicized case, as far as the French speaking 
world is concerned, is that of Li Shuang, the Chinese fiancee of 
Emmanuel Bellefroid, a French diplomat in Beijing. She was arrested 
on 9 September 1981 without any charges being prepared against 
her, and her parents were not allowed to visit her. Two months later 
she was sentenced to two years of reeducation.4 8
A person in detention is asked to write daily reports about his 
past activities that might help the court to convict him. It is a 
compulsory act and if someone fails to do so then they are charged 
with non-cooperation with the authorities. It is like a "theatrical 
place" where everybody knows exactly what to say, and the 
judgement was sometimes decided before the trial took place.49 The 
cou rt's  judgem ent depends very much on the defendant's 
confessions, and because of the official policy which stresses that: 
"confession deserves leniency, resistance deserves severity" or 
"leniency is given to those who confess their crimes and severe 
punishment is given to those who refuse to do so",50 some people do
4 7 -"A  Japanese journalist, Tadashi Ito, reported in 1977 that some Japanese 
lawyers who visited China in 1975 and attended the court proceedings of a man 
charged with embezzlement learned that three months had passed between his 
arrest and his prosecution." Ibid., p. 46. Moreover, "[Tjhere is no presumption 
o f innocence in Chinese law and trials are often a mere formality, with the 
verdict decided before the trial.: Amnesty International Report ( 199(V> op. cit. 
p .67
48-For a detailed description of the events see: Le Monde 7, Octobre, 1981. 
T rente- huitiem e Anne6, No. 11411. Le M onde 12, October, 1981. Trente- 
huitiem e Anne6, No. 11468.
4 9 -Political Imprisonment in China (1978) op. cit. p. 55.
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confess their "crimes", or are presumed to be guilty, even if they did 
not commit them "to secure lenient treatment".5 1
Such an emphasis on the defendant's confession has led to the 
use of torture and coercion to extract confession. Although such a 
practice is totally prohibited by law, it is still a common practice in 
China's prisons and camps. In its 1988 Report, Amnesty International 
states that:
The use of torture is prohibited by law. Despite an 
official drive which began in 1985 to publicize torture 
and punish responsible officials, cases of torture by 
police were reported from various parts of China.52
The adoption of a new criminal code which was intended to 
improve the human rights situation in China has not curtailed these 
abuses. Moreover, it has made things worse in some areas. There are 
still a lot of people illegally detained. Their number has increased 
over the years. According to Amnesty International during the first 
half of 1986, "the number of cases (of illegal detention) nearly 
doubled over the same period last year, to 949, in which more than 
140 were reported to have been tortured,"53 let alone people
detained during the last events in Tienanmen Square solely for 
expressing their views, and their legitimate demands for peaceful
self-expression.
However, perhaps the most significant measure is that the new
50-Ibid., pp. 47-54.
51-Amnesty International Report (1986) states that: "At the beginning of the 
trial Xu Wenli, unsuccessfully asked for the presiding judge to be withdrawn 
on the grounds that the judge had presumed him guilty, having asked him to 
acknowledge his guilt on several occasions before the trial 'to secure more 
lenient treatment’." p. 215.
5 2 -Amnestv International Report (1988) p. 155.
5 3 -Amnestv International Report (1987) p. 224.
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criminal code failed to abolish the death penalty. There is no 
suggestion here that such a practice should be abolished in China, as 
Amnesty requires. Nonetheless, a comparison between the two 
periods (before and after 1980) suggests that the situation has 
worsened; not only in terms of the number of cases punishable by 
the death penalty, but also the speed of sentencing after the
judgem ent as well. Moreover, different courts, apart from the
Supreme People’s Court, can pass death sentences without referring 
to the Supreme People's Court.54
However, the death penalty is not always carried out in China. A 
person sentenced to death can have his sentence suspended for two 
years to judge how willing he is to be reeducated. According to the
New China News Agency, 6 July 1979:
If a criminal shows real signs of repentance and
performs meritorious service, his sentence may be 
commuted to life imprisonment or to a term of not less 
than 15 years and no more than 20 years.55
The extensive use of the death penalty is to be explained by the 
particularities of China itself. The social and economic situation in 
which China is living has, undoubtedly, influenced its position 
towards capital punishment. If not, how can one explain the use of 
the death penalty for crimes which do not deserve such a severe 
punishment? James Seymour states that:
5 4 -China: V iolations of Human Rights (1984) op. cit. states that: "However, 
since 1981 the number of offenses carrying the death penalty has doubled... 
Legislation has been adopted on several occasions since 1982 not only to 
increase the number of offenses punishable by death, but also to speed up 
proceedings in death penalty cases... a decree was adopted which ended the 
review of all death sentences by the Supreme People's court." p.53. See also 
A m nesty  In te rn a tio n a l Report :"In order to speed up the procedure for 
execution, it also became possible for the Provincial High Courts to approve 
death sentences without referring them to the People's Court." p. 217.
5 5 -China: Violations of Human Rights (1984) op. cit. pp. 63-4.
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Most subjected to capital punishment were often 
accused of internationally recognised crimes, but often 
the offenses of economic crimes which could result 
only in a short prison term in the West.56
Unlike Amnesty International's position, the Chinese officials do 
stress the importance of the death penalty "to safeguard social 
order". It is used as a warning in order to decrease the number of 
crim inal cases.57 Nevertheless, despite these measures, China still 
has a long way to go in observing human rights, not just to 
international standards, but even to accommodate its practices with 
its own laws and constitution. The recent events that shook the 
country may persuade the government to think about new measures 
and to cope with the demands of the population. The shortcomings of 
the Chinese government in securing economic and social rights could 
have an influence on its position. It may perhaps become more 
flexible in relation to civil and political rights.
56-James Seymour, in Donnelly, J. and Howard, R.E. eds., (1987) op. cit. p. 84. 
See also Amnesty In terna tional Report (1986) which states that: "Six people 
w ere sentenced to death in April (1985) in Xian, the capital of Shaanxi 
province, for holding "dance and sex parties" at home. Three of them were 
e x ecu ted  by firing -squad  im m ediately after sen tenc ing  by the Xian 
Interm ediate People's Court." pp. 218-9.
5 7 -The New China News Agency reported, on 18 Novem ber 1983, that 
"crim inal cases recorded an overall drop of 46.7 per cent nationwide from 
A ugust to September, with a 38.7 per cent decrease in major cases. In October, 
there were 11.5 per cent fewer criminal cases than in September, while major 
cases dropped a further 28.5 per cent. Crime rates in September and October 
were the lowest in recent years." China: Violations o f Human Rights (1984) 
op.cit. p. 80. Furthermore, on 2 November 1983 a spokesman of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry is reported to have acknowledged the receipt of the letter 
and to have said: "crim inals must receive the punishm ent they deserve
according to the law. This is a normal measure and routine work to maintain 




As indicated earlier, Nicaragua was chosen mainly for political 
re a so n s .58 The instability that the country has been experiencing 
makes the task of evaluating its human rights performance very
difficult. Catherine Gander argues that:
It is difficult to provide a relatively durable evaluation 
of human rights in a country undergoing revolutionary 
transformation. Economic, political and social relations 
change very quickly, in comparison to more "stable" 
systems that have evolved gradually over a century or 
two.59
Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to compare the two 
periods that Nicaragua has witnessed, i.e., before 1979, during the 
years of the reign of the Somoza family, and after July 1979, when 
President Anastasio Somoza Debayle fled the country to the United 
States and the revolutionary government assumed power.
It is generally agreed that the worst violations of human rights 
that occurred in Nicaragua were under the Somoza dynasty. 
Ironically enough, the country was not under international scrutiny 
until the late 1970s.60 Amnesty International, for instance, sent its 
first mission to Nicaragua in May 1976. This question was raised
58-For a general discussion on Nicaragua see T. W alker..Nicaragua. The Land 
of Sandino 2nd edition, revised (Boulder and London: Westview, 1986)
59-Catherine Gander, "Nicaragua" In J. Donnelly, and R. E. H oward,.eds., 
(1987) op. cit. p. 253.
60-"Although it was a matter of public knowledge that the Somoza dynasty 
had consistently violated the human rights of the Nicaraguan people since its 
inception, for many years the situation in N icaragua was not the object of 
much public scrutiny at the international level. In 1978 and 1979 things began 
to change." Q. C. Medina, The Battle of Human Rights. Gross. Systematic 
Violations and the Inter-American System (The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1988). p. 288.
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with Amnesty and the delay was ascribed to practical difficulties, i.e., 
the Research Department in the International Secretariat did not 
expand enough, at the time, to cover different countries.61
However, one further explanation for this delay is the fact that 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (F.S.L.N.), which took the 
task of organizing resistance to the Somoza’s government, had 
Marxist-Leninist tendencies.62 The fear of "communism" widespread 
in Latin America led to public opinion turning a blind eye, and the 
Somoza government was labelled corrupt rather than one that 
abused human rights. In the mid 1970s, however, the situation 
dramatically changed. Human rights violations by the National Guard 
reached their peak and such practices had to be denounced. The 
indiscrim inate bombing of civilians, and the disappearance of 
peasants from the northern part of the country were very common. 
Amnesty International reported in 1979 that after the bombing of
the civilian population from the air:
The Red Cross reported that some 5,000 people had 
died, 10,000 were injured, 25,000 had lost their homes 
and 57,000 are believed to have fled into exile in 
neighbouring Honduras and Costa Rica.63
Such violations happened under the rules of a state of
61-Interview source, note 8  above.
62-There does not seem to be agreement about the creation of the F.S.L.N. For 
instance, Amnesty International states that: "The F.S.L.N. was founded by 
students in 1958 as a revolutionary M arxist-Leninist group directed to the 
overthrow  of the government. It takes its name from the guerilla, Cesar 
Augusto Sandino, who fought against the United States of America from 1927 to 
1933." Amnesty In ternational. The Republic of N icaragua. An A m nesty 
International Report including the findings of a mission to Nicaragua 10-15 
M a y .1976 p. 6 . See as well, Q. C. Medina (1988), op. cit. p. 228, when she states 
that:" The Sandinista National Liberation Front(F.S.L.N.) had been created in 
1959, and had waged war against the Somozas ever since."
6 3 -Amnesty International Report (1979) p. 69.
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emergency or martial law, which had been in force in Nicaragua since 
1974. Many of these violations, according to the Nicaraguan 
government, occurred in the northern and western states where the 
guerrilla  forces were concentrated. W holesale killings and 
disappearances of peasants and farmers occurred because they were 
supposed to have links with, or supported the guerrillas. However, 
this does not in any way mean that the abuses were concentrated in 
this area only; they covered the country as a whole. Republican 
Congressman Ronald V. Dellums inserted in the congressional record 
on 24 March 1976 a report on political imprisonment in Nicaragua in
which he stated that:
The arrests have occurred throughout the Republic, 
but especially in the Northern and Western states. It is 
important to clarify that a very large number of 
people have been detained in spite of having no 
connection with the guerrillas in these zones.64
At this point, there is no need for an in-depth discussion of other
aspects of human rights violations such as torture or ill-treatment of
prisoners. This does not mean that such violations did not occur, but 
what would torturing a prisoner mean compared to the barbaric act 
of killing the people indiscriminately? A government which 
deliberately kills its own people has little respect, if any, for other 
rights.
After the flight of Anstasio Somoza Debayle and the accession to 
power of the revolutionary government, a fundamental law was
issued on 20 July 1979, which replaced the 1974 Constitution.
According to Amnesty International:
Article 6 of the fundamental law gives full recognition 
to the human rights established in the Universal
64- cited in L A. Sobel (1978) op. cit. p. 194.
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Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
on Civil and Political Rights.65
Moreover, the death penalty was abolished. These measures 
have been taken to show the goodwill of the new government in 
observing human rights. Nonetheless, martial law was restored again, 
which suspended almost all the constitutional guarantees.
Furthermore, thousands of people were being held in police custody, 
most of them former member of the National Guard or members of 
the Somoza's government. There was ill-treatment and even killings 
of the prisoners despite the official policy of the government. On 28 
July 1979, ten days after the revolutionary government came to
power, the Interior Minister stated that:
Im m ediate steps would be taken to prevent
misconduct by the Sandinista forces, declaring that no 
prisoner would be ill-treated and that neither the 
death penalty nor torture would exist after the 
revolution.66
The trials of the Guardsmen continued, especially under
T ribunales Especiales de Justicia (Special Courts) which lasted for 
fourteen months (Dec. 1979 to Feb. 1981).67 The sentences they 
received depended on where they were stationed. Those who served 
in the rural northeast part of the country received the maximum 
prison sentence. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the country 
was unstable at the time. The Contras' military opposition backed by 
the United States had undoubtedly made things worse in Nicaragua. 
Such threats led to the announcement of martial laws in the country, 
which are discussed in the International Covenant on Civil and
6 5 -Amnesty International Report (1980) p. 154.
6 6 -Ibid., p. 155.
67-Amnesty International Report (1981) pp. 170-1.
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Political Rights.68 Different attacks by the Contras were the origin of 
the continuity of the state of emergency in Nicaragua. Human rights 
abuses under Ortega were, to some extent, linked to the economic 
and political situation of the country. Part of the information 
received about human rights abuses suggested that they were, in 
fact, carried out by the forces opposed to the revolutionary
government. Catherine Gander rightly argues that:
Economic, military and ideological facts must be
considered in an analysis of human rights in
Nicaragua... The war created exceptional circumstances 
in Nicaragua.69
The exceptional circumstances that the country was experiencing 
made it very difficult to evaluate the human rights situation; and 
even more difficult to apply Amnesty's standards. Apart from the
abolition of the death penalty, it is quite difficult to apply the rest of 
the criteria and base a judgement on them. Any relatively new 
government having to deal with those responsible for past violations, 
improving the standard of living, and above all, facing the military 
threats of the Contras, might reasonably have neglected human 
rights in an attempt to carry the country through a very difficult
period until stable institutions are achieved. These were translated
during the elections of 1984 which gave Nicaragua a president, a 
vice-president and a National Assembly.70 Although the situation
6 8 -L. A. Malone, "Human Rights in the Middle East" , a review article, in the 
Middle East Journal 38 (4) 1984. p. 735 states that: "The International Covenant 
on C ivil and Political Rights speaks only for a"public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation" and the existence of which is officially 
p ro c la im e d ."
69-Catherine Gander In J. Donnelly, and R. E. Howard eds., (1987) op. cit. pp. 
260-1.
70-T. Walker, (1986) op. cit. p. 119
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has relatively improved compared to the Somozas' days,71 still a lot 
remains to be done.
It should be pointed out at the end of this section that elections
were in held in Nicaragua in February 1990, which marked the
defeat of president Daniel Ortega by Violeta Chamorro who 
represented a coalition of different political parties, and assumed 
power in April.
3-3: The M iddle East
This case has been included in the study because of the religious 
issues involved. Middle Eastern countries are almost exclusively 
Muslim, which in some senses provide a real challenge to Amnesty's 
work . The emphasis here will be upon Saudi Arabia since it is one 
country where Muslim laws inspired from the 'Quran' are applied.
However, different countries will be m entioned whenever 
appropriate .
The information available about human rights in Middle Eastern 
countries is quite scarce. Amnesty's reports, which are supposed to 
give brief descriptions of different countries, fail to do so in some of 
these countries. Saudi Arabia, for instance, was not included in the 
1979 and 1981 Reports: not because there were no human rights
71-Amnesty International reported that: "On 14 March [1989]the National
Assembly passed a decree pardoning 1,894 prisoners who had been convicted 
by the Special Courts between 1979 and 1981 for crimes allegedly committed by 
them as members o f the National Guard under the previous government of 
A nastasio  Somoza Debayle." A m nesty In terna tional R eport 1990. p. 177. 
Furtherm ore, a second report on Nicaragua was published in which Amnesty 
acknowledged that, in general, progress has been made. For further details see
A m nesty  In terna tional, N icaragua:__ tUfi Human Rights L££Sid 1986-1989
(London: Amnesty International, 1989)
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violations, but because of the lack of information.
For the purposes of this chapter, no investigation of the different 
aspects of human rights in these countries will be attempted. The 
survival of the governments depends largely on a heavy oppressive 
apparatus and state police. Freedom of expression is almost non­
existent, and censorship of the press and imprisonment on political 
grounds are very common. Nonetheless, what constitutes an 
exception is the death penalty which is widely applied in the Middle 
East, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Amnesty International in its
Report stated that in Saudi Arabia:
Justice is administered according to a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Shari'a, Islamic law, based on the 
Quran and the Sunna, the way of life and the
pronouncement of the Prophet.72
Islamic law insists on the use of the death penalty as a
punishment for certain offenses. Moreover, Islamic law also stresses 
the imposition of flogging and amputation, which would be 
unacceptable in a Western society.
Such practices are carried out in Saudi Arabia. Amputation, for 
instance, is the penalty for repeated theft. Amnesty International has 
expressed its concern about such practices and has worked towards 
the abolition of the death penalty. On 11 December 1981, it wrote to
the Saudian Minister of Interior urging him "to give consideration to
the question of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia and the possibility 
of restricting and eventually abolishing it."73
Despite Amnesty’s efforts, the death penalty in Saudi Arabia 
cannot be abolished as long as its laws are based upon the ’Quran'. To 
judge the record of human rights by the country’s use of the death
7 2 -Amnestv International Report (1980) p. 351.
7 3 -Amnesty International Report (1982) p. 344.
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penalty would be unfair, at least to those imposing it for religious 
reasons. In other words, a comparison can never be fair when it is 
based upon "arbitrary standards". Islamic countries do represent in 
this area a real challenge to the work of Amnesty International. The 
latter believes that the death penalty will be abolished eventually, 
since there are some schools of Muslim jurisprudence which are in 
favour of its abolition.74 However, such a claim does not have any 
foundation. The 'Quran' is clear about the question and leaves no 
room for jurisprudence. What would be cruel in the United Kingdom 
for instance, might not be considered as such in another country 
depending on the political culture of the country. The amputation of 
the hand for repeated theft is widely accepted in a country where 
Islamic law is fully implemented, e. g., Saudi Arabia, where such 
practice, in their views, is not a violation of human rights.7 5 
Therefore, the role of political culture, and the circumstances in 
which the abuses occur, have a significant role in determining 
whether a country respects human rights or not.
IV: Amnesty International and comparative politics
In terms of comparison, the work of Amnesty International does 
not offer a ranking of different countries of the world, and indeed 
quite deliberately refrains from such a comparative judgement. They 
acknowledge the fact that no comparison is attempted,76 but offer a
74-Interview source, note 8  above.
75-In an interview conducted at Exeter University -England- students from 
Saudi A rabia assured the author that such a practice is accepted since it 
derives from the teaching of Islam, a strong belief which had been carried out 
for centuries.
76-In the 1978 report, Thomas Hammerberg, a former director of the British 
section, Amnesty International, said that:"W e are not publicizing any list of
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broad range of evidence, and relatively clear reports - depending on 
the country under scrutiny- upon which an independent observer 
may make a judgement.
However, having dealt with the basis that Amnesty offers and 
the obstacles that it faces in carrying out its work, it becomes 
apparent that it is quite difficult to use Amnesty's standards as basis 
upon which a cross-national comparison is attempted.
First of all, as it has already been pointed out, Amnesty 
International seeks to implement the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. However, a close look at this Declaration 
shows that it contains two sets of rights; civil and political on the one 
hand, and economic, social and cultural on the other. Amnesty 
focuses only on some aspects of the former, thus making it and its 
work vulnerable and appear hostile to a lot of countries around the 
world. In an attempt to justify this, Thomas Hammarberg, a former
director of the British Section, states that:
Amnesty International is not a do gooder for all 
possible causes; it has a restricted mandate. It works
for the release of prisoners of conscience and against 
torture and executions, but it is not involved in work 
against unemployment, starvation and other social 
diseases. Our platform is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights adopted thirty years ago by the nations 
of the world. Within that frame Amnesty International 
concentrates its resources on particular civil and 
political rights...This is not because we ignore the 
importance of all rights, but because we recognise that 
we can only achieve concrete results within set 
limits.77
Nevertheless, this is still unacceptable to different governments
the worst violators, any,"ranking list", Amnesty International does not work
this way." Amnesty International Report (1978) p. 1.
77 -Ib id .,
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which do not believe in the set of rights that Amnesty works upon. 
Although Amnesty insists on "achieving concrete results within set 
lim its", its arguments are not entirely satisfactory. Why does it 
concentrate upon political and civil rights, for instance, bearing in 
mind that countries which have ratified the Covenant on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights outnumber those that have ratified the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,78 let alone countries which 
did not ratify them? How can it apply different criteria to a country 
which rejects them, and expect to conduct useful comparison and 
achieve fruitful results?
Amnesty as an organization 'born' in the West, has been in one 
way or another influenced by the philosophy and the norms in which 
it has developed, although it claims that it is independent from any
government or ideology. Cosmos Desmond rightly argues that:
We have defined as fundamental human rights those 
rights which can be accorded to people in our society 
without posing any threat to our socio-political system.
It is we who have decided how societies should be 
judged and since our society is taken as the norm, it is 
not surprising that we measure up to it better than
other societies. The West may be worse than other 
countries in some respects, but we have decided that 
those respects are not the important ones. The most
important aspect, we have decided, is whether a 
country recognized human rights as we have defined 
them. We have decided, for example, that individual 
freedom is so important that some people must be left 
free to exploit other people.79
From this East-West antagonism it becomes quite difficult, if not
78-”By the end of 1987, 92 states were parties to the U.N.'s International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 87 to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 39 to its Optional Protocol." A m n esty  
In terna tiona l Report(1988) p. 15
79-C. Desmond, (1984) op. cit. p. 24.
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impossible, to compare different kinds of political systems on the 
b as is  tha t Amnesty offers. To conduct a comparison in terms of 
political prisoners, for instance, between a totalitarian or a military 
regime and a liberal democratic one would be misleading, and will 
not lead to useful results.
Secondly, what makes it difficult to compare according to 
Amnesty's work is that it does not take into account the political 
culture of the country under investigation, and its level of 
development and modernization as well as of its level of political 
p a r tic ip a tio n .80 In its annual reports, Amnesty offers pictures of 
almost every country in the world, conducted on the basis previously 
discussed (section 2).
Human rights abuses are social phenomena, which are influenced 
by and influence the political and social environment in which they
occur and therefore, should be taken and analyzed within that
context. What could be considered as a major violation in the United 
Kingdom, for instance, is not automatically considered as such 
elsewhere; not forgetting the role of the religion in influencing the 
practices and behaviours of the people. Let us try to make a
comparison between the United Kingdom for instance, and an Islamic 
country such as Saudi Arabia or Iran in the light of Amnesty's work 
over the past ten years, especially in terms of the death penalty.
Although Amnesty opposes it, and works for its abolition, it cannot
be widely applicable. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it was
80- Gander argues that: "A country's progress in human rights is directly
related to its level of political participation. Nations in which the majority of 
the population is excluded from any degree of power are more apt to
transgress rights than those where people take an active part in decision 
making and can fight for their rights." Catherine Gander, In J. Donnelly and 
R. E. Howard eds., (1987) op. cit. p. 264.
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abolished in the mid 1970s, whereas in Iran or Saudi Arabia, to 
name just a few, the death penalty is still carried out and will never 
be abolished, as long as their laws are inspired by the 'Quran'. 
Muslim laws still dominate the internal laws of these countries, so 
this practice will remain as violation of basic human rights in the 
eyes of Amnesty. On the other hand those which have abolished it 
are seen as having taken a very significant step forward in 
improving their standards of human rights.
Amnesty takes different countries at the same level of 
development, or deals with them equally. Here, the emphasis is not 
on economic development and the standard of living, but it is on the 
political dimension. The backwardness or the development of any 
political system does, in one way or another and relatively, influence 
the human rights situation. Countries such as the United Kingdom or
the United States which have experienced democratic practices for a
very long period of time cannot be compared to a country which
achieved its "independence" two or three decades ago. There are 
pressures on every government, but the scale and the way in which 
governments respond to these pressures vary considerably from one 
country to another. In a democratic developed country, the system is 
able to adapt to almost every new situation, and the succession of 
different governments is guaranteed smoothly through democratic 
means. It would be absurd to imagine a coup d'etat in the United 
States or in the United Kingdom, whereas a government in a
backward country could not cope with the pressures and may 
collapse, which in turn, affects its human rights record. In its 1978
report, Amnesty acknowledged that:
We do realize that there is a link between general
politics and the rights we try to defend; changes of
138
government often result in arrests or releases. But this 
fact does not make us change our approach. We simply 
take facts into account without hiding some of them or 
em phasizing others, according to regim e or 
ideology.81
However, it would be misleading to take the facts into account 
without answering the question of what has led to these facts.
Different political systems, and especially the change of the political 
structure, or of the government mainly in the Third World do have a 
great effect on the human rights situation in other countries. The 
facts, of course, are important in conducting a comparison, but they 
are misleading if they are not understood within the social and 
political environment in which they have come into being. Thus,
investigators must bear in mind the particularities of each country, 
how developed it is, and to what extent it is able to cope with the 
pressure from the people. Moreover, in which way will the 
government respond?
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the variety of political 
systems around the world makes the comparison very difficult. It is 
generally agreed on that emergency rule and martial law have been 
frequently imposed by military regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. As a matter of fact, the steps taken by the military in 
assuming power are generally: first, to suspend the constitution, 
dissolve the civilian government and parliament; second, to disband 
the political party or parties and finally to kill those who "oppose” 
the new government. In countries which lack stability or legitimacy-
81 - A m nesty  In te rn a tio n a l Report (1978^ p. 2. Moreover, Peter Benenson 
wrote: "Again we can understand that there are situations, particularly in
newly emerged states, where it is difficult to govern in the face of sustained 
criticism . But this fact alone does entitle the government to keep its critics
permanently imprisoned." Quoted from C. Desmond (1984) op. cit. p. 41.
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in a sense that governments did not come to power through 
democratic means such as elections reflecting the will of the people-, 
protection of human rights will almost always take a secondary place 
in their political agenda. Furthermore, they will claim that the 
situation obliges them to "sacrifice" this issue for more important 
ones such as national unity and economic development. Peter
Benenson rightly argues:
Let us all recognize that there are situation when the 
security of the state is threatened, in which the 
governments feel obliged to arrest their opponents.82
This can be a satisfactory answer by some governments, that the 
abuses had happened because of "the general interest" under 
different ideals. However, there might be some situations where 
there are genuine calls to justify suspending some political rights and
civil liberties e.g., war situation or natural disaster, but not, as is the
case in many Third World countries, when a government loses an 
election or creates a state of emergency.
The above discussion was a brief survey of the difficulties that 
face a comparativist in an attempt to make a comparison based on 
the principles already set by Amnesty. The particularities of every 
country on the one hand, and the difficulties that face Amnesty in 
carrying out its work properly on the other, make the task difficult. 
One cannot imagine a comparison being carried out without facts,
statistics and supporting arguments that make the comparison 
meaningful and the results convincing. However, it is not always the 
case in the work of Amnesty, since it is dealing with one of the most 
sensitive issues in today’s politics. No government, to varying 
degrees, wants its "dirty linen" to be washed in public. Thus,
82-Ibid.,
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different steps are taken to curtail the flow of information by 
censorship of the press, limiting the movement and contacts of 
foreigners in their countries and refusing to grant entry visas. 
Amnesty have acknowledged this many times in different reports.83 
Such obstacles and how to overcome them are of great importance to 
Am nesty's findings. After all, investigators will base their 
judgements upon the accuracy of the information it gives. The 1978 
Report stated that: "the effectiveness of Amnesty International 
depends upon the accuracy and the availability of its information."84 
However, many statistics are neither available nor accurate in the 
work of Amnesty, and are given depending on the country and how 
flexible the flow of information is. Furthermore, Amnesty reports 
only about the cases known to it. But this proportion, no matter how 
big or small it is, is not representative of the situation in the country 
as a whole. In its 1990 Report, Amnesty stresses this fact when
dealing with China:
The death penalty continued to be used extensively. 
During 1989 Amnesty International recorded 282 
death sentences and 273 executions. The true totals
were thought to be much higher.85
The lack of information concerning different categories of people 
imprisoned, combined with the relatively available information
about those who have been granted freedom, still does not give a
83-In China for instance, "the lack of detailed inform ation on political
imprisonment in the P.R.C. is due to various factors including the size and the 
diversity of the country... the restrictions of movement and the lack of free 
access to information." Amnesty International, Political Im prisonm ent in the 
P .R .C .(1978^ op. cit. p. xii. See as well Amnesty International Report (1988> 
when it states that: "refusing to grant visas to foreign observers also makes
the task of monitoring human rights harder." p. 4.
8 4 -Amnesty International Report (1978) p. 7.
8 5 -Amnesty International Report (19901 op. cit. p. 6 8 .
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clear picture even within the borders of the same country. A 
government which imprisons, tortures and sentences people to death 
would not publicize its acts since they are not the kind of actions to 
be proud of. Thus, the cases known to the outside world are still a 
proportion, and no one knows in terms of percentages how much it 
represents of the real figures. Whereas, the figures concerning people 
who were granted freedom are publicized to show the goodwill of the 
government and its wish to gain respect and praise from the 
international community.
Having said that, it does not automatically follow that the work 
of Amnesty is "useless" or misleading. The point that was intended to 
be stressed is that there are tremendous difficulties if one has to 
compare countries on the basis given by Amnesty on a cross-national 
level, or even between a sample of countries, or even just two. The 
segments of the society that are to be studied are carefully chosen.
In this case, they are already set by Amnesty. Moreover, if the death
penalty is considered a major violation of human rights, it should be 
considered as such in all the countries that the comparativist has 
chosen as a field to his research. Dogan and Pelassy rightly point out 
that:
Once the comparativist has decided which part of the 
political system or sector of the society he wishes to 
study, he has another decision to make. He has to 
choose the countries to be included in his analysis.86
The significance of a comparison and the validity of the results 
achieved will depend basically on the countries chosen. To conduct a 
comparison on such a basis, for instance between a Muslim,
8 6 -M. Dogan, and D. Pelassy, How to Com pare N ations: Strategies in
com parative politics (New Jersey: Chatham House,1984) p. 105.
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underdeveloped country in which a new government has emerged 
such as Iran, with the United Kingdom or Sweden would be of little 
significance since the beliefs, the economic, social and political 
environment are totally different. Such circumstances may, in many 
instances, explain the differences in governments' attitudes towards 
what some see as violations of human rights.
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Chapter Five 
The Human Rights Committee
The question of human rights, as we have seen, is one of the 
most significant issues in contemporary world politics. There is no 
single agreement on its definition, let alone measurement. Many 
attempts have been made, both by organizations such as Amnesty 
International, as pointed out in the previous chapter, and by 
individuals, as will be discussed in the next chapter, to define and 
measure human rights on a cross-national basis. Such attempts fall 
short in terms of their applicability to different countries; not only 
because they derive from one specific philosophy or culture, which 
makes them unacceptable in some parts of the world, but because 
they are arbitrary measures. Such situations make the task of 
comparing and agreeing on specific standards very difficult, if not 
impossible.
Nevertheless, one may think of a body which has 'revolutionized* 
the issue and which has completely a different approach to human 
rights and aims at promoting them. It is the Human Rights 
C o m m itte e 1 (hereafter referred to as the Committee), which was 
set up under the provision of article 28 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter referred to as the 
C o v en an t) .th eo re tic a lly  speaking, it is not biased: there has been
1-For a full d iscussion  of the Human R ights Com m ittee see Dominic 
M cGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee.Its Role in the Development of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) 
pp.44-202, E. Decaux, "La Mise en vigueur du pacte international relatifs aux 
droits civils et politiques", Revue generate de droit international public, Vol. 
84, 1980 pp.487-534, A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in the 
W orld  3rd edition,(M anchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) pp.37-72.
2-In an address to an NGO conference in Geneva on 10 December 1983, to
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an agreement on a single measure as a basis on which to judge 
human rights performance. That is, the states freely decided to ratify 
the Covenant which, as a result, gave power to the Committee and, 
conversely, made the states party responsible to the Committee 
through a system of communication.
In order to shed light on the different aspects of the Committee’s 
work, it seemed appropriate to divide this chapter into the following 
main sections: The first concentrates on the Human Rights Committee. 
Then its work. The third section deals with two cases: the former 
Soviet Union and Chile to monitor the work of the Committee, and the 
chapter concludes with a general assessment of its work.
I: What is the Human Rights Committee?
The central purpose of this section is to answer the above 
question in this preliminary discussion. For instance, how did the 
Committee come into being? How are people elected to it? Is the 
geographical distribution really respected in elections of the 
Committee? For how long are the Committee's members elected? How 
many times a year does it hold sessions? For how long? Is there 
enough time for the Committee to carry out its work properly? How 
many cases does it have to deal with a year? And how impartial are 
the Committee's members?
m ark the 35th anniversary of the U niversal Declaration on Human Rights, 
Eric Soy, Former Director-General of the United Nations Office in Geneva, 
stated that: "The adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights led to 
the establishm ent of the very im portant procedure of requiring states parties 
to subm it regular reports to a com m ittee... This obligation and this procedure 
have, in my view, revolutionized in ternational relations." The R eview . 
International Commission o f Jurists, No,32, June, 1984 p.45.
1 4 5
These are some preliminary questions one attempts to clarify. 
The purpose of this section is to give the reader a clear idea about 
the body with which one is dealing, and some critical reflection 
whenever appropriate.
1-1: The Committee:
Article 28 of the Covenant states that:
1-There shall be established a Human Rights Committee 
(hereafter referred to in the present Covenant as the 
Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and 
shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.
2-The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the 
states parties to the present Covenant who shall be 
persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the field of human rights, consideration 
being given to the usefulness of the participation of 
some persons having legal experience.
3-The members of the Committee shall be elected and 
shall serve in their personal capacity.3
The Covenant came into force on 23 March 1976 after thirty five 
states have ratified it. The Committee was established in 1977 with 
different functions in respect to the provisions of the Covenant and 
its Optional Protocol. Its term of office began on 1 January 1977 in 
accordance with the provisional rules of procedure.4
It is composed of eighteen members, nationals of the states 
party to the Covenant, elected for a period of four years5, with half
3-Ian Brownlie, ed., B asic  D ocum ents in International Law 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 172.
4-Rule 12 states that: "The term of office of the Committee elected at the first 
election shall begin on 1 January 1977. The term of office of members of the 
Committee elected at subsequent elections shall begin on the day after the date 
of expiry of the term of office of the members of the Committee whom they 
replace."
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the membership renewed every two years. Article 29 (3) allows the 
renomination of Committee members. Each state may include more 
than one candidate, but membership of the Committee should not 
exceed one member per state. According to Article 31 of the 
Covenant:
1-The Committee may not include more than one 
national of the same state.
2-In the election of the committee, consideration shall 
be given to the equitable geographical distribution of 
membership and the representation of different forms 
of civilization and the principal legal systems.6
The first striking feature at the first elections was that, although 
the Committee was set up under the provisions of a Covenant which 
does not generally adhere to what was the Eastern block orthodoxy, 
it was surprising to find that the number of countries from the 
former communist countries was the highest at the time (1976) 
compared with Western Europe, Africa, Asia or Latin America. 
However, out of the ten communist countries, four members only 
were elected to the Committee compared with five members elected 
from Western Europe out of the original seven.7 This discrepancy 
has led some writers, especially Jhabvala, to suggest at a later stage 
that the membership of the Committee should be reduced for some 
countries and increased for others for a strict geographical
5-Article 5 of the Covenant.
6-1. Brownlie, ed.,(1972) op. cit. p.173.
7-F. Jhabvala, "The practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Com m ittee, 
1976-1982: Review of State Party Reports". Human Rights Quarterly, (6 ) 1984 p. 
83. Furthermore, Decaux states: "Le comite elu en 1976 traduit un certain 
d e se q u il ib re :
Europe Occidentale: 5 sieges pour 7 Etats Parties.Europe de l'Est, 4 sieges pour 10 
Etats Parties. Amerique Latine, 3 sieges pour 7 Etats Parties. Afrique,3 sieges 
pour 8  Etats Parties, and Asie 3 sieges pour 6  Etats Parties." E. Decaux, (1980) op. 
cit. p. 496.
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d is t r ib u t io n .8 Nonetheless, the provision of the article above 
provided for the geographical distribution of the Committee's 
membership and not for proportional representation. There has been 
representation of different forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems within the Committee which, as Jhabvala himself 
acknow ledges,9 puts the Committee beyond criticism or suggestions 
of any change in its membership. These members are of high moral 
character and recognized competence in the human rights area. 
Members with legal professions have been the dominant feature of 
the Committee. They serve in their personal capacity and do not 
represent the views of their governments. In order to achieve this 
impartiality, each member has to give a solemn declaration according 
to Rule 16 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.10 Such qualities 
and requirements make the views of the Committee's members 
homogeneous. Nonetheless, there are still some sharp disagreements 
among the members on the way they assess matters brought before 
them. Such disagreements are based on the background of the 
member making the comments, which, in many cases, represent the 
views of his/her own government. A conspicuous example of that 
was during the discussion of the second periodic report of the former 
Soviet Union in 1984. Mr Tomuschut (West Germany) said that the 
"dialogue between the Soviet delegation and the members of the 
Committee was less than positive". On the other hand, Mr Graefrath 
(East Germany) "congratulated the Soviet delegation... [and] regretted
6 -F. Jhabvala, (1984) op. cit. p.83.
9 -Ib id .,
10-Rule 16 states: "Before assuming his duties, each member of the Committee 
shall give the following solemn declaration undertaking in open Committee: "I 
shall solmnely undertake to discharge my duties as a member of the Human 
Rights Committee im partially and conscientiously.”
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that the dialogue had been hampered by politically motivated
s t a t e m e n t s . " 11 Moreover, there might be some provocative 
comments by Committee's members. Mr Bouzidi (Tunisia), when
discussing the Report of Iran, said:
...what was the Iranian government doing to promote 
the right of Palestinian and Lebanese peoples to self-
determination? Why had the Iranian government not 
accepted the cease-fire by Iraq, so that Iraq could go 
and fight the Israelis? Why had Iranian troops not come 
to the aid of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples now 
that the Iraqi army had withdrawn from Iran?12
These kind of statements put the impartiality of the Committee 
in jeopardy. When dealing the Soviet report, one may think that the 
views of the Committee may differ, but not sharply. There is a
standard upon which the experts make their comments, i.e., the 
Covenant compared with the codes and practices of the country 
under scrutiny. Although one objects to these disagreements 
between the experts, it could well be understood, in the the case of 
the Soviet Union, that the remarks made by the experts from both 
East and West Germany were based on their backgrounds and the
views of their governments (mainly the former East Germany) as 
well as their own interpretation of the Covenant. However, from the 
second example, there is a clear understanding that there is a direct 
attack on the Iranian government. In other words, a statement such 
as "...so that Iraq could go and fight the Israelis" does not seem 
relevant at all. The expert seems to forget that Iraq did not fight the 
Israelis before entering the war against Iran, apart during the 
conflict between Israel and the Arabs, the latter group including
11-F. Jhabvala, "The Soviet-bloc's view of the im plem entation of Human 
Rights Accords". Human Rights Quarterly, (7) 1985. p.480.
12-U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/1/ Add. 58. Par.35 (365th meeting, Thursday, July, 15th, 
1982.)
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Iraq. The point to be stressed here is that the Committee is not an 
arena for war propaganda. It is meant to promote and help countries 
to enhance their human rights records, not to tell Iran to accept a 
cease-fire so that Iraq could enter into a new war. One member of 
the Committee assured the author that the Committee had known
such practices, but things have changed for the better, and reports
are now judged unequivocally by all members regardless of the
country's report being discussed. To borrow her words: "the experts
are experts more than ever before"13.
1-2: Sessions:
Rule 12 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure provides that:
1.The Committee shall normally hold two regular 
sessions each year.
2.Regular sessions of the Committee shall be convened 
at dates decided by the Committee and the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Secretary-General"), taking into account the 
calendar of conferences as approved by the General- 
Secretary.
This does not mean that the Committee cannot hold other special 
sessions; Rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure provides for 
th is .14 However, since 1978 the Committee has held three sessions a
13-In terv iew  of the author w ith P rofessor R. H iggins, P ro fesso r of 
International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a 
member of the Human Rights Committee.
14-Rule 3 states that:
1. Special sessions of the Committee shall normally be convened by decision of 
the Committee. When the Committee is not in session, the Chairman may 
convene special sessions in consultation with the other officers of the 
Com m ittee.
The Chairman of the Committee shall also convene special sessions:
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year. Given the amount of work with which the Committee has to
deal, it was felt that two sessions were not enough. Even with a new
session, the Committee is still unable to cope with the work it has to 
do. Three sessions a year of three weeks each had been the practice 
of the Committee, while the number of countries becoming parties to 
the Covenant kept increasing every year, and the Committee found 
itself with more work to do in the same period of time. The problem 
is that it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for the Committee to 
carry out its work properly and effectively within this short period 
of time. This is especially the case if one bears in mind that some 
countries are notorious in delaying their reports, adding to the 
C om m ittee 's  already overburdened w orkload. Furtherm ore, 
additional information is requested from countries whenever it is 
appropriate at the time of the discussion of the initial reports, as well 
as other reports every five years.
There is no doubt that the Committee could be more effective if
it had more time to deal with reports, or if it had more resources to 
recruit personnel to undertake preparation for the sessions. A
member of the Committee agrees that there is a lack of time and an
adequate balance between time and amount of work is needed.15 
Nonetheless, the Committee has followed a strategy that saves time 
for the experts to deal with the most important aspects. Thus, a 
working group is to meet one week before every session to look at
a) At the request of a majority of the members of the Committee;
b) A t the request of a State Party to the Covenant.
2. Special sessions shall be convened as soon as possible at a date fixed by the 
cha irm an  w ith the Secretary-G eneral and with o ther officers o f the 
Com m ittee, taking into account the calendar of conferences approved by the 
G eneral Assembly.
1 5 -Interview, see note 11 above.
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the different reports, especially those that appear after the initial 
ones. These latter are usually shorter, so the discussion within the 
Committee can concentrate upon "problem areas", to see if the 
country in question has made efforts to take into account the 
Committee’s views. Further, it has the task of looking at personal 
communications and deciding on their admissibility. In doing so the 
working group is helped by a Special Rapporteur, who deals with the 
same question between sessions.
This "focus discussion", carried out by the committee after 
having been scrutinized by the working group, saves the Committee 
a lot of time, but it is still unable to cope with the increased pressure 
placed upon it every year. Given the fact that the experts are doing 
this in their personal capacities, having other professional 
arrangements which may sometimes make them unable to attend the 
Committee's proceedings, little time is available to study different 
reports.
It would seem that more time should be made available, or that 
these experts should become full time staff paid for their 
membership of the Committee,16 so that the Committee can more 
easily and effectively carry out its work. However, these are not 
ideal solutions; for the amount of time to be increased is not 
necessarily convenient for the experts themselves. As mentioned 
earlier, they have other professional engagements and may not be 
able to adjust to the new requirements. Making them full time staff 
would require a new budget which the United Nations is unable to 
secure due to its limited financial resources.
16-A. H. Robertson,.sees that: "There is a strong case for making membership 
on the committee a salaried occupation to which members could devote all 
their time.” in L. Henkin,.ed„ The International Bill of Rights. The Covenant on 
Civil and Political R ights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) p. 339.
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A great deal of research is carried out whenever a country's 
report is to be scrutinized. The researchers focus not only on states’ 
reports and their laws, but different sources are used such as non­
governm ental organizations, newspapers, the State Department 
country reports etc.. which are certainly time consuming. It might be 
appropriate, in these circumstances, for a small unit to be 
permanently created under the auspices of the Committee. Its main 
task would be the preparation of the Committee's work and following 
developments in different countries.
Finally, concerning places where the committee holds its
sessions, Rule 5 of the provisional Rules of Procedure reads as follow:
Sessions of the Committee shall normally be held at the 
Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United 
Nations Office at Geneva. Another place for a session 
may be designated by the Committee in consultation 
with the Secretary-General.
Although the provision of this rule specifies that another place 
may be designated, to the best of the author's knowledge, except for 
the fourteenth session held in Bonn (in the former West Germany), 
the practice has always been to meet either New York or Geneva. 
A lthough, normally one the spring session is held at the 
headquarters in New York and the summer and autumn session in 
Geneva, for economic constraints, however, the Committee was forced 
to hold most of its sessions in Geneva17. It may be suggested that 
holding sessions where United Nations offices already exist, or at the
17-Dr.John Pace, Chief, Research studies and Prevention of Discrimination, at 
the Centre for Human Rights, the United Nations Office in Geneva explained 
that although many countries, especially those which do not have diplomatic 
representation in Geneva, wish the sessions to be held in New York, however, 
it is less costly to hold sessions in Geneva where the Centre for Human Rights 
exists and where all the information and archives are held.
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headquarters of any Regional Organization, would be helpful in 
publicizing the work of the Committee. Holding a session in a Third 
W orld country such as Kenya or Ethiopia would be a good 
opportunity to raise the awareness of the people, not only in these 
countries, but in the region as a whole regarding their rights and how 
their governments should treat them. With the media coverage of the 
Committee’s activities, more people would be aware of the rights that 
other peoples enjoy and that their governments can be held 
accountable to this body in the event of any abuse of human rights. 
The Committee's members, aware of this fact, stress the importance 
of holding sessions in countries others than those in which they are 
usually held, but because of financial limitations they felt bound to 
hold them in New York and especially in Geneva. They would thus 
welcome any invitation from governments to hold sessions in their 
coun tries.18
3-1: Decisions of the Committee:
After the study of any country's report the Committee makes 
general comments about the overall situation. Decisions in the 
Committee are taken by majority vote but the practice is first to look 
for a consensus.19 It was pointed out earlier in the chapter that the
18-Interview, see note 11 above.
1 9 -Rule 51* states that:"Except as otherwise provided in the Covenant or 
elsewhere in these rules, decisions of the Committee shall be by a majority of 
the members present."
*The Committee decided, at its first session, that in a footnote to rule 51 of the 
Provisional Rules of procedure attention should be drawn to the following:
1-The members of the Committee generally expressed the view that its method 
of work normally should allow for attempts to reach decision by consensus 
before voting, provided that such attempts did not unduly delay the work of 
the Committee.
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Committee suffers from a lack of time. Moreover, whenever a 
consensus is sought, a great amount of time is required to attain it.
Although the footnote to Rule 51 (see below) specifies that the 
proposal can be put to a vote at the request of any member, the 
process is, nevertheless, time consuming. It should save more time if 
any matter is resolved by ballot voting. However, the system of 
voting itself is not beyond criticism. It might be the most appropriate 
way to deal with any proposal, although in the case of the Committee 
this is not always true. If one looks at Rule 50 which states that: 
"each member of the Committee shall have one vote", bearing in 
mind that the Committee comprises eighteen experts, the question 
arises regarding what would happen if the votes were divided into 
two groups of nine each. This situation did in fact occur during one of 
the Committee's sessions, one member of the Committee assured the 
au thor.20 One would be very much in favour of a number that could 
not be divided evenly into two to ensure a majority within the 
Committee, or that the vote of the Chairman should be taken into 
account whenever the votes were equally divided.
II: The work of the Committee:
The Committee performs two roles: an investigatory and a 
conciliatory one. Its role as an investigatory body can be seen from 
the provisions of article 40 of the Covenant where the reports of the 
states’ party are discussed, and also under article 3 of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights
2-bearing in mind paragraph 1 above, the Chairman at any meeting may, at 
the request of any member shall, put the proposal to a vote."
20-Interview, see note 11 above.
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(hereafter the Protocol). The conciliatory role can be understood in 
the case of interstate complaints as provided for in articles 41 to 44 
of the Covenant.
In what follows a more detailed analysis of each of the roles of 
the Committee will attempted to better understand its work as a
whole.
2-1: The study of states' reports:
The main task of the Committee is the study of the compulsory 
reports covering every right set forth in the Covenant states Party 
have undertaken to submit under the provision of article 40.21 
These reports should include the measures adopted by the states
21-Article 40 states that:
1-The State Parties to the Covenant undertake to subm it reports on the
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein 
and on the progress made in the enjoyment of these rights:
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the 
States Parties concerned.
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.
2-All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall 
indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the im plem entation of 
the present Covenant.
3-The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the 
Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts 
of the reports as may fall within their field of competence.
4-The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the 
present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as 
it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also 
transm it to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the 
copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present 
C o v en an t.
5- The States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee 
observations or any comments that may be made in accordance with 
Paragraph 4 of this Article.
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Partly to bring their internal laws in conformity with the provisions 
of the Covenant and also the difficulties, if any, affecting the 
implementation of the Covenant. Because of the inadequacy and the 
general character of many of the initial reports, the Committee has 
developed some general guidelines about the form and content of the 
re p o r ts 22 in order to help the states to fulfill their obligations and 
facilitate the Committee's work when examining them.23
Nevertheless, although different countries have willingly ratified 
this Covenant, whereby the investigatory body was set up, there has 
been resistance from these states party themselves to the work of
the Committee. Some states believe that human rights practices are
within their internal jurisdiction and therefore should not be subject 
to international scrutiny. Others thought that such practices 
represented a diminution of their national sovereignty.24 These 
reservations soon began to emerge when states party were reluctant 
to send their representatives to the Committee, or delayed sending 
their reports.25 In spite of these difficulties, the Committee, on the
whole, has been able to carry out its work satisfactorily.
22-These guidelines where adopted at the second session (44th meeting) in 
August 1977. Doc. A/32/44 Apx. IV.
23-For a better explanation of the General Guidelines, see U.N. Doc. CCPR 
1/A dd.l. Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee 1977-1978. Vol. 2 Documents 
o f the first to the fifth session including of the Committee to the General 
Assembly, p. 248.
24-The views of Afro-Asian states was that: "The time has not yet come when 
the states which had recently gained their independence could give up their 
sovereignty with complete confidence." F. Jhabvala, (1984) op. cit. p. 86.
25-U.N. Document A/33/40. Paragraph, 33 states that: "At the third session, the 
Committee was informed that 18 states had so far submitted their initial reports 
to the Committee, that 20 other States Parties which should have submitted 
their initial reports in 1977 had not yet done so, and 6 States Parties were due to 
subm it their initial reports in 1978." Moreover, the worst case of a delayed 
submission was by Zaire. It report due in 1978, was submitted nine years later. 
Doc. CCPR/c/4/add. 10.
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There has been a further debate about how the Committee ought 
to operate. Does it limit itself to the reports submitted by the states
party only, or does it have to go far beyond that to include reports
by the m edia, or non-governm ent o rgan izations? Some
representatives expressed the views that the Committee should 
restrict its activities to the literal provision of article 40. The
representative of Chile, for instance, said that:
Consideration of the report of Chile should be confined 
to the terms of article 40 of the Covenant and it was 
inadmissible that allegations should have been made on 
the basis of information obtained from sources other 
than those provided in the Covenant.26
Moreover,.another question needed to be resolved concerning 
the role of the Committee in relation to the study of states' reports. 
Does the Committee have to make general comments? Is it 
em powered to conclude whether a country has satisfied its 
obligations or not? The role of the Committee has become one of
studying reports and making general recommendations whenever it 
feels it is appropriate, and to assist states party in fulfilling their 
obligations and encouraging them to promote human rights by the 
way of work which follows.
Once a state's report is received -which is supposed to be 
prepared according to the general guidelines27- it is discussed in the 
presence of a representative of the state concerned. This is to engage 
in a friendly dialogue between the experts and the delegation, which 
will explain different points and/or answer some of the questions
26-U.N. Document, A/34/40. Par. 107.
27-A ccording to Rule 70 o f the Human Rights Com m ittee's Rules of 
procedures, if in the opinion of the Committee a state report does not contain 
sufficient information, the Committee may require that state to furnish more.
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that the Committee's members may ask. It also takes notes of the 
different questions that the Com m ittee may require some 
clarification. Professor R. Higgins, a member of this Committee,
describes its work as follows:
But the total context is one of encouragement rather 
than condemnation, if that is at all possible. Each 
delegation will be warmly welcomed, and an attempt 
will be made to put them at their ease....It is explained 
that the Committee's role is not to attack or condemn, or 
to engage in any sort of political campaign against the
state concerned. Rather it is to engage in a constructive
and friendly dialogue, to see if the Committee can assist 
the government concerned in making progress in the 
realization of human rights in its territory...The 
Committee much prefers to know that there are 
problems and shortcomings, and try to assist in 
rectifying these, than to be told that the Covenant is 
fully implemented and that absolutely no problems 
exist in respect of human rights.28
According to this opinion, the Committee is to encourage rather 
than condemn the practices of human rights. Different claims that the
Covenant is fully implemented in some countries is a general practice
such as those made by the Soviet representatives.29 Such claims are 
not usually true, since the practices of the states fell below what they 
in fact committed themselves to. Thus, a self recognition of the 
shortcomings in the progress of implementing the Covenant is a 
significant factor to the Committee in helping countries where the
changes are needed. The experts, as Professor Higgins puts it:
do not grade the countries, either issuing blanket 
condemnation or giving a clear bill of health. Nor do we
28-R. Higgins, "Encouraging human rights." L.S.E. Quarterly, Autumn 1988. 
p. 256.
29-T he Soviet rep resen ta tive , Mr D.V. Bykov, claim ed that with the 
development of socialism "the nationality question had been resolved once and 
for all." Another Soviet representative, Mr K. F. Gustenko, claimed that "there 
were no political prisoners in the USSR" F. Jhabvala, (1985) op. cit. p. 479.
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put them on a league table in which they be compared
to other countries.30
The purpose of this is to make countries feel that no matter what 
their human rights record is, the Committee is not going to condemn 
them or make any comparison with others which have better
records. On the contrary, it deals with each country on its own, and 
tries to pinpoint the shortcomings and the different means by which 
countries may overcome them.
Up till now the process has been conducted on the basis of
friendly dialogue. It is a comprehensive way whereby cooperation 
with the Committee is maintained. Nevertheless, it would be more 
appropriate to make some comparisons during the Committee's 
sessions that would be beneficial for different countries.31 That is, 
the Committee will not criticise the country under scrutiny, if it feels 
some shortcomings by referring to different experiences in other 
states party; at the same time it encourages countries which have
3 0-R . Higgins, (1988) op. cit. p. 257.
31-This is not to suggest that the Committee should grade countries, or as "legal 
com m entators have suggested that we [the Committee's members] should be 
more ready to condemn, to issue hostile criticism , to differentiate the "good" 
countries from the bad countries"(R. Higgins, (1988) op. cit. p. 257.) But, the 
point that needs to be stressed in that breaking on how to bring to the
attention of different countries experiences that have been followed in any of
the state party and which may be genuine in the respect and promotion of 
human rights. The example that can be stated in this respect is the Italian one 
after the introduction of the Interm inisterial Committee on Human Rights. Sir
V in cen t Evans (U .K ., form er C om m ittee m em ber) said that: "The
In te rm in is te ria l Comm ittee on Human R ights, which included not only 
governm ent representatives but also representatives of private organisations 
and scholars was an admirable mechanism, that had helped to produce one of 
the best reports the Committee had yet received." U.N. Doc. CCPR/3. p. 37. The 
experience of Italy, for instance, is a genuine one which should be brought to 
the attention of different states which may follow the same path or develop 
other measures which would be more suitable for their conditions.
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done well to do more in the promotion of human rights.
There has been some resistance to the work of the Committee;
some states, for instance, have resisted sending reports or providing
additional information. There are still some difficulties in the
reporting system or the steps taken by the states towards the
enjoyment of human rights. This covers specific areas when there is
of antagonism between the provisions of the Covenant and national 
laws. Nonetheless, the Committee has been successful in many
instances. This will be discussed in the next section when dealing
with the particular case studies.
2-2 Individual communications
Apart from dealing with states' reports as discussed above, the
investigatory role of the Committee consists of dealing with 
individual communications under the Protocol. Article 6 of this
Protocol states that:
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to 
the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications 
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to 
be victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the 
rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall 
be received by the Committee if it concerns a state 
party to the Covenant which is not party to the present 
Protocol.32
This procedure has further revolutionized the approach to the 
issue of human rights. The fact that an individual can make 
complaints against his/her own state is a very significant step 
forward towards the full implementation of human rights. However,
32-1. Brownlie, ed., (1972) op. cit. pp. 181-2.
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there are some conditions that are to be taken into account when 
sending these communications. They must be sent by the person 
concerned, or by another on his/her behalf-stating the kind of the 
relationship- and that the matter had exhausted all domestic 
remedies, so that the Committee would consider whether they were 
admissible or not. If a communication was admissible, it would be 
forwarded to the state party concerned for clarification within six 
m onths.33
This again will depend on the publicity given by the state having 
ratified this Protocol. In other words, how many people, or what is 
the percentage of the population who know that their government
has ratified this Protocol? How many of them would know that they 
can complain to the Committee when their rights under the Covenant 
are, in their view, abused? Governments have willingly ratified both 
the Covenant and the Protocol knowing the new responsibilities they 
would have to undertake. Nonetheless, there might be some 
hypocrisy on the part of some governments to give shining example 
and argue that human rights are observed since they have ratified
these instruments. What is the meaning of a country like Zaire, for 
instance, ratifying this Protocol? There is little, if any, significance for 
the simple Zairian citizen who is underfed, lacks adequate housing,
and is often illiterate, that he can complain against his/her
33-Article 4 of the Protocol states that:
1-Subject to the provisions of article 3, the Committee shall bring any
communications submitted to it under the present Protocol to the attention of
the State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be violating any provision of
the Covenant.
2-W ithin six months, the receiving states shall submit to the Committee written 
explanations, or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that
may have been taken by that state.
Ibid., p 182.
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government. How can one expect illiterate people in the Third World 
to be aware of their rights under the Protocol? In the best of cases 
where people are indeed aware of this possibility, a fundamental 
question cannot be avoided: what would happen to the letters, if any, 
they send to the Committee? In other words, how many 
communications does the Committee receive from the original 
number of communications sent? It is quite impossible to answer 
this question since the original number of communications sent is 
never known. Furthermore, people living under oppressive regimes 
would certainly abstain from such exercise fearing their 
governments' response. Nevertheless, the point that needs to be 
stressed in this context is that the process of controlling private mail 
in the majority of Third World countries, for instance, is a daily 
event, let alone 'official' mail. One may safely conclude that hundreds 
of these communications never reach the Committee, and that the 
number of people who do send these communications is never 
know n.
Finally, the last task of the Committee is to deal with interstate 
disputes. The provision of article 41 provides for the way whereby 
the Committee works. The Committee receives communications from 
a state party which recognized the competence of the Committee to 
do so, against another state party which failed to take the necessary 
steps towards observing the provisions of the Covenant. However, 
surprising as it might seem, to the best of the author's knowledge the 
Committee has never dealt with such disputes.34
2-3: Derogation:
34-R. Higgins, (1988) op. cit. p.254.
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Article 4 of the Covenant provides for the right to derogation in 
emergency, would be appropriate to see what effect it has on the 
work of the Committee in general.
Article 4 of the Covenant allows states party to derogate from 
the provisions of the Covenant by suspending some guaranteed
aspects of human rights in times of public emergency that threaten 
the life of the nation. Although the article provides for rights that 
should not be derogated from, and the suspension should strictly be 
in accordance with the exigencies required by the new situations, 
states' practices have often been open to criticism. It is generally
agreed that the worst abuses occur during times of public emergency
that make states invulnerable to scrutiny, since what happened finds 
its logical explanation in the newly emerged situation. However, the 
questions to be asked here are: what constitutes a threat to the 
nation? Is there a real threat and a genuine case where a state of
emergency should be declared? For how long does the situation last?
Since there is derogation in public emergency, states have often 
used it to justify their actions. Although the Covenant provides for 
the states party to notify the Committee of the new situation and the 
rights that are to be suspended, "States Parties to the Covenant have 
tended to provide only delayed and inadequate notices of derogation, 
or sometimes, none at all."35
In some cases, states of emergency have been declared when 
there is no real threat to the nation, unless the term 'threat to the 
nation' means to the privileged group in power. In other words, 
states of emergency have been declared because there is a danger 
that may bring down a government, or governments themselves
35-J. F. Hartman, "Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the article 4 
Derogation provision" Human Rights Quarterly, (7) 1985 p. 99.
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have created these states of emergency to ensure that their powers 
are unchallenged. These is especially true in Africa and Latin 
America, where states of emergency have been declared after the 
numerous coups d'etat that these countries witnessed. Moreover, 
long lasting states of emergency are another problem, where the 
reasons behind the declaration of the state of emergency are no 
longer applicable.
There are several further difficulties, in connection with 
derogation, that may arise when dealing with the work of the 
Committee. These are due to the different interpretations of the term 
"threat to the nation". What constitutes a threat in an 
underdeveloped country is not automatically one in a developed one. 
In the former, it is generally linked to the selfishness of the people in 
power and how to ensure their long standing in power. As with the 
study of states' reports, overcoming these difficulties depends very 
much on the cooperation of governments, i.e., to assist the Committee 
by providing the up to date information concerning the state of 
emergency, and seeking advice and help whenever the governments 
are in doubt. By joining efforts both governments and the Committee, 
especially governments, have shown their willingness to promote 
and respect human rights, which is the main aim of the Committee.
Ill: Case studies:
This section deals with some particular cases in the light of the 
Committee's work. The choice of case studies was difficult to make, 
since there are a lot of countries that could possibly be considered. In 
this choice Western developed countries were avoided since they do
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not lead the reader to understand fully the Committee’s work and 
how successful it has been. On the other hand, they have the 
organizational and judicial organs whereby they implement the 
Covenant. However, by taking different countries such as the former 
U.S.S.R., a leading example of communist practice up to 1991, one 
sees that the Committee operates in a different environment, since 
the priorities in the former Soviet Union were not those which the 
Committee has tried to safeguard. Moreover, I shall discuss the 
changes that took place in that country after the introduction of 
P eres tro ika .  The other example that will be highlighted is that of 
Chile, a country notorious for its human rights violations especially 
after the 1973 military coup, and which has experienced extended 
periods of states of siege.
3-1: The U.S.S.R.:
The U.S.S.R. ratified the Covenant on 16 October 1973 and 
therefore was among the first thirty five countries for which the 
Covenant entered into effect almost three years later. What seems to 
be surprising about the Soviet Union, as already pointed out earlier, 
is that the provisions of the Covenant are not in line with Soviet 
orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union made itself accountable to 
the Committee. However, what should be pointed out at this stage is 
that ratifying an international agreement does not automatically 
mean that the state which has done so, observes it. Therefore, the 
Soviet case should be scrutinized to find out to what extent, if any, 
the Committee was successful in bringing about changes in the Soviet 
jurisdiction concerning human rights.
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Extensive changes in Soviet policies were clearly taking place in 
the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power. In other words, 
improvements, if any, in the sphere of human rights could not be 
solely attributed to the Committee, but to the different policies 
introduced by the new General Secretary. Moreover, a genuine 
assessment of the Soviet experience would be ideal, but could not be 
achieved. This is due to the fact that changes were taking place so 
rapidly in the former Soviet Union and what can be satisfactory 
today would be out of date in a short period of time.36
A close look at the different reports submitted to the Committee 
reveals that there was a shift in the Soviet government's attitude 
towards the Committee in the course of a decade: from a hostile 
position to a more accommodatory, self-critical one.37 This can be 
seen as a very significant step forward towards the improvement of 
the human rights situation. The claims that the Covenant is fully 
implemented in any country are not in the interests of the country
36-M r. Yakovlev ( the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics) said that: "changes were taking place so rapidly in the Soviet Union 
that the report was already somewhat out of date, and he would therefore 
provide some additional information in his introduction." U.N. Doc. CCPR/ C/ SR 
928 par. 5.
37-The defensive position of the Soviet government can be seen during the 
d iscussion of the Soviet initial report in 1978 claiming that everything was 
fine. Mr. Sudarikov, the Soviet representative, said that his country's report 
(CCPR/C/l/A dd. 22) clearly showed that all the provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were fully respected in the Soviet law." 
CCPR/C/l/A dd. 22, 108, Meeting, Tuesday, Oct. 24, 1978. par. 2. He stressed 
further that "due to a high level of development of Soviet legislation, the 
ra tifica tion  by the Soviet Union of the International Covenants on human 
rights in 1973, and their entry into force in 1976 did not entail any essential 
changes of, or supplements to, Soviet legislation." U.N. Document A/33/40. Par. 
411. However, this position changed, Mr.Yakovlev (U.S.S.R.) said that: "A matter 
o f m ajor concern to his government was the lack of effective machinery for 
the full realisation of civil and political rights." U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928 Par. 
8 .
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concerned given the role of the Committee. Mr.Sadi, a Committee
member, stated that:
...the Committee was not a tribunal with the power to 
condemn but rather a body responsible for constructive 
criticism that would help countries to fulfill their 
obligations under the Covenant.38
The Soviet Union, as well as other East European countries, did 
not at first cooperate with the Committee. There had always been 
claims that the Covenant is fully implemented, and that there are 
different interpretations of human rights depending on the socio­
political system. Jhabvala states that:
During the Committee's discussion of the Soviet Union's 
report, Committee member Bernhard Graefrath, an East 
German national, noted that it would be improper for 
the Committee to define human rights according to the 
standards of one model social system since different 
countries have "different conceptions" of "public order 
and morality" as well as approaches to freedom of 
expression.39
Thus, the initial Soviet report was full of claims that the
Covenant was fully implemented in the Soviet Union, and that the
Soviet peoples, according to the representative of their government,
"were proud of their achievements in human rights and had nothing 
to hide from world public opinion in that field."40 Soviet laws and 
constitution, it was agreed, guaranteed the rights set forth in the
Covenant. However, there is a big difference between different 
provisions of the laws and the constitution and the practices. 
Although the Soviet constitution guaranteed freedom of movement, 
for instance, how easy was it for a Soviet citizen to travel abroad?
38-U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 25 and 40. 130th Meeting, April 12, 1979. par. 44.
39-F. Jhabvala, (1985) p. 478.
40-U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/1/ Add. 22. 112th Meeting. Thursday, Oct. 26th, 1978. par. 3.
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From a Soviet point of view, this right was fully guaranteed, and 
anything that questions this fact was just a myth. Mr.Sudarikov, the
Soviet representative, said that:
The situation with respect to freedom of movement was 
clearly set forth in the Soviet media and by Soviet 
official bodies. The assertions that millions of persons 
wanting to leave the Soviet Union was a myth: that was 
not the case and never had been. The decreasing 
number of persons who did, however, could request exit 
visas from the Ministry of Interior.41
Nonetheless, such a statement is of questionable validity. There 
must have been some exaggeration on the part of the Soviet 
government as well as from the Western media. However, what is 
the percentage of the people who obtained their visas as compared 
with the total of people asking for one? Moreover, what is the 
percentage of people who asked for visas from the original number 
wanting to leave the Soviet Union but who never asked for an exit 
visa for various reasons? The answer to these questions is not an 
easy one, if not impossible. But they show that there are some 
restrictions upon this right, which make freedom of movement not as 
obvious a right as the Soviet Constitution stated.
The defensive attitude of the Soviet government could be seen 
as well in the case of self-determination and the secession of the 
Republics. Members of the Committee questioned the possibility of 
any Republic wishing to secede from the Soviet Union, and how easy 
it might be for them to do so. In his response, the Soviet
representative stated that:
...in the first place it should be realized that it was 
absolutely inconceivable that a republic would want to 
secede, since there was an unshakeable bond uniting all
41-Ibid., par. 33.
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the peoples and nations of the state, and they attribute 
their well-being to the fact that they formed part of the 
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the right to secede did exist 
and could be exercised.42
What could be understood from the answer above, and others by 
the Soviet representative, is that they are very politicized, very 
much embodied within the Soviet attitude of defending their 
achievements. The answer could have been more fruitful if it had 
been limited to the question put forward by the Committee's 
members, i.e., that the right to secede exists and how it can be 
exercised, giving examples, if any, of any attempts to secede from the 
Union.
In this context one has to ask oneself a question about the 
"unshakeable bond uniting the peoples and nations of the state", 
which were often no more than a heavy coercive state machinery
ready to interfere whenever a movement aiming at secession 
emerged. This was especially true, at least, in the events that the 
Baltic Republics have witnessed since 1989.
Having said that did not automatically mean that the Soviet's 
record was the worse. As with any country, there were some 
shortcomings in its human rights record. Nonetheless, the Soviet 
Union showed its willingness to cooperate with the Committee, not
only by ratifying the Covenant which made it accountable to this
body, but by submitting its different reports and sending 
representatives of very high calibre to discuss the matter with the
Committee's members.
M oreover, there were some improvements in the Soviet 
performance after the mid 1980s. At this stage one cannot talk about
42-Ibid., par. 8.
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any improvement without reference to the policies introduced by 
G o rb a ch e v .43 Perestroika was a new policy which represented the 
thinking of the new leadership on the internal as well as the external 
situation of the former U.S.S.R. Many changes took place there, among 
those in the sphere of human rights.
The willingness of the Soviet government to carry its cooperation 
with the Committee and its commitment to improve its human rights 
record could be seen from the shift in its attitudes; stating the 
difficulties that the country faced, as well as sending its third 
periodic report ahead of schedule.44 With the different changes that 
took place, undoubtedly, the former Soviet Union was making 
significant steps forward towards the full implementation of human 
rights. Moreover, more attention was paid to international human 
rights standards.45
According to the Soviet representative, the Soviet government 
had realized that there had been some shortcomings in the area of 
human rights and different draft laws had been adopted or were
43-M r.Fador, a Com m ittee member, "said that since the Com m ittee had 
received the second periodic report of the U.S.S.R., tremendous changes had 
taken place in Soviet society in the framework of the new policy P e re s tro ik a . 
The positive effects of that policy where human rights were concerned
deserved acknowledgement, as did the informative and concise report o f the 
U.S.S.R. (CCPR/C/52/Add. 2) and its useful supplement (CCPR/C/52/Add. 6). The 
Soviet representative's introduction had been extremely helpful in outlining 
the most recent developments in the human rights situation in his country.
"U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928. par. 21.
44-The Chairman recalled "the third periodic report, due in November 1988,
had been received ahead of scheduled." U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928. par. 2.
45-M r.Y akovlev, the Soviet representative, said that "a teaching course on 
in ternational human rights standards was to be organised in Moscow in
N ovem ber/D ecem ber, 1989 by the Centre for Human R ights, with the 
participation of three members of the Committee, Mrs Higgins, Ms Chanet and 
Mr Procar, whose presence could be most welcome. The programme included a 
visit to the Ministry of Justice." U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928. par. 13.
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waiting to be approved to put an end to that situation.46 Perhaps 
the most important measure to be taken was in the judicial field. Mr.
Yakovlev told the Committee that:
Important measures had also been taken in the field of 
judicial reform. It was realized that without a suitable 
legal system and independent courts governed solely by 
the law and protected against interference there could 
be no effective machinery to guarantee the enjoyment 
by citizens of their rights and freedoms.47
Moreover, there have been some changes in different aspects of 
human rights, mainly freedom of movement, of conscience, 
expression and ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals, which have 
mainly been the subject of the 931st meeting.48
Different shortcomings were acknowledged and remedies were
in prospect. Mr.Pocar, a Committee member, stated that:
...after having examined the summary records of the 
meetings devoted to the consideration of the second 
periodic report of the U.S.S.R. (CCPR/C/28Add.3), he 
wished to emphasize that distinct progress had been 
made, precisely in areas that had caused the Committee 
concern, namely, freedom of conscience, the treatment
46-The Soviet representative told the Com m ittee that: "A great deal of 
legislation with direct bearing on human rights was being enacted." U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR. 928 par. 6.
M oreover, Mr Yakovlev, answering the questions put forward to him by the 
C om m ittee 's m em bers said that: "R egarding freedom  of relig ion , he
acknowledged that the legislation in force was not yet perfect. However, there 
were no limitations in practice, which evolved more rapidly than legislation, 
and it might be said that religion has its place in society." Ibid., par. 18.
47-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928. par. 9. Moreover, Yuri Bandura, argues that:" 
W hat we need are not just "good" laws, we also need mechanisms supporting 
e ffec tiv e  leg islation  oriented tow ards the all-around w ell-being o f the 
individuals. We need a system of control to monitor observance of human 
rights, commitments as strict as that monitoring the observance of arms 
limitation agreements. "Human Rights: The View From Geneva." Moscow News , 
No. 9, 1989. p. 6.
48-For a detailed analysis see U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 931.
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of persons interned in psychiatric institutions, freedom 
of movement and freedom of political activity.49
To sum up, there were many changes taking place in the former 
Soviet Union which had some effect on the human rights situation. 
Although Gorbachev's policies were very significant, one should not 
neglect the role of the Committee. The discussion of the different 
reports submitted by the Soviet Union, and different shortcomings 
highlighted by the Committee's members, undoubtedly helped the 
Soviet government improve its standards. Satisfaction was noticed on 
the part of the Committee’s members with the third Soviet report,50 
and with promises from the Soviet delegation to work on the 
improvement of their record.5 1
3-2: Chile:
The Covenant came into force on 23 March, 1976 in Chile, after 
the latter ratified it on 10 February 1972. Nonetheless, substantial 
changes took place in the period between the ratification of the 
Covenant and its entry into force, which should be pointed out for a 
better understanding of the attitudes of both the Chilean government 
and the Committee's members.
In the fall of 1973, the democratically elected government of
49-U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/SR. 931. par. 54.
50-Mrs Higgins, for instance, observed that: "the third periodic report of the 
U.S.S.R. and the discussion to which it had just given rise were exemplary. She 
congratu lated  Mr Yakovlev and his colleagues on their com petence and
thanked them for having accepted the suggestions of the Committee on a
number of points." U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 931. par. 73.
51-Mr Yakovlev said that: "The discussion had been extremely enriching for 
the Soviet delegation which had acquired considerable knowledge that would 
be useful in the future." Ibid., par. 86.
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Chile was overthrown by a military coup d'etat, suspending all the 
constitutional guarantees although the Chilean representatives stated 
the opposite.52 Following the coup a state of siege was imposed, all 
political parties were dissolved and major human rights abuses
began to take place.
The initial Chilean report, due in 1977, was submitted and
discussed in 1979. In the discussion, the Committee's members did 
not limit themselves to the information and the claims contained in 
the report submitted by the government, but went beyond that to 
use the information contained in a report by the ad hoc working
group. This had led to some tensions between the Committee's 
members and the Chilean government's representatives.
The Chilean report claimed that the situation in the country was 
in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, and that human 
rights in general were fully respected.53 Also "the government of 
Chile had also informed the Secretary-General which rights had been 
restricted, thus complying with its obligation under the Covenant".54
In what follows, I shall not engage in a detailed scrutiny of the 
Chilean report, but examine the improvement, if any, that may have 
taken place since the discussion of the initial one. The latter give rise 
to many controversies. The Committee's members, although
52-Mr. Claredon, the Chilean representative, states that: "On September 11th, 
1973, the same day that the armed forces had assumed power, legislative decree 
No. 1 had declared  that the governm ent Junta guaranteed the full 
effectiveness of the powers of the judiciary and respect for the constitution 
and laws." U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 25 and 40. 127th. meeting, par. 18.
53-M r Dieye, Chilean representative, "pointed out that civil and political 
rights, and human rights in general were respected only when there was an 
independent judicial power. That was especially important in the case of Chile, 
a country with a very old democratic tradition in which the independence of 
the magistracy had always been unquestioned." Ibid., par. 34.
54-Ibid., par. 23.
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maintaining a friendly dialogue, heavily criticized the report showing 
that it was insufficient,55 that it did not give a clear picture of the 
human rights situation and especially that it contradicted the 
findings of the ad hoc working group. Mr. Hanga, for instance, in his
remarks stated that:
...there were conflicts between the facts established by 
the working group and the statement in the report 
submitted by Chile.56
Given these facts, a new report was requested by the Committee, 
which was eventually submitted. A close look at the reports that 
have followed the initial one shows that there was a shift in the 
Chilean government's attitude towards the Committee as well as an 
improvement in the human rights situation in the country. At the 
discussion of its third periodic report, the Chairman of the committee 
said that:
Members who had been present when the second report 
of Chile had been examined would recall the spirit of 
co-operation and understanding shown by the
delegation of Chile in its dialogue with the 
Committee.57
What can be pointed out at the beginning is that Chile had 
adopted a new constitution in 1980, which, according to its
55- Decaux, argues that:"Le Committe ne s'est pas contente' d 'enrigistrer les 
rapports des Etats parties. En demandant un nouveau rapport au Chili, il a 
souligne' l'insuffisance des informations fourni." E. Decaux, (1980) op. cit. p. 
529.
56-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 25 and 40.128th meeting, par. 10. Moreover, Mr 
Koulishev, a Committee member, said that: "It was not difficult to compare the 
report submitted by the government of Chile with the report of the ad hoc 
w orking group. Anyone examining the former could not forget the working 
group’s findings on the increase in detention for political reasons or for 
reasons of national security and the growing number of cases of intimidation 
torture and missing persons." Ibid., par. 30.
57-U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/SR. 942 par. 2.
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representative, "marked the beginning of a transition towards full 
d em o cracy " ,58 and some improvement in the field of human rights 
was clearly noticeable. Perhaps the most significant of all was the
plebiscite held in October 1988, with the lifting of the state of 
emergency in August 1988.
Since the lifting of the state of emergency many rights have 
been restored, mainly freedom of assembly and of opinion. The
position of the Chilean government has become more flexible, willing 
to cooperate with the Committee on various issues. Such a position, 
undoubtedly, helped Chile improve its human rights record. Mr. El- 
Shafei, a Committee member, summarizing the improvement in Chile, 
observed:
The third periodic report of Chile, although short was
informative, particularly regarding developments which 
had taken place since the submission of the previous 
report. The most notable of those developments had 
been the plebiscite on the presidency, held in October 
1988; the promulgation of a number of acts designed to 
restore a democratic, pluralist regime; publication in the 
Diario Oficial of the text of the Covenant; the lifting of 
the states of emergency in force since 1973; the 
publication of the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Torture; the closing of detention centers 
run by the State Security Police; and, finally, the
conclusion of an agreement with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) permitting that body 
access to detainees.59
Having said that does not mean in any way that human rights in 
Chile are fully respected. There are still some shortcomings in 
different aspects which have been brought out to the attention of the 




there have been improvements in this field since the initial report 
and the Chilean government has shown some cooperation with the 
Committee. Given the adoption of the constitution and laws and the 
restoration of different rights, one would expect the human rights 
situation to improve further in this country.
IV: The Committee's work and the comparative study of
human rights
Although the Committee does not engage in any comparison or 
ranking of countries, nonetheless, its work can lead to such a 
conclusion. In addition to the different difficulties that face the 
Committee in carrying out its work properly, discussed above, one 
may stress two other which are of the same importance. First, it was 
found that some misunderstanding had taken place during the
discussion of some reports due to difficulties in the translation. Again 
problems of a conceptual nature arise whenever a study of human 
rights is attempted. During the discussion of Madagascar's report, for
instance, the representative of that government said:
The question which had arisen with respect to 
imprisonment for debt appeared to be the result of 
misunderstanding. He explained that the French 
expression "contrainte par corps" used in Article 68 of
the Decree No 59.121 (section 7 of the report) did not in
fact refer to persons "imprisoned for debt", as the 
English translation suggested. As used in Madagascar, it 
meant simply that persons sentenced to pay a fine 
could, in a lieu of payment, serve a prison term.60
Therefore, one would be very much in favour of the presence of 
an expert from the state concerned during the translation of the
60-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 14. 87th meeting, par. 24.
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report to avoid any misunderstanding that might otherwise occur. 
The second, pointed out earlier, is that the Committee lacks enough 
time to sustain the workload put upon it. This is made worse by the 
fact that some questions are raised by more than one member of the 
C om m ittee ,61 at the time, when Committee members should abstain 
from  raising any question already mentioned by one of their 
colleagues.
The Committee's work is very sensitive and may face a lot of 
difficulties especially in the Third World. "The selfish reluctance of 
the ruling classes or groups", Bandura argues, "to give up their long 
lasting privileges"62 is very significant in generating opposition to 
the work of the Committee. The Committee, as opposed to the 
different analyses dealt with in this dissertation, has set itself a 
standard of achievement in the Covenant. Countries have freely 
ratified it, knowing the responsibilities they should assume. The 
scope of the human rights is larger, i.e., does not limit itself to some 
aspects of human rights but to the civil and political rights set.
Some difficulties had been posed by the fact that the Committee 
works within one single set of rights, avoiding the economic and 
cultural ones. The formulation of the Covenant was undertaken 
within a dominant Western orientation, which makes it quite distant 
from the realities in the Third World. The realization of the Covenant 
does require a minimum level of development and of state welfare. 
This is especially true in the case of Madagascar and Mali, to name 
just two. The representative of the former publicly pointed out that:
61-D uring the discussion of the Iranian report, Mr. K hosroshachi, the 
government’s representative, said that: "The question of the Bahai's had been 
raised by no less than five members, which seemed a waste of time when one 
would have sufficed." U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 58. 368th meeting par. 53.
62-Y. Bandura,, op. cit. p. 6.
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The promotion of civil and political rights in his country 
had been hampered by the lack of judicial facilities, the 
sharp rise in crime and the worsening of the economic 
situation as the result of the world economic crisis.63
There is no doubt about the importance of economic and cultural 
rights if the Covenant is to be fully implemented. The more people 
are educated, the higher their awareness is about their rights, and 
the more likely they are to put pressure on their government to 
comply with the international standards. Sir Vincent Evans, a former 
Committee member, questioned "whether serious attention was being 
paid in Madagascar to prison conditions and the rehabilitation of 
p r iso n e rs ."64 Although along with the Covenant's provisions, one 
would have done better to make inquiries about the living situation 
of the people in Madagascar let alone prisoners' condition. How can 
someone expect improvement in prison conditions in a poor,
deprived country like Madagascar?
Members of the Committee had often stressed the 
importance of economic and social factors for civil and 
political rights [Mr. Hanga argues,] unless there had 
been economic and social basis, the civil and political 
rights set out in the Covenant are practically
m eaningless.65
63-U.N. Doc. A/33/40. Par. 260. Moreover, in the discussion of the report of 
Mali, "the view was expressed that the report could not be judged in absolute 
terms or on the same basis as a report from a developed country; that although 
the Committee must adopt an objective approach in seeking assertions whether 
a state party was safeguarding the rights set forth in the Covenant, it should 
bear in mind that civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, 
social and cu ltu ral rights on the o ther, were interdependent, that the
econom ic circum stances of a Sahelian country like M ali could not be 
overlooked when considering its report; and that it was particularly important 
to understand the background and the conditions prevailing the country 
concerned." F. Jhabvala, (1984) op. cit. p. 103.
64-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 14. 84th Meeting par. 31.
65-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add. 14. 83rd Meeting par. 25.
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Therefore, one would have hoped to see the Human Rights 
Committee dealing not only with the states’ report under the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but also under the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is particularly relevant 
since another Committee was set up for the purpose of studying 
reports under the latter Covenant.66 This question was put to a 
Committee member who assured the author that it was better for the 
Committee to work within the existing set of rights, and that it was in 
the interest of the states themselves if the rights were monitored by 
two different bodies. Moreover, it was easier for the Committee 
members also to deal with the different questions that were within 
their field of competence.67
In the light of what has been said one can see the importance of 
the work that the Committee does. It is a body which provides 
different information in great detail about what is happening in 
different countries that have ratified the Covenant. It is difficult to 
argue that the work of the Committee is motivated by political 
considerations. The differences between countries do exist in terms 
of their understanding of the Covenant, and the different stages of 
development that had they experienced. Nonetheless, the Committee 
does not apply arbitrary measures which would make its work 
hostile in some parts of the world. The stress has always been, as far
66-"The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will replace the 
sessional working group of governmental experts of ECOSOC which has been 
dealing with the reporting obligations of States Parties to the Covenant on 
Econom ic, Social and cultural rights." J. L. G. Del Prado, "United Nations 
Conventions on Human Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in dealing with 
reporting obligations of States Parties". Human Rights Quarterly , 7 (1985) p. 
494.
67-Interview, see note 11 above.
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as the Committee's work is concerned, not upon comparing countries 
in terms of their observance of human rights, but on helping them to 
improve their standards. This can be very significant to the states 
themselves knowing that they would not be condemned but offered 
help whenever they request so. This will not only improve the 
human rights record in general, but at the same time offer a 
researcher fertile ground upon which a comparative study of human 
rights, based on the Committee’s work, can be conducted. This study 
can either be an over-time assessment of one particular country to 
monitor the improvements, if any, with respect to the provisions of 
the Covenant, or, it can be a comparison between states party to the 
Covenant to compare whether they made any progress in the rights 
provided in this Covenant. Such comparisons are plausible and would 
certainly help to detect whether progress has been made or not and 




Quantitative Approaches to the Comparative Study 
of Human Rights: The work of Charles Humana
The measurement of human rights is a very complex issue. As 
with many other concepts in the social sciences, difficulties arise not 
only at the level of data but at the conceptual level as well. In order 
to measure human freedoms, one needs a basis to one's analysis, 
which consists of a definition of the concept, and also consists of the 
different variables which are considered to be relevant to the subject 
upon which the measurement and comparison can be obtained.
In the discussion that follows, I shall look at the work 
undertaken by Charles Humana more closely than has been 
attem pted before.1 Humana carried out two exercises of this kind 
in 1983 and 1986, both of which will be discussed in this chapter. (It 
should be added, that a third edition of Humana's work was 
pub lished  in 1992.2 This will be discussed briefly in the 
conclusion). In particular, I look at the validity of these attempts at 
quantitative measures for human rights. Thus, I shall try to answer 
some critical questions that may influence the outcome of his results 
by giving examples whenever appropriate. The most important of 
these is the objectivity of the questions and the accuracy of the 
answers. In other words, what are the philosophical foundations or
1-The quantitative work of Charles Humana has not really been taken very 
seriously by the human rights community. However, it became a m atter of 
public controversy in 1991 when it was taken by an independent body: the UN 
D evelopm ent Program , which published the "Human Developm ent Report" 
based on Humana's work.
2-C. Humana, World Human Rights Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992)
1 8 2
the background to the questionnaire? Is his work applicable to 
different cultures? Is the study biased, in this case, influenced by the 
Western culture to which the author belongs? Finally, what are the 
main difficulties, if any, in applying Humana's inquiries on a cross­
national basis?
In order to answer these questions, and for a better 
understanding of Humana's attempts to measure human rights, this 
chapter begins with the philosophical foundations of his study. In the 
second part, the methodology he employs is analyzed. The third 
section focuses on the two different types of assessment of countries 
employed in the study. Two striking examples are highlighted in this 
connection; Israel and South Africa. The strengths and weaknesses of 
applying this study in comparative perspective are also examined.
However, before doing that it was thought appropriate to stress 
that, contrary to what Humana states in his introduction that: "the 
United Nations organization, though it adopted the human rights 
treaties, does not issue periodic reports on the extent to which the 
member states honour them."3 The UN Human Rights Committee 
does indeed report to the UN General Assembly on its monitoring of 
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and with the Optional Protocol, and has published reports 
throughout the 1980s. This was discussed in some depth in chapter 
five. Furthermore, before going into the study of Humana's work, his 
definition of the concept of human rights should be quoted He
defines them as:
In simplest terms they are laws and practices that 
have evolved over the centuries to protect ordinary 
people, minorities, groups and races from oppressive
3-C. Humana, The Economist World Human Rights Guide (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1986) p. 1.
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rulers and governments.4
I: Philosophical foundations of the study
To understand the philosophical foundations of any study is to
be able to predict, to some extent, the outcome of that particular
study. When dealing with a sensitive issue like human rights, and 
trying to develop a set of criteria upon which the ranking of different 
countries may be based, one has to be careful in selecting the 
variables. The selection of variables is very much influenced by the 
culture of any researcher. Humana selects the ones he thinks are 
appropriate, or should be considered as such, and these variables 
influence the outcome of the study. This first section accordingly 
analyses the foundations of Humana's study, which will enable the 
reader to better understand the conclusions and the rankings of 
different countries that are the outcome of his inquiries.
It should be borne in mind, as already pointed out in this 
chapter, that Humana undertook two inquiries of this kind; these will 
be examined in order to determine the extent of changes between
the two studies or if any occurred at all.
1-1: The first inquiry
Humana's first inquiry, published in 1983, was based on a 
sample size of 107 countries evaluated in two different ways. When 
there was cooperation with the compiler and data were available, 
countries were assessed through questions. When information was 
scarce or suspect, however, countries were assessed in different,
4-C. Humana, World Human Rights Guide (London: Hutchinson, 1983). p. 7.
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more summary ways. I am particularly interested in the first 
category, which contains 75 countries.5 This group offers the reader 
opportunities to follow the methodology employed to obtain the 
results, and to pinpoint the shortcomings, if any. I shall look at the 
questions and examine their applicability on a cross-national basis.
1-1-1: The questions
A close look at the range of the questions used by Humana 
reveals that some of them are of questionable validity. In other 
words, they do not derive from the usual sources of human rights 
a g re e m e n ts .6 This is not to say that what derives from the usual 
sources is always accepted (as we have seen in the previous chapter 
not every country ratified the international documents that 
Humana's study is based upon), but at least it rests upon a fair and 
widely acceptable foundation. However, in this inquiry some of the 
questions are arbitrarily  selected and are culture bound, 
representing the values of western liberal thought. Problematic 
questions such as: drink and the purchase of alcohol, or the number 
of police and military and weapons normally carried out by civil 
police, do not relate to the subject. Moreover, they may favour the 
ranking of some countries and disfavour others. The questions 
related to drinking and purchasing alcohol may very well fit in a 
tourist guide, rather than a serious attempt to measure human rights. 
Some countries in the world, i.e., Islamic ones, prohibit this practice,
5-Ibid., pp.24-5
6-"This Guide is not similarly bound by what is acceptable to all and is 
therefore free to extend its inquiry with explicit questions about divorce and 
abortion, about com pulsory military service and maximum sentences for 
standard offenses." Ibid., p. 8.
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and are therefore culturally different from the rest of the world in 
this respect. The same applies to the remaining questions. One should 
look, for instance, at the causes of the higher number of police and 
military and what roles these two institutions perform in their 
respective countries.
Humana seems to believe that the higher the proportion of police 
and military personnel to the number of citizens in a country, the 
worse the country concerned is in human rights. A country such as 
Syria, to name just one, is seen to be behind many countries on
Humana's scale. This phenomenon can be explained, at least from a
Syrian point of view, by the fact that Syria neighbours Israel and 
there is a constant threat from the latter to its territory. So, the 
question to be asked here is about the role of these institutions. The 
comparatively high number of the Syrian military and police can find 
a reasonable explanation in terms of national security. Therefore, it 
does not seem in any way that the high number of police and
military is a violation of human rights, or that a country's record can 
be judged upon such a variable. These two institutions may be, and 
indeed are in some countries, agencies in the hands of governments 
whereby torture and coercion are carried out, but this has nothing to 
do with their number. Another question is about the weapons
normally carried out by the police. In Algeria, for instance, they 
carry sidearms, while in Papua New Guinea they carry batons only. 
Given this information, one sees in Humana's scores that the former 
is behind the latter. Once again one should not ask oneself what kind 
of weapons are normally carried by the police, but how likely or how 
often they use them? If in a country police carry pistols or sidearms, 
this does not automatically mean that they use them against citizens.
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Perhaps gun control may also be a reason why police need weapons. 
In the U.S. they are armed, however, citizens are allowed to own 
firearm s.
In addition to some of the questions not pertaining closely to 
human rights, Humana's survey also suffers from a degree of 
repetition. The issue of military service, for instance, is the subject of 
two different questions in the study. Although one does not oppose 
the inclusion of "freedom from military service" as a variable - 
because it might be seen as a means of war propaganda- but one 
does object to the inclusion of another question relating to "maximum 
punishment for refusing military service".
It is a general practice in some counties that citizens are free 
from m ilitary serv ice,7 and if they are free, there will be no
punishment whatsoever for refusing it. The opposite could be said 
about countries where military service is compulsory and, if someone 
refuses it, he will be punished accordingly depending on the country. 
Faced with this situation, one sees that there is a tendency in the 
part of the compiler to favour countries which have no compulsory 
military service.
Finally, the questions employed by Humana and which have 
some legal basis derive mainly from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. This Covenant, although ratified by
different countries in the Third World and in the former Eastern 
Europe, nonetheless represents the traditional perception of human 
rights, associated with Western liberal thinking. David Banks rightly 
argues that:
Each of Humana's forty variables reflects a different 
facet of human freedoms. But some are strongly
7 -To name just a few this category includes: Canada, Japan, Senegal and
Papua New Guinea.
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associated and some are quite difficult to assess.8
Humana, nonetheless, undertook a second inquiry to measure 
human rights. He may have done so to overcome the difficulties and 
contradictions found in his first inquiry; a close analysis of his second 
study will help to establish the extent to which he has been able to 
do so.
1-2: The second inquiry
Raymond Gastil argues that:
Charles Humana's World Human Rights Guide, a
comprehensive attempt to review the state of human
rights, is now in its second edition. Humana's selection
of forty questions of detailed country by country
exam ination is buttressed by citation of the 
international human rights documents that support 
each.9
Humana sought to avoid arbitrary questions, and in this inquiry 
all the questions used in the questionnaire were based upon 
different articles in international agreements. However, this does not 
mean that the questionnaire is immune from criticism or that it can 
be relied upon as an objective measure of comparative human rights.
A critical look at the questionnaire reveals that 57.5 per cent of 
the questions are drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 35 per cent from the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and only 7.5 per cent from the International
8-D. Banks, "Patterns of oppression: A statistical analysis of human rights."
In  the 1985 proceedings o f the Social S ta tistics Section o f  the American
Statistical Association, Vol. 4 p. 156.
9-R. D. Gastil, Freedom in the World . Political Rights And Civil Liberties
1986-1987 (New York: Greenwood, 1987) p. 87.
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Such a distinction 
greatly influences the outcome of the inquiry. Although Humana 
drew his questions from legal documents that countries had agreed 
upon, the result of the questionnaire would have been different if 
the distribution of the questions had been in favour of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Civil and Political Rights had little 
significance -in practice- in the Eastern bloc because of the priorities 
they had at this time adopted, and in most countries in the Third 
World because of historical and practical reasons: historical reasons, 
such as poverty and illiteracy and the commitment of governments 
to overcome these problems, and practical reasons, such as the form 
of their governments (usually military dictatorships). Thus, a 
questionnaire based on civil and political rights will, without any 
doubt, favour western countries.
A lthough the questionnaire is based on international 
instruments, nonetheless, it fails to overcome the fact that these 
rights represent the values of the liberal democracies. Moreover, 
some of the rights in the questionnaire are only indirectly supported 
by international instruments. Humana derives the right to be free 
from Capital Punishment, for instance, from article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.10 However, the 
provisions of this article do not prohibit the imposition of the death
1 0 -Paragraphs 2 and 5 of article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights state that:
2) In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death 
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in 
force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the 
provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out 
pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.
5) Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
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penalty. It stresses rather that it should only be imposed in "most 
serious crimes in accordance with the law", and that it "should not be 
imposed for crimes committed by persons below the age of eighteen 
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women". If the provisions of 
this article permit the death penalty -albeit in very rare cases- why 
should Humana class countries which have failed to abolish it below 
those which have done so? Moreover, the term "most serious crimes 
in accordance with the law at the time" is a very vague and complex 
one. What is considered as a most serious crime under Iranian or 
Saudi Arabian laws does not mean anything in another society with a 
different culture. Adultery, for instance, is a very serious crime 
under Islamic law and is punishable by the death penalty, whereas 
the sentence, if any, is less severe in most other countries. Moreover, 
what one has to bear in mind is the crimes committed during times 
of emergencies. Experience has shown in many countries in the Third 
World that some of the worst human rights abuses have occurred 
during states of emergency. The point that needs to be stressed here 
is that the Covenant does not prohibit the use of the death penalty in 
principle, and some of the violations are within the law at the time 
they are carried out.
To sum up, the example discussed above shows the internal 
contradiction of Humana's attempt to measure human rights on a 
cross-national basis. In the first inquiry, some of the questions were 
irrelevant to the subject, and in the second, although based on 
international agreements, they tended to be western and culture- 
bound. Upon these two sets of questionnaires, Humana tried to 
develop a strategy whereby human rights are m easured 
internationally; this will be discussed in the section below.
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II: The strategy of assessment
Humana has developed a comprehensive method whereby he 
assesses countries' human rights performances. The strategies he 
follows are very similar in the two inquiries, with the latter differing 
in the system of weighting as will be seen later.
2-1: The method
The method used is quite simple. Humana proposes a scale of 
four points from zero (0) to three (3). The score that each country 
receives depends on the kind of answers to each of the forty 
questions. Each question receives a score depending on the severity 
of the government's action towards that particular issue. This can be 





For the purpose of this study, I shall refer to these categories as: 
top, upper middle, lower middle, and bottom respectively.
Depending on the scores of each of the forty questions that
l l - C .  Humana (1983) op. cit. p.9.
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Humana employs, a country's human rights situation is determined.
The scores and countries' rankings will depend on the kind of
questions themselves. As pointed out earlier, the questions are
influenced by western values, so it will be no surprise to see Western
countries enjoying leading positions compared to the rest of the
world. Moreover, the scores given to any question depend very much
on the availability of data and the cooperation of governments
around the world. So, the sources of information are a very
important factor in dealing with this issue. Humana states that
the accuracy and objectivity of the answers to the 
questionnaire have been considered of paramount 
importance. In most instances information has come 
from the most authoritative sources and is the latest 
available at the time of compilation. 12
However, one has to bear in mind that one is dealing with the 
human rights issue, a very sensitive question in contemporary
politics, and even "the most authoritative sources" do not necessarily 
have accurate and objective data and information. Governments,
especially in the Third World and indeed in the former communist 
countries, tend to conceal facts relating to different aspects of social 
and political life, let alone questions related to human rights. Some 
feel that they are not accountable since the matter is of internal 
competence. Moreover, the accuracy of data available from a 
developing country like Ethiopia or Niger cannot be as accurate as 
those of a developed country like the United States or Germany.
Such reservations should have been considered by Humana in 
making his compilation. To highlight the fact, I shall give the example 




earlier in this chapter, there are two questions related to this area. 
Although one objected to the second one, I shall deal with both of 
them here to highlight that some of the answers are misleading and 
therefore influence, positively or negatively, the ranking of countries.
Concerning the question related to "freedom from military 
service", in Algeria citizens are not free from obligations of this kind. 
Everyone has to spend a period of time engaged in this way. The 
answer in Humana's inquiry was that everybody has to do six 
months' military service and thus Algeria was ranked lower middle. 
It would be of some interest to know the source of this information. 
The period required for military service in Algeria was for two years 
-at the time of the compilation- which was decreased to eighteen 
months in January 1990. Thus, according to the system of scoring, 
Algeria should have been ranked at the bottom and not lower 
middle. The same measure could apply to the question dealing with 
maximum punishment for refusing such service. Humana states that 
the maximum punishment is one year's imprisonment. However, if 
the period required for compulsory military service was two years, 
how could the punishment for refusing it be just one year in prison? 
The punishment for refusing it is much more severe when it is 
related to some civil liberties, such as movement outside the country 
or the acquisition of a passport and application for jobs. In these 
cases confirmation of a citizen's status vis-a-vis military service is a 
necessary prerequisite. Thus, Algeria, instead of being in the upper 
middle category, should have been in the bottom one.
Another contradictory area of the comparison is the question of 
the death penalty. In some instances, where the answers were 
similar, the scores given to the countries concerned were different in
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1983. This category includes two countries in Western Europe. The 
answers to the question on the death penalty for France and Italy 
were respectively: recently abolished, and, abolished in 1944. The 
answers show that both countries do not carry out this kind of
punishment any more. Nonetheless, the ranking of the two countries 
differs. France was ranked at the top, whereas Italy was ranked 
upper m iddle.14 The two countries should have been in the same 
category, i.e., at the top, following his line of argument. The scores, 
however, were corrected in 1986.
His strategy of ranking or giving scores to each country depends 
on the relative position of the state. But, the decisive question to be 
asked here is how can someone assess the position of a country
concerning the death penalty? I believe that this question should not 
have been assessed on a four point scale as Humana did. What is the 
attitude of governments which have been ranked at the upper 
middle or lower middle?15 As far as the death penalty is concerned, 
there is nothing in between; whether the state carries out the death
penalty and is to be ranked at the bottom, or does not, and be ranked
top. The crux of the matter is not whether the death penalty is an 
established violation of the right to life or not, but the way by which 
Humana had tried to assess it. If the state carries out the death 
penalty, the damage is done. There is nothing relative that gives any 
room for argument as is the case with other rights. Algeria for 
instance, has been ranked bottom middle, but, it should have gone 
down to bottom.
Finally, the results or the scores of the different questions are
14-Compare the scores of the two countries in ibid., pp. 187 and 199.
15-Ibid., p.33 (Algeria), p.41 (Marocco), p. 63 (Zimbabwe), p. 193 (Greece). See 
also, C. Humana (1986) op. cit. p. 12 (Algeria), p. 64 (Columbia).
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turned into percentages. Each country that was assessed through this 
questionnaire was given a percentage which indicated its position 
compared to other countries and to the world average. I shall be 
discussing the world average at a later stage. What matters here is, 
how he achieved his percentages in both inquiries. In the second 
study there is a clear indication of how the figures are turned into 
percentages using a system of weighting. However, there is no 
indication to this effect in the first one. Humana fails to show how 
countries are ranked this way: how a particular country is ranked 
above or below another country. It would have been very helpful 
had Humana explained how these percentages were calculated, and 
how he established the basis on which the performance of countries 
was to be compared.
I have tried one possible and logical way to achieve his 
percentages, but it turned out to be slightly unsuccessful. In his first 
study, there are fifty questions. The first forty are the ones which 
receive scores, the remaining ten are divided into two categories: the 
first five "are given simply as an indication of the severity or 
otherwise of the penal code,"16 whereas the last five are compulsory 
documents for citizens.
The percentages are reached by adding the scores of each
question multiplied by one hundred (100) and the result is divided
by one hundred and twenty (120), which is the maximum possible 
score for the forty questions. I have tried this method on two 
countries; Algeria and Sweden. The results were slightly different: in 
the case of Algeria, for instance, the finding was 62.5 per cent, and
therefore its percentage should have been 63. In the case of Sweden ,
however, the finding matched the number Humana proposed.
16-C. Humana (1983) op. cit. 27.
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Probably this is the method since the dif ference between the actual 
percentages and the findings is just slight. But, it is possible that the 
rest o f  the questionnaire might have som e inf luence on the final 
p e r c e n t a g e .
B y  apply ing  his percentages for the year 1986 to different  
co u n tr ie s ,  one  reaches  the s ituat ion in the h is togram b e lo w  
representing some countries around the world.
Histogram (6) 1: The percentage o f  human rights in selected  
c o u n t r i e s
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This is the position and the ranking o f  selected countries as far 
as human rights are concerned according to Humana. One can easily 
m ak e  a c o m p a r i s o n  from this h i s to g r a m  and d e c id e  for  
him se l f /herse l f  which country complies  with Humana's scale better 
than the others. Nonetheless,  these results are questionable,  not only 
because  the quest ions  are not acceptable  to all, but because the 
q uest ions  t h em se lv e s  are sometimes  m is lead in g .  In this context  
Algeria  provides  the best example.  Its score should have dropped 
s ince  Humana gave  some answers scores  higher than his system  
w a r r a n t e d .
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2-2: The system of weighting
Humana introduced a system of weighting in his second exercise. 
Although he did introduce weight in his first study, Humana 
considered using it.17 Through the introduction of this system, some 
rights apparently become more equal than others. Among the range 
of the forty questions employed in the inquiry, he chose seven 
weighted ones. This weighting system means giving each of these 
seven questions three times the weight of each of the remaining 
thirty three. Here, a crucial question cannot be avoided: Where is the 
willingness to "avoid the impression of arbitrary selection on the part 
of the compiler"? The questions that Humana weights are freedom 
from:
-Serfdom, slavery, forced or child labor.
-Extrajudicial killings or "disappearances".
-Torture or coercion by the state.
-Compulsory work permits or conscription of labor.
-Capital punishment by the state.
-Court sentences of corporal punishment.
-Indefinite detention without trial.
Certainly the rights mentioned above are very important. In 
terms of human rights some rights are more important than others, 
and, indeed, some may depend on the others. It would be absurd to 
talk about human rights when the basic right, i.e., the right to life, is
17-"A system of weighting each of the questions was considered. In human 
rights terms some are undoubtedly more important tan others -but would there 
be a general agreement on the exact order of the fifty questions?...It was 
therefore decided that the overall picture offered by the range of the fifty
questions would be enough to inform the reader adequately, and would avoid
the impression of an arbitrary selection on the part of the compiler." Ibid., p.
1 1 .
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violated. The reason behind this system of weighting is the 
endurance and the pain to which the individual is subject. Humana 
argues that:
An individual screaming while subjected to torture or 
locked for years in an unlit cell because of his or her 
opinions is enduring a degree of physical or mental 
suffering greater than the denial of a vote or of having 
his or her newspaper censored.18
Nevertheless, every right should be considered as equal as the 
o th e rs .19 One cannot talk about a state as not violating human rights 
if it does not carry out the death penalty or the rights mentioned
above. Professor Yoram Dinstein, a prominent international lawyer 
from Tel Aviv University, in a talk at the Department of Law and 
Financial Studies (Glasgow University) about "Human Rights in
Israel", stressed this point. He said:
Each state should be credited for honoring and
respecting any aspect of human rights, and should be 
blamed for failing to do so."[He continued:]"In Israel 
the state does not carry out the death penalty, but at 
the same time some practices of dem olishing 
Palestinians' houses are witnessed. There is no way to 
suggest that the state is observing human rights since 
the right to life is respected, which is above all.20
Thus, according to this system of weighting, the percentage that
each country receives is calculated as follow:
(33x3) + (7x3) x3) x 100 
162
18-C. Humana(1986), op. cit. pp.3-4.
19-J. Donnelly and R. E. Howard argue that: "Although no rights can be 
enjoyed unless one is alive, the right to life has no moral priority; it may be a 
prerequisite to enjoying other rights, but does not make it a "higher" right." 
"Assessing National Human Rights Performance. A Theoretical Framework."
Human Rights Quarterly, (8) 1986 p. 215.
20-Professor Yoram Dinstein, talk at the Department of Law and Financial 
Studies (Glasgow University) on "Human Rights in Israel" 9 February 1990.
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Thirty three refers to the number of the non-weighted questions 
multiplied by three, which is the maximum score for each question. 
From this formula the highest possible number accounting can obtain 
be ninety nine. Seven, is the number of the questions that are 
weighted by being multiplied by three, and the result is multiplied 
again by up three -these rights are more important than the others 
according to Humana. The maximum score for this section would be 
sixty three. Converting these scores into percentages is achieved by 
adding the two sets of results, multiplied by one hundred and the 
overall is divided by one hundred and sixty two, which is the 
maximum score for the forty questions after weighting.
One concludes that, not only is the choice of questions of 
debatable validity, but there is also a discrepancy within the 
questions themselves. Or, how does one explain the fact that the 
maximum a weighted right receives equals the maximum score of 
three non weighted questions put together? Thus, according to the 
methodology suggested by Humana, if a country performs well in the 
weighted rights, it will have a big advantage over others which did 
not observe human rights in general. These particular weighted ones, 
moreover, are widely enjoyed in all Western countries. They 
constitute a necessity, whereas they are a luxury in most, if not all 
Third World countries.
Let us try to imagine a situation where two countries A and B 
were subjected to the questionnaire, and see their ranking position 
using this system of weighting. Country A scored the maximum 
points for the first twenty questions, and none for the second twenty. 
On the other hand, Country B did exactly the opposite, i.e., scored 
none for the first twenty, and the maximum for the second twenty.
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N eedless  to say, according to the questionnaire,  the weighted rights 
are within the first twenty. Normally,  they should be at the same  
level within the ranking table, since both received maximum points 
for twenty questions and none for the other twenty. However ,  one  
sees that country A is well ahead of  country B, thanks to this system
o f  weighting, as follows:
C ountry A: (13x3)  + (7 x 3 )x 3 )  xlOO
162
39 + 63 = 102 x 100 = 62.96%
162
C ountry B: (20x3) + (7x0 )x3 )  x 100
162
60 + 0=  60 x 100 =37.03%
162
To see  the discrepancy between the the two countries,  these  
percentages shown above will be highlighted in this histogram.
Histogram (6) 2: Percentages of  human rights after the system of  
weight ing
COUNTRY(A) COUNTRY(B)
This  h is togram  sh o w s  the in e q u a l i t i e s  b e tw e e n  the two  
countries.  This  inequality that I shall refer to as "spurious lead" 
would not have existed if Humana had not introduced his system of  
weighting. Although he intended to highlight some rights o f  genuine
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importance, applying them world wide would be exalting some 
against the others. Any weighting of this kind, however plausible, 
introduces an element of arbitrariness into the entire exercise.
2-3: The world average
In his assessment of human rights situations, Humana has 
developed a minimum standard of achievement referred to as the 
world average. Of course the world average in the first inquiry 
differs from that in the second.21 In other words, countries scoring 
above this percentage may be regarded as better than those below it. 
In his comprehensive table of countries assessed, the ranking 
position of each country is determined relative to this world 
average.22
In his first inquiry, the world average was 64 per cent.
Surprisingly it was a very high average as Humana himself conceded.
He gave two main explanations for this phenomenon, stating that:
The first is the earlier reference to regional, religious 
or social distinctions which establish certain areas of 
tolerance in different groups of countries. The
second, is that the efficiency of a state usually falls
short of controlling all aspects of life.23
Nonetheless, there might be another possible explanation to this 
and it is not less important than the two mentioned above; it is the 
size of the sample. Humana established a world average for human 
rights taken from the seventy five countries assessed through his
questionnaire. So, it does not reflect a comprehensive overview of
21-In the first inquiry the world average was 64 per cent, whereas, in the 
second it dropped to 55 per cent.
22-C. Humana (1983) op. cit. pp.24-5. and C. Humana (1987) op. cit. pp.XIV-XV.
23-C . Humana (1983) op. cit. p .l l .
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human rights in the world. If the study had included more countries, 
the world average would have fallen to just fifty or slightly over. 
This is why, perhaps one thinks, the world average in the second 
inquiry was 55 per cent, since the study included eighty nine 
countries; fourteen new ones had been added. It is perhaps safe to 
assume that, if further inquiries are carried out which include more 
countries, the world average will, with little doubt, fall again. The 
reason is that countries missing in the inquiries are usually from the 
Third World, where abuses and human rights violations are a 
relatively common practice.
There is no explanation to why the world average was 64 and 55 
per cent in 1983 and 1986, respectively. In other words, why did he 
establish these percentages and not others? The explanations given 
above help illustrate the 1983 average attained its level and dropped 
in 1986, but they did not tell us why 64 per cent, for instance, was 
the outcome in the first instance.
I tried to figure out how Humana achieved his world average. 
The only possible way was to add the score of each country, and the 
result was divided by the number of countries assessed. I tested this 
hypothesis on the two inquiries. In the first one, the findings were 
slightly over the number Humana gave. According to this strategy, 
the world average should have been 65 per cent rather than 64 per 
cent. This is because the test resulted in 64.6 per cent, and this figure 
is nearer to 65 than to 64. However, in the second inquiry, the gap 
between the findings and the figure given by Humana invites the 
reader to be suspicious whether the strategy followed is the 
appropriate one. I have added the score received by every country, 
and divided the result by 89 -which is the number of countries
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assessed under the questionnaire. The world average reported by
Humana was 55 per cent, but the actual finding was 61.8 per cent.
Thus, the world average should have been 62 per cent, if the second 
inquiry does not suggest that the strategy followed in obtaining the 
world average is different from the one thought was. It would have 
been appropriate if Humana had explained how his results were 
achieved.
Even if one agrees with Humana on the establishment of 64 and 
55 as percentages, one does not agree with the system as a whole. 
Human rights, in this view, are a kind of test a government has to 
take: if it achieves the minimum requirement it passes, and if it does
not it fails. Professor Yoram Dinstein observed that:
Human rights are not a balance between credit and 
debit. If a government does not violate one right it 
should be credited for it and if it does it should be
debited for it. At the end if the credited side is higher
than the debited one, we cannot say that the country 
is observing human rights.24
The same reasoning could be applied to this world average. 
Countries which have reached this average might be thought to be 
more observant of human rights than those which received lower 
averages. One believes, on the contrary, that every government 
violates human rights in one way or another, and that the 
enhancement and enjoyment of human rights is a continuous process. 
It does not mean in any case that countries like the United States, 
France, Sweden and Norway which scored high -far beyond the 
world average- are not questionable in terms of their performance. 
This world average makes them less vulnerable to scrutiny at a time 
when they should work harder towards improving the standards
2 4 -Professor Yoram Dinstein, note 20 above.
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already achieved. Therefore, one thinks that the world average 
should have been omitted from the two inquiries, because it is not 
fully representative on the one hand, and because it invites 
comparison between countries' scores and a spurious global norm, on 
the other.
I ll:  Types of assessment
This section examines the different types of countries considered 
in the two inquiries. As a matter of fact, Humana has selected two 
types of assessment: countries assessed under the questionnaire and 
others assessed in more summary form, both of which will be 
analyzed below.
3-1: Assessment under the questionnaire
(The cases of Israel and South Africa)
Seventy five and eighty nine countries respectively were 
assessed through the questionnaires in the two inquiries. The kind of 
questions that constitute the questionnaire and the method 
developed to rank countries were discussed in some detail. The focus 
here will be particularly on two countries which pose a lot of 
difficulties: South Africa and Israel. It is generally agreed that, 
relatively, some of the worst human rights violations occur in these 
countries. For some historical reasons these two countries have 
become very peculiar, and whatever strategy is followed to assess 
human rights in them will have its shortcomings. Humana has 
applied two different strategies; one for each country. For the former,
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the compiler  asked:
H o w  d o e s  one ,  for e x a m p l e ,  app ly  a s in g le  
questionnaire  to South Afr ica with its bewildering  
contradictions o f  human rights for its white citizens  
and the denial o f  most o f  the non-white two-thirds o f  
the population who do not qualify,  because o f  their 
co lour  for c it izenship? As the Guide accepts the 
premise that in the field o f  human rights mankind is 
one, the only honest treatment o f  South Africa is to 
apply the questionnaire to the least favoured o f  the 
population. And this approach has been fo llowed.25
W hereas ,  as far as Israel is concerned in Humana's study,
another approach has been followed. The justification was that:
These [The Occupied Territories] are administered by a 
separate military government,  and law enforcement  
and breaches  o f  human rights  are much more  
repressive than in the liberal state o f  Israel. For the 
purpose o f  this Guide Israel has been assessed without  
the Occupied Territories.26
Histogram (6) 3: Human rights in South Africa and Israel
ISRAEL S. AFRICA ISRAEL S. AFRICA
1983 1986
This  his togram, a result o f  Humana's inquiries,  sh o w s  the  
dif ferences  between two countries with notorious records vio la t ing
2 5 -C. Humana (1983)  op.cit. p .11.
26-Ib id .,  p. 12.
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human rights. Nonetheless, after the elimination of the Occupied 
Territories for Israel, it is clear that the latter is ranked much higher 
than South Africa. Had it not been for this discriminatory strategy, 
these countries would have had the same scores, i.e., well below the 
world average. If "in the field of human rights mankind is one" -as 
Humana has suggested- why is it then that Israel is assessed without 
the Occupied Territories? Why were the Occupied Territories 
assessed by themselves in the second inquiry? Who is responsible 
for the violations that the Occupied Territories witness daily? The 
answer is obvious: the Israeli government. These are practices by a 
state against individuals; if they are positive acts it should be 
credited, and if they are not, the state concerned should be blamed. 
Looking back to the definition of human rights that Humana suggests 
in his introduction, one sees that they are "laws and practices.... to 
protect ordinary people, groups and races, from oppressive rulers 
and governments". Since they were not considered, where do the 
Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories fit, if they do not 
belong in these categories? Moreover, where are the laws to protect 
them against abuses and by which standards should we judge the 
oppressor? Therefore, what is the purpose of a guide which assesses 
Israel without the Occupied Territories?
Conversely, why does the questionnaire in South Africa apply to 
the blacks only,"the least favoured of the population"? The standard 
of 30 per cent in South Africa does not reflect the real situation in 
the country as far as the white citizens are concerned. If one was to 
apply the same questionnaire, using the same techniques, that 
Humana suggested, to white citizens only in South Africa, the 
outcome of the inquiry would be completely different from the one
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Humana achieved. The same could apply to Israel; the high 
percentage, really, is not representative for the unprivileged Arabs. 
If mankind is one, then one questionnaire only should be applied to
different groups or segment in the society. Although one accepts that
the questionnaire in both cases was applied to the majority of the
population, one would be in favour of applying the questionnaire to
all the population within the jurisdiction of the state; or applying the 
questionnaire to the two segments of the society, adding the results, 
dividing this figure by two to produce a clearer picture.
The important question that should be asked in this instance is
why were the Occupied Territories independently assessed in the
second inquiry? The Occupied Territories as such do not qualify as a 
state since there is no legitimate sovereign government enjoying
acceptance within the international community. Power in these 
territories is concentrated in a military authority, which is 
responsible for what is happening. It would be absurd, then, to
examine the Occupied Territories as independent from Israel, with 
the latter's performance not influenced by the abuses in the Occupied 
Territories. Otherwise the result would be to hide facts or mislead
readers to believe that Israel performs well and observes a wide 
range of human rights. The situation in this area is very difficult; the 
Arabs do not recognize the state of Israel, while the latter claims 
sovereignty over some areas through military authorities. Therefore, 
it is quite difficult to find an accommodation that would satisfy both 
parties. Nonetheless, in the area of human rights where human
beings are supposed to be equal, the same treatment should be
applied to both of them. Thus, Israel's performance should have been 
lower than what Humana proposed.
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3-2: The summary forms
Countries where information was scarce were assessed in both 
studies in a more summary form. In other words, the questionnaire 
was not applied to them, but the compiler tried to give a general 
picture about the situation in each of the countries considered. After 
that, he divided the countries into three different categories: 'Bad', 
'Poor' and ’Fair’. These categories are comparatively acceptable, but 
did not mean anything in terms of percentages in the first inquiry. In 
the second inquiry, he tried to define his categories further by giving 
them percentages. Thus, 'Bad' is the category where the percentage is 
forty per cent or lower, 'Poor' is between forty one and seventy five 
per cent, and 'Fair' is over seventy five per cent.27
These are the categories and the percentages representing each. 
Humana felt that the categories were vague in terms of significance, 
and tried in his second inquiry to make them more understandable. 
Nonetheless, the matter is not clear, especially in the lower and the 
middle categories. There is a gap of 40 per cent, and another of 34 
per cent in both categories respectively, which poses a lot of 
difficulties. In other words, how is it that the two countries are 
ranked in the same category with one scoring 73 per cent and the 
other just 41 per cent? Since both of them have scored between forty 
one and seventy five per cent, they are both in the 'Poor' category 
according to Humana. But, if one looks at the score of each, if any, one 
sees the discrepancy between them.
It would have been more appropriate, surely, if these countries 
had been ranked in different categories or clusters of six or seven: to
27-C. Humana (1986) op. cit. p.4.
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narrow the gap between different categories and make the 
comparison more meaningful. One does bear in mind that this 
depends on the information available to the compiler, and the 
availability of just one source of information may play a crucial role 
in the positioning of any country. However, if this cannot be done, 
and the compiler felt that countries should be ranked in just three 
categories, it would perhaps make more sense if these categories did 
not have these high percentages. The reason behind this strategy is 
the lack of information concerning the attitudes of governments 
towards their citizens. In the area of human rights, governments try 
to hide or falsify facts related to abuses in human rights. That is not 
the kind of publicity that governments will normally seek. So, the 
assumption is that, when there is no cooperation with human rights 
organisations, the country's record must be quite bad. Therefore, one 
is very surprised to see some countries, assessed through summary 
forms, in the middle category -'Poor'- indicating that they scored a 
percentage between 70 and 75 per cent..
IV: Humana's work in comparative perspective
Before going in depth into the assessment of Humana's inquiries, 
it is important to consider his third study. As pointed out earlier, it 
was published in 1992. I shall discuss this edition briefly, mainly to 
point out the new elements, where they exist, that this study 
contains.
This edition includes 104 countries, 15 more than were 
previously included. Countries, in this edition, were assessed through 
a questionnaire, and none in the more summary way. One may say
20 9
that, in principle at least, more information became available to the 
compiler. However, the strategy followed was the same in his second 
survey (1986). Forty questions were used, all of them based on 
international instruments (23 on the Universal Declaration, 14 on the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 3 on the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), and a system of weighting was 
followed (the same rights which were weighted in the second survey 
were used in this edition). However the world average in this edition, 
contrary to the presumption made earlier that the more countries 
are included the lower the world average would be, has gone up to 
64 per cent compared with 55 per cent in 1986. This could be 
explained by the wave of change that the former communist 
countries have experienced since the publication of Humana's second 
inquiry in 1986. Countries in Eastern Europe such as Czechoslovakia, 
Poland and Romania which did not reach the world average in both 
former studies, in 1992 scored 97, 83 and 82 per cent respectively. 
This shows that the world human rights situation, according to 
Humana, has improved and therefore the world average should be 
higher to be truly representative. The publication of the world map 
is another new feature in this edition. This map is similar to the ones 
published by Freedom House (see chapter eight), where respect for 
human rights in any country is readily apparent. While black means 
human rights are violated, white respected, grey means that most 
human rights are respected.
Humana had tried to develop a comprehensive strategy whereby 
one could measure the human rights performance of every country. 
It has been suggested elsewhere in this chapter that the criteria he 
develops are not necessarily acceptable as a basis of comparison on a 
cross-national basis. He himself acknowledges the fact when he says
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that:
One of the purposes of this Guide is to make possible 
comparison between countries. Such comparisons, by 
the distinctive nature of each society, can be only 
approximations, and objections to such an exercise can 
be predicted and understood.28
To start with, Humana defined human rights as "laws and 
practices". However, in his application of the questionnaire he 
scarcely takes into account the practices. One acknowledges that the 
laws are necessary, in some instances, to establish standards and to
obtain reparation, nonetheless, the practices have tended, for 
different reasons, not to take into account the provisions of the laws.
What is the meaning of freedom of movement in a country where the
acquisition of a passport is very difficult? In Algeria, for instance, 
"Algerians are free to travel within Algeria and outside, although 
travelling abroad is made difficult by strict currency controls."29 
This may be the case; but if citizens do not have any access to foreign 
currency, what does freedom to travel mean to them?
In his definition of the term, there is a reference to time when 
he says:" They[ human rights] are laws and practices that have 
evolved over the centuries". This in turn poses some difficulties in 
comparison. The development of the laws differs from one country to 
another. The evolution over the centuries did not follow the same
course in different countries. In this context the age of the nation has 
some significance. One cannot possibly apply the same standards to 
countries which have existed for centuries such as the United 
Kingdom, France or the United States to the majority of Third World
28-C.Humana (1983) op. cit. p.9.
29-Freedom  House, Freedom in the World 1989-1990. Political Rights and Civil 
L iberties (New York: Freedom House, 1990) p. 30.
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countries which have existed for only a few decades.30 Clearly it is 
difficult to achieve high standards of human rights in countries with 
a long tradition of arbitrary and authoritarian rule and oppression. 
Human rights, as they are enjoyed in today's West, are the product of 
a continuous process that has been progressing over the centuries; 
and, relatively, the same process is taking place in the 
underdeveloped world. It is difficult to apply standards developed in 
the West, and thought to be the best, to describe situations in
different countries in the world. Dogan and Pelassy argue:
Is it possible to analyse, with concepts formulated in 
Europe, in a completely different context what is now 
happening in Burma or Zaire? What is a"nation" or "a 
social class" in Sub-Sahara Africa? Are not the words 
we are using surreptitiously  leading us to
m isin terpretation?3 1
To achieve valid results when comparing human rights one 
cannot to be ethnocentric. In other words, the establishment of a set 
of variables and a minimum standards of achievement -referred to
as the world average in the inquiries- and try to apply them on a
cross-national basis will not solve anything. It will, on the contrary 
create a lot of controversies.
Thus, when attempting to measure human rights, a clear
definition of the concept has to be provided as well as the different 
variables upon which judgement is to be based. A small set of 
variables can give, relatively, a clear picture of the situation in any
30-R. J. Goldstein, "The limitations of using quantitative data in analysing 
human rights abuses". Human Rights Quarterly (8) 1986.p 612 .He states that: 
"Yet sociologist Rhoda Howard and others have made compelling arguments 
that in effect measuring all countries by the same definitional standards is 
grossly unfair to developing nations."
31-M. Dogan, and D. Pelassy, How To Com pare N ations: S trategies in 
C om parative P o litics.(New Jersey: Chatham House, 1984) p.22.
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country. Nonetheless, these variables should not be in contradiction 
with the political system of any country.32
It is quite difficult to reach an accommodation as far as this area 
is concerned. What constitutes a human right in one country may not 
be quite so fundamental in the other. What has to be taken into 
account are the social and economic conditions as well as the cultural 
factors whenever human rights are discussed. They do not develop in 
a vacuum. They influence, and are influenced by the environment in 
which they exist. Different attitudes can be understood by looking at 
the political culture of the society itself.
To understand the economic factors better, Algeria provides an 
example par excellence. The country witnessed the worst human 
rights violations since independence when government troops 
indiscriminately massacred its citizens in October 1988. Since that 
time, it moved from a one party system to multi-party "democracy". 
Algerians currently enjoy different forms of freedom that did not 
exist before: freedom of expression, independent newspapers,
associations etc,. In both instances ( before and after October 1988) it 
was due to economic factors. Protests against unemployment, 
corruption and the failure of the economic system led to these 
demonstrations ending in bloodshed. The inability of the government 
to provide materially what it did previously, and to manage the 
increasing demands of the people, led to these reforms as a strategy 
to gain legitimacy. The question that one wants to ask here is, would 
these violations of human rights, and the flexibility in the part of the 
government have existed, if it was not for the failure of the economic
32-A secret ballot affords one the opportunity to reject the single party on 
offer. However, in his second work, Humana states that Czechoslovakia is a 
one-party communist state, and uses a question about multyparty elections by 
secret and universal ballot. C. Humana (1986) op. cit. p.72.
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system ?
Therefore, many factors are involved when human rights are 
discussed. However, it should be made clear that Humana's inquiries 
are not without value. They are above all comprehensive inquiries; 
he tries to develop a strategy by which one can measure human 
rights, in principle, on a global basis. As already mentioned, however, 
they are heavily influenced by Western thinking, which find little, if 
any, significance in different parts of the world.
Among the purposes of these guides is to make possible 
com parison between countries in terms of human rights. 
Nevertheless, one does believe that it is not enough to have concepts 
and statistics to conduct a meaningful comparison. The latter concept, 
as defined by LaPalombara, is "to look for similarities and differences 
in phenomena in order to understand, explain and predict them"3 3 
or, as Sartori puts it "to compare is to control."34 The question that 
needs to be answered in this respect is: how could one look for 
similarities and differences or how can one be in control?
This question may be answered in terms of the strategy that 
should be followed when making the comparison. To make the best 
possible use of Humana's inquiries, one needs to select the countries 
one is going to study. The adoption of the method is a very 
significant step in the process of comparisons. The cross-national 
approach that Humana followed in his inquiries led to disagreements 
on the range of the questions asked on the methods of assessment. 
The inclusion of different countries, with their differences in cultures
3 3 -J. Lapalom bara, P o lit ic s  Within Nations (New Jersey: Prenticehall, 1974) 
p.7.
34-P.G. Lewis, et al. eds., The Practice of Comparative Politics. A Reader 
(Milton Keynes: Longman and Open University Press, 1973) p.239.
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and backgrounds, further added to the difficulties one encounters in 
measuring human rights. It would have been more helpful had 
Humana restricted the application of his strategies to countries from 
the Western world. If the concepts concerned are not judged and 
valued within the same context, the result of any inquiry would not 
be very convincing. Human rights are a social phenomenon that 
influence, and are influenced, by the environment in which they 
occur, as well as the culture of the actors involved whether in 
violating or assessing them. Therefore, one would not be surprised to 
find a completely different picture had the inquiries been carried out 
by a scholar from the former Eastern Europe or the Third World. The 
argument and variables he would use would, undoubtedly, differ 
from those seen in Humana's inquiries.
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Chapter Seven 
Comparative Measures of Human 
Rights and Democracy
In this chapter I shall investigate different attempts made by 
political scientists to measure democracy, especially on a 
crossnational basis. I have concentrated on these quantitative 
measures of democracy in this work, solely because the definition of 
democracy and its measurement extends into the field of human 
rights. In other words, different variables used for measuring 
degrees of democracy have been used in different attempts to 
measure human rights and civil liberties. One such attempt is 
Humana’s approach, as pointed out in the previous chapter; another 
is that of Freedom House, as will be seen in the next chapter.
Apart from this, among the elements included in the definition 
of democracy, or seen as crucial factors or preconditions of it, many 
are supported by the provisions of legal international agreements 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants 
that followed. These include, to name just a few: the right to free 
speech, assembly, association and of the press. Such inclusion and 
association of many human rights with political rights suggests, 
further, that when a country is democratic it is observing human 
rights, since the definition of democracy includes aspects of human 
rights such as freedom of expression.
To some extent, the definition of democracy is based upon the 
existence or absence of human rights. Having said that, it does not 
mean that a democratic system observes human rights, and that the
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violations of human rights occur only when a system is 
undemocratic. I shall deal with this at a later stage. Nonetheless, 
what is evident is that, among the variables used in defining
democracy, several are used in measuring human rights.
Given the diversity of political systems and their different 
attitudes towards observing human rights, some questions on this
aspect cannot be avoided. The most significant of all are: Do 
democratic countries observe human rights? Can one safely conclude 
that countries where human rights exist are democratic? What are 
the variables used in measuring the degrees of democracy that are 
not used in the measurement of human rights?
In order to answer these questions and others, and for the
purpose of this study, I have concentrated on two main studies 
which have tried to measure democracy: those by Robert Dahl and 
Kenneth Bollen. However, having said that, it does not automatically 
follow that different definitions and conditions are ignored. I shall 
highlight them whenever appropriate. This chapter first of all 
considers Dahl's study. I shall look at the definition he gives and the 
conditions upon which he judges whether a system is democratic or 
not. Then, I shall turn to the study undertaken by Bollen. The third 
part of the chapter contains a comparative analysis of the two 
inquiries. In other words, it highlights the characteristics shared by 
the two scholars in measuring the degrees of democratization. The
chapter concludes with some critical reflections about the 
shortcom ings of the two inquiries discussed and a general 
assessm ent.
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I: Dahl's measurement of democracy
It should be noted at the outset that Robert Dahl believes no 
political system in the contemporary world is fully democratic. He 
suggests, rather, calling a system which is near to satisfying the 
criteria of democracy, a "polyarchy."1 In this study I shall use these 
terms interchangeably.
Thus, I shall look at the variables used in defining and 
measuring democracy and consider their shortcomings, as well as 
considering their general acceptance. However, before doing that, one 
should first identify a democratic system. This may be done by 
employing a definition of the concept which includes the different 
conditions that may favour it. Dealing with this issue will enable the 
reader to understand why emphasis has been placed on some 
variables and not on others.
1-1: Definition of democracy
What should be borne in mind is that there have been many
definitions of the term democracy since its evolution over the 
centuries. What concern us, in this respect, is the definition used by 
Dahl. As suggested above, he believes that no system in today's 
world is democratic. Nonetheless, he suggests that: "democratic
theory is concerned with the processes by which ordinary citizens
exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders."2
1-..."since (in my view) no large system in the real world is democratized, I 
prefer to call real world systems that are closest to the upper right corner 
polyarchies... Polyarchies, then, may be thought o f as relatively (but
incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it in another way, polyarchies 
are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized." R. Dahl, 
P o lvarchv  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) p. 8.
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This suggests that, where citizens have a relatively high degree 
of control over their leaders, that country is democratic. In other 
words, governments are not in office to exert authority over their 
citizens, but to be responsive to the demands formulated by them.
Dahl observes that:
The key characteristic of democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences 
of its citizens considered as political equals.3
Such a distinctive characteristic of democracy leaves the door 
wide open to debate and offers grounds for questioning the 
statement itself. The questions that need to be clarified in this
respect are: what kind of responsiveness of governments exist in 
relation to the preferences of their citizens? And how far do
governments go in responding to these preferences?
Dahl offers three requirements favouring democracy, and 
therefore makes his statement valid, i.e., when government is
responsive to its citizens, and they are considered as political equals.
The conditions are:4
1-To formulate their preferences.
2-To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens 
and the government by individual and collective 
action.
3-To have their preferences weighted equally in the 
conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no 
discrimination because of the content or source of 
preference.
If one scrutinizes these requirements (which will be the basis for
2-R. Dahl, A Preface To Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1956,.p. 3.
3-R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. p. 1.
4-Ibid., p. 3.
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his measurement of democracy, as will be seen at a later stage in the 
chapter), the right to vote, freedom to form and join organisations
and freedom of expression would be at the centre of democracy. 
They are ordinary channels whereby citizens can make their voices
heard, and government can take the appropriate decisions.5
Although one does agree that if a system works this way it 
would be democratic since the government is always under constant 
pressure from its citizens, however, in practice it is difficult to be 
achieved. In other words, they exert a kind of control that would
make the government responsive to the d ifferent demands 
forwarded to it. This may appear to be a utopian society where 
everything works perfectly. What one has to bear in mind is that 
although these characteristics are vital to a democratic system, they 
are insufficient. This is especially true of some systems which are 
democratic but do not have all these kinds of rights. The United
States is an example par excellence. There is no doubt that the U.S.A. 
is considered among the most democratic countries in the world, and 
one would suspect that the different requirements that Dahl 
proposed for democracy were met within the American system. 
However, in the process described above, freedom to form or join 
organisations is not well established. This is a fact when it comes to 
organisations of a communist character. The same objection to these 
organizations was, until recently, found in the former West Germany.
To better understand democracy, how it works and how it is
measured, a close look at the conditions that favour democracy may
5-"In so far as democracy is concerned with the issue of rule and control or
decision-m aking it is perforce concerned with freedom and liberty; and at 
least to the extent that no one is excluded from a share in decision-making 
some rudimentary notion of equality is im plicit.” K. Graham, T he Battle For 
D em ocracy. Conflicts Consensus and the Individual ( Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 
1986) p. 13.
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enable the reader to understand the choice of variables used in the 
m easurem en t.
1-2: Conditions of polyarchy
The previous section showed that whatever requirements or 
dimensions of democracy are put forward they are insufficient and 
democracy may actually involve different dimensions other than the 
right of every citizen to participate
The measurement of democracy depends on its existence in the 
first place. One cannot possibly think of measuring this phenomenon 
unless it exists. Then the variables are looked for to conclude 
whether the system is democratic or not. In this respect, it was 
thought that the inclusion of the conditions favouring polyarchy 
proposed by Dahl would be of paramount importance to observe 
whether the variables used have any connection with these 
conditions. Democratic political systems do not exist as such, but 
there are some conditions which favour their emergence. These 
conditions, according to Dahl, can be summarized as follows:
1-2-1: Historical sequences
Historical events that countries experienced may play a crucial 
role in determining whether a country moves towards polyarchy or 
not. According to Dahl, countries where competition precedes 
inclusiveness are more favourable to polyarchy than others where 
the process is the other way around.
One would be inclined to agree with Dahl about the importance
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of the historical factor, and the perspective from which he sees this 
point. Obviously competition has to precede inclusiveness if the 
system is to develop smoothly into a polyarchy. Little by little, more 
and more citizens are included in the system. However, if one takes 
this for granted many questions arise that need to be clarified.
Applying this condition would mean omitting many countries 
from the political map. Historical sequences could be applicable to 
different countries which have existed for centuries, which have 
experienced different periods of transformation and social change. In 
this respect, what would someone say about different countries in 
the Third World, especially in Asia and Africa, which are the creation 
of foreign domination? How would one account for Tunisia or 
Zimbabwe, for instance, countries which have achieved independence 
recently whether competition preceded inclusiveness or the other 
way around?
The terms by which one judges countries, in the case of historical 
sequences, have to be different. I am not suggesting that countries in 
today's Africa should be compared to nineteenth century Europe as 
some do.6 This is methodologically difficult, if not impossible. What 
needs to be stressed here is that the development in the majority, if 
not all, the Third World countries did not follow a smooth path, but 
was disturbed by different foreign domination.
6 -"She [Rhoda H oward] concluded that "human rights studies should 
compare countries "at similar levels of social evolution or development, and 
must take into account d ifferent cultural traditions." Africa of the 1980s, 
therefore, should be com pared to nineteenth century Europe, which was 
marked by "massive violations of what we would now consider elementary 
human rights." R. J. Goldsmith, "The Limitations of using quantitative data in 
studying human rights abuses." Human Rights Quarterly (8) 1986 p. 612.
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1-2-2: The socio-economic order
In societies where access to violence and economic sanctions is 
monopolized, the chances for polyarchy, in Dahl's view, are lower. 
Both economic sanctions and violence are two important tools
whereby one group, segment or class influences the decisions of 
others. In a society where these powers are concentrated in the 
hands of the government, the chances that it will tolerate the
emergence of opposition are very weak indeed. The government has 
free access to these tools to curtail the opposition when it is unable to 
cope with its increasing demands.
They are two ways by which governments respond to the 
continuing demands of their citizens. The first includes positive 
response when the institutions are adaptable to the new situations, 
i.e., the feedback of the government in terms of laws and decrees 
which would meet the increasing demands of the citizens. The second 
is the use of violence and economic sanctions.
Here again, one has to be very careful in taking this condition for 
granted. What one should bear in mind is that equal access amongst 
government and opposition to violence and economic sanctions may 
be a very good condition favouring democracy, but seeing it from 
another angle it would be an outcome of democracy as well. Would it 
be safe to assume that if access to violence and socioeconomic 
sanctions was neutralized, a country would become democratic? On 
the other hand, would not this concentration in the hands of the
government lead to democracy?
As for the type of economy, Dahl believes that if it is agrarian, 
the free farmers type is more favourable than the traditional
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peasant, whereas decentralized direction in a commercial industry 
would favour polyarchy rather than centralized direction.
Here one can see that Dahl's vision of democracy goes hand in 
hand with the type of the economy. That is, a competitive politics 
requires a competitive economy.7
What matters more, is not the type of economy, whether it is 
centralized or decentralized -although one may disagree on the 
grounds that a centralized direction means hierarchy which is 
incompatible with democracy- but the attitude of the people and 
their backgrounds. Someone who learned that tolerance and 
compromise are vital in any process is highly unlikely to use violence 
or economic sanctions.
The concentration of violence in the hands of the government,
although a condition unfavourable to polyarchy, according to Dahl,
might be seen as a path to it. In every country in the world,
legitim ized access to violence and to economic sanctions are 
monopolized in the hands of governments. The point to be made here 
is that, 'legitimized access', in the Weberian sense, is the determining 
factor in favouring polyarchy. Moreover, the concentration of these 
powers in the hands of government, and their steady use against
opposition groups may lead to uprisings and disturbances that would 
end in the transformation of the system towards polyarchy.
1-2-3: The level of socio-economic development
Dahl observes that when the GNP per capita is high (over or
7- This is also the view taken by N. Bobbio, The Future of Democracy. A 
D efence of the Rules of the Game Translated by Roger G riffin.(Cam bridge: 
Polity Press, 1987) p. 26
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about $700-800), at the time of writing (1971), it favours polyarchy, 
and when it is low it does not.
This is the variable that was, to some extent, ignored by the 
different attempts to measure human rights. Having said that I am 
not implying that the higher the level of socio-economic 
development, the higher the respect for human rights. Nonetheless, 
this factor should be taken into account when dealing with the issues 
of human rights and democracy. It is borne in mind that this high 
level of socio-economic development is very much related to the 
richness of the country itself, whether in raw materials or in the 
weather favouring agriculture, whereas the treatment of the citizens 
such as granting them freedom of speech, assembly, etc.... depends on 
the goodwill of the government.
The higher the level of socio-economic development in a country, 
the more opportunities are available to the citizen to learn, to travel, 
and to communicate. Such development enables the citizen to become 
aware of what others enjoy in different countries. Neubauer rightly 
argues that:
It is quite clear, one may say obvious, that extremely 
poor, traditional societies characterized by illiterate, 
rural population in which intergroup communication is 
barely developed and national identification and 
national institu tions barely extant, w ill have 
considerable difficulty in establishing and maintaining 
political equality.8
What needs to be stressed here is that the role of the socio­
economic development in a country is so crucial it cannot be 
neglected, and to some extent, should be considered as the driving 
force for any changes that may occur in political systems. Many
8-D. E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions for Democracy" A m erican  P o litica l 
Science Review (61) 1967 pp. 1008-9.
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social phenomena, including political ones, find their explanations in 
the economy. To a certain extent, experience has shown that when a 
country is prosperous, the system tends to be stable and more 
d e m o c ra tic .9 This is not to say that, when a country is rich, it is 
dem ocratic, since there are many examples that refute this 
hypothesis such as Libya, South Africa and all the Gulf states.
1-2-4: Equalities and Inequalities
Extreme inequalities, according to Dahl, in a country do not 
favour polyarchy. By contrast, the lower the level of inequality, the 
higher the chances for polyarchy to develop according to Dahl.
Inequalities in this context are seen mainly from an economic 
point of view. The allocation of wealth, income and social status to a 
particular group within the society would privilege them with more 
influence. The accumulation of these economic resources in the hands 
of a handful of citizens may be turned into political resources which 
can influence, at a later stage, the kind of the political system. In 
such a situation, polyarchy is unthinkable. The system that would 
develop is one which would safeguard the privileges already realised
by this handful of citizens. However, what type of society would
decrease inequalities and therefore favour polyarchy?
Dahl argues that industrial societies would. He states that:
If industrial societies do not eliminate inequalities 
they significantly reduce them. As average income 
rises with advancing technology and growing 
productivity, more and more advantages hitherto
abrogated to small elite come within reach of an
9-"The data show rather conclusively that: the higher the socio-econom ic
level of a country, the more likely it is to have a competitive political regime." 
R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. p. 64.
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expanding proportion of the population... In loose 
language, then, one might say that as a country 
approaches high levels of industrialization, extreme 
inequalities in important political resources decline.10
Here, two questions ought to be answered. The first would be: if 
inequalities do not favour democracy, do equalities inevitably lead to 
it? Then, if extreme inequalities decline in a country when it 
approaches high levels of industrialization, does this imply that an 
agricultural country, or one without high levels of industrialization 
cannot decrease these inequalities and therefore cannot become 
dem ocratic?
To answer these questions two countries come to mind, to name 
just a few: the former U.S.S.R., a country with high levels of 
industrialization and low inequalities, but still considered to be far 
from being democratic; on the other hand India, a poor agricultural 
country with a relatively high level of democracy.
1-2-5: Subcultural Pluralism
Subcultural pluralism is one of the most significant dangers that 
any political system may face. A country with deep divisions is 
vulnerable to violence and instability, which in turn may put the
system in jeopardy. Dahl rightly argues that:
There are conflicts, that a competitive political system 
does not manage easily and perhaps cannot handle at 
all. Any dispute in which a large section of the 
population of a country feels that its way of life or its 
highest values are severely menaced by another 
segment of the population creates a crisis in a 
competitive system.11
10-Ibid.,. p. 86.
11 -Ibid., p. 105.
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Having said that, it does not necessarily mean that a country 
with different segments cannot be democratic. Many are considered 
as such while having these divisions, Belgium and Canada to name 
just a few.
Generally speaking, in countries with such peculiarities, loyalty 
is to the group or the segment rather than to the country, and this 
therefore makes the country's political system very fragile in coping 
with different changes and demands.
Although one agrees with Dahl that this condition does not 
favour polyarchy, what should be borne in mind is that: when the 
persons who constitute the segments in a society have reached a 
degree of compromise and tolerance and learned that the interests of 
the country should come first, then this condition will not be as 
important as it may be thought to be. There are many grounds for 
optimism in saying that a kind of democracy may succeed in such 
countries. Consociational democracy is a system for countries with 
subcultural divisions, where some conditions have to be met to 
ensure the success of the political system. Any imbalance or 
shortcomings in these conditions would put the system in jeopardy. 
If this were not the case, then one would ask why two countries like 
Lebanon and Switzerland, with subcultural divisions, had totally 
different outcomes of their systems?
1-2-6: Domination by a foreign power
A country dominated by a foreign power is influenced, 
depending on the extent of that domination, by the policies and 
structures in the dominant country. That is to say, the people are not
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really free to choose the type of political system whereby they want 
to be governed. This in turn will very much affect the chances of 
polyarchy. Such a variable is used by Raymond Gastil in the 
Comparative Surveys of Freedom that Freedom House produces, as 
will be pointed in a later chapter.
There is no doubt about the domination of a foreign power in 
any country and how it affects its political system. However, taking 
this variable into account, although convincing in principle, would 
leave a group of countries outside consideration. In other words, 
foreign domination cannot be clearly identified when it comes to 
countries in the developed world.
This in turn would lead us to more issues in need of clarification, 
such as what is meant by foreign domination and in what forms this 
foreign domination may be said to exist.
Foreign domination involves more figures than was traditionally 
thought, i.e., military occupation of territories other than those of the 
dominant states. Dahl believes that, among other factors, if the 
foreign domination is strong and persistent, it disfavours polyarchy, 
and if it is weak or temporary it favours it. In this case, one cannot 
avoid asking questions about the kind of foreign domination in 
countries such as the U.S.A. or the U.K.?
1-2-7: Beliefs of political activists
The beliefs of political activists together with the level of socio­
economic development are the most significant conditions favouring 
democracy. That is not to say that the others are not significant, 
however, they are not as important as these two. This reasoning can
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be understood from the following:
The level of socio-economic development is very important not 
only for the stability of a country, but for its development as well. 
The higher this level in a country, the more chances a citizen has for 
a better life, and the more resources the government has to respond 
to the demands of its citizens. The higher this level, the more 
responsive a government is to social and economic rights. As Dahl 
suggests:
Looking more closely we see that the claim to primary 
social rights can be justified on one or both of the two 
grounds. They may be necessary simply in order to 
make it possible for citizens to exercise their primary 
political rights, or like the primary political rights they 
may be directly necessary in order to satisfy the 
criteria of democratic process.12
To some extent the stability of the system is kept since the need
for material goods is met by the country. It may reasonably be
objected that a higher level of socio-economic development does not 
automatically lead to democracy and the stability of the system. The 
answer to this challenge would be to agree with it. Although it is a 
very significant factor, it is not sufficient. It would make more sense 
if it were coupled with the beliefs of political activists.
Among the criteria under the beliefs of political activists, Dahl 
sees that what favours polyarchy are: "its [polyarchy] institutions are 
legitimate and it is effective in solving major problems". However, 
these are not conditions favouring polyarchy, but favouring its 
continuity. Political activists cannot believe in the legitimacy of the
institutions of such a system unless they have already experienced it,
12-R. Dahl, "The Moscow Discourse", Government and Opposition (15) 1980 p. 
14.
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at least for a period of time, and realized that it is effective in solving 
major problems.
Depending on the extent to which the seven conditions discussed 
above are fulfilled, a country can be judged on whether it is 
democratically governed. As one may see these conditions are very 
complex, and there is no answer to a country being considered 
democratic if just some conditions are present.
Dahl applied these conditions to some countries on deciles from 1 
to 10 to determine whether they were democratic. The scores that
each answer receives will range from 1 to 10 depending on whether
the condition in question is provided for or not. The ideal situation 
would be when all the answers received a score of 10 each. Such a 
country does not exist, and is not likely to. However the closer the 
score is to 10, the more democratic a country is compared with the 
others which received less.
What Dahl has told us up till now is the conditions that favour
polyarchy and therefore be able to identify a democratic regime, he
did not say anything in terms of comparison between countries in 
terms of degree of democracy. The conditions given above are not of 
general acceptability. Some of them impose on the researcher a 
narrowing of scope or comparison. What one needs at this stage is a 
discussion of the measurement of democracy as conceived by Dahl. 
This will be the focus of the following.
1-3: The measurement of democracy
Up to this point, it seems that Dahl had asked more questions 
than actually provided answers. Dahl himself was quite reluctant to 
engage in any kind of quantitative analysis of democracy since the
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data that would support his conditions for polyarchy are difficult, if 
not impossible, to come by. Data concerning the level of socio­
econom ic developm ent or equalities and inequalities are
comparatively easily obtainable and more convincing than the other 
variables which are difficult to quantify. However, in his appendix an 
attempt to measure democracy was carried out. I shall look at it
more closely to assess the validity of the measures used as well as 
the reliability of the data, which are the sole basis for the whole 
operation.
It should be pointed out that the attempt to measure democracy 
was carried out by Dahl and two associates, Norling and Williams.13 
There are two dimensions upon which the classification of countries 
was undertaken: classification of countries according to the
eligibility to participate by Norling and the their ranking according to 
the degree of opportunity for public contestation by Williams. These 
two dimensions, however, were discussed in the book itself.
Moreover, the variables used in the measurement of democracy 
are quite different from the conditions that would favour democracy. 
One would assume that the variables used would be the conditions
themselves, since they can determine whether a system is
democratic or not. In other words, if the conditions exist one can 
safely assume that a system is more democratic compared to those in 
which such conditions are not met. These variables are discussed in 
what follows.
1-3-1: The variables
13-R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. p. 231.
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It should be borne in mind that definition of the concept under
study influences the choices of variables used in the measurement.
At the centre of Dahl's definition of democracy are elections: in other 
words, participation and the opportunity for opposition. This, of 
course, depends on a variety of the variables chosen which should be 
met to determine the degree of democratization in any country. Then 
the question that needs to be answered is: do the variables used by
Dahl and associates to measure polyarchy correspond to the
theoretical definition of the concept given earlier? One cannot answer 
this question unless an attempt is made to consider the variables
used, which are:
1- Freedom of group opposition,
2-Interest articulation by associational groups,
3-Freedom of the press,
4-Representative character of current regime*,
5-Current electoral system,
6-Interest articulation by political parties,
7-Party system: quantitative,
8-Constitutional status of present regime,
9-Interest aggregation by legislature,
10-Horizontal power distribution,
11-Current status of legislature.
In an attempt to measure polyarchy in terms of variables for 
which data were available, Dahl and his associates sought to take 
these variables from Banks and Textor's A Cross-Polity Survey, 
which aimed at quantifying 115 countries on 57 characteristics as of 
about 1960-62.14 The choice of these variables was carefully 
undertaken to correspond to the theoretical definition Dahl gave to 
democracy. In other words, these variables are closely linked to the 
term that needs to be measured, and applied to different countries 




As pointed out earlier, the data were for the years 1960-62, but 
updated as to 1968, before the classification of countries was 
attempted. This led to one of the variables above (Representative 
character of the current regime) being dropped as redundant. A look 
at the different categories considered under this variable will help 
explain the reason behind this operation. The categories are: 
polyarchic, lim ited polyarchic, pseudo polyarchic and non 
polyarchic.15
A close look at the variables chosen reveals that they are quite 
difficult to assess, and scores received by each country are not 
available to scrutiny. One can just conclude that the scores vary from 
1 to 6 depending upon the categories that resulted in the breakdown 
of each variable.16 This would lead to countries receiving the 
highest point for any variable if the answer corresponds to the first 
c a t e g o r i e s .17 This poses a problem as far as one variable is 
concerned. The party system -quantitative variable contains 
"multiparty” as the first category, and "two party" as the second. The 
two kinds of political system can both actually be democratic since 
they allow opposition to the government and offer opportunities to 
participate. It would have been more appropriate had these 
distinctions not been introduced. Nonetheless, and according to this
15-A. S. Banks and R. B. Textor A Cross-Politv Survey (Cambridge MA : MIT 
Press, 1963) p. 85.
16-The variable considering the degree of freedom of the press contains four 
categories, the constitutional status of the current regime variable contains 
three categories whereas the party system -quantitative variable contains six 
categories. R. Dahl, (1971) op. cit. pp.238-9. See also A. S. Banks, and R. B. Textor, 
op. cit. pp. 67-97.
17- For a better understanding of the breakdown of the variables chosen to 
different categories, see R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. pp.238-40.
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hypothesis, countries within these two categories should receive the 
highest scores.
To determine whether this hypothesis is true or false is quite 
difficult, if not impossible. This is especially true bearing in mind 
that the updated data upon which they based their ranking are not 
available. Nonetheless, whether it is true or false, more issues need 
to be clarified, among which are: how can someone assess, for 
instance, freedom of the press? Does this mean freedom from 
government ownership and should the press be privately owned? 
Dahl found that in 40 countries freedom of the press was 
c o m p le te .18 The question that needs to be answered in this respect 
is: to what extent can one say that freedom of the press is complete? 
There is a kind of censorship on every press, however, the degree of 
such censorship or control varies from one country to another. This 
in turn will make a press freer in a particular country compared with 
another.
Furtherm ore, the breakdown of the variables "in terest 
articulation by associational groups", "interest articulation by political 
parties" and "interest articulation by legislature" resulted in the 
follow ing categories: "significant", "moderate", "limited" and
"negligible". Dahl and associates, in particular for the updating they 
have undertaken, do not provide the reader with a set of criteria 
upon which he can judge for himself. In other words, there is no 
clear cut threshold, at least for the author, between the different 
categories. When does moderate finish and limited begin? This would 
perhaps suggest that some of the variables are based on judgemental 
rather than hard data. It is left to the judgement of the scholar, 
based on the information gathered and his background or previous
18-R. Dahl, (1971) op. cit. p. 238.
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knowledge of any country, to decide what the country's score should 
be.
Before going into the different points in the scale represented by 
countries, two points of caution should be made. The first is that Dahl 
treats every variable equally compared with others. In other words, 
he does not introduce a system of weighting that would favour one 
variable as against others. Since the classification is based on the 
opportunities to participate and to oppose from the greatest to the 
least, the highest score is given to the variables that provide the 
greatest opportunity and so forth. These in turn would represent the 
scores received by every country. The second point of caution is that 
I shall not display all the countries, but only a few of them which are 
of a particular interest. The countries are placed on a scale from 1 to 
31, with some values missing.19
Table (7)1: Selected Countries Ranked by Opportunities to
Participate in National Elections and to Oppose the Government,
Circa 1969.
Opportunities for Elections percent of population U nascertained
political opposition not held eligible to vote uncertain *
Scale tvpes under 20% 20-90% over 90%
Greatest









14 Sth Africa Mexico
19- It should be pointed out that the initial scale was of 31, but since no 
countries were found on scales 2 and 21, it was decided that the perfect scale 
would be of 29. R. Dahl, (1971) op. cit. p. 241.
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O pportunity 31 Nigeria
* Includes countries where a constitutional government or 
elections have been suspended or nullified at least once since 
1960, the constitution has been suspended, a state of siege 
declared, or massive violence has occurred.
Source: Based on R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. pp 232-4.
The table above suggests that Dahl, as pointed out earlier, 
reserves the term political democracy to just popular sovereignty. 
The study has emphasized the electoral processes by which citizens 
can exert some kind of control over their leaders. The assessment of 
whether such a component alone is valid and leads to meaningful 
conclusions will be dealt with at a later stage of the chapter. 
Nonetheless, what matters in this respect is that the ranking of some 
countries seems to be of debatable validity. The most obvious one is 
that of France. In this table, France appears twice; in point 6 along 
with Turkey and Lebanon, and in point 11 with Bolivia, well behind 
some Third World countries such as Colombia, Venezuela and Costa 
Rica. This may perhaps suggest that there is a kind of ambiguity in 
the system of ranking as a whole, or a bias in the treatment of the 
data ava ilab le .20 It might further support the claim that the
20-R. D. Gastil, Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New 
York: Freedom House Publications in association with G. K. Hall, 1978). p. 248. 
He argues that:"...France was placed in the same category as Bolivia in both 
1962 and 1968. Since intuitively he saw an error, Dahl took France out of this 
category and placed it much higher. In this case the "data" used as well as the 
final aggregation seem to have been at fault."
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judgem ent and the personal knowledge about any country will 
influence either positively or negatively the scores and the rankings 
of countries. There is a prejudice about the safeguarding of different 
rights and liberties in every country. It may seem that France was 
severely judged as far as variables are concerned. Dahl, rightly, 
argues that:
one does not have to be biased in favour of France to
conclude that France was badly misplaced.21
This is to suggest that there is no exact scale, or a better scale 
that can be devised, for judging or weighting different social 
phenomena. A country with a history of safeguarding such rights and 
liberties, for which the outcome of the inquiry would not match the 
general impression, would be judged severely compared to others.
Dahl concluded that:
Its [France] dual location will perhaps serve as a
visible warning against taking the ranking in table A-l 
[table above] as if it had been engraved in stone by 
the hand of god. Doubtless, there are other errors.
Nonetheless, the ranking, I believe, is useful.22
One is not questioning the usefulness of the ranking, however, 
some countries do not seem appropriately ranked. The ranking of 
these countries was based on the opportunities to participate in 
national elections and to oppose the government. This is to suggest, 
once again, that the study focuses on elections, and how great the 
opportunities are for citizens to oppose the government at these 
times. Nonetheless, one can clearly see that some countries that share 
the same characteristics were placed at different points. The table 




countries were no elections were held. One would expect to see these 
countries at the same point in the scale, however, they were at 20, 
26, 27, and 31 respectively. Regardless of the different variables 
discussed above, if one takes this table into account, one will safely 
ask the question about the discrepancy in the ranking of these 
countries. If no elections were held, how will one know about the 
opportunities available to adult citizens to participate in national 
elections and to oppose the government? Furthermore, there is no 
indication in terms of the adult population eligible to vote about 
these countries in the first column. The fact that no elections were 
held in any country does not mean that adult citizens are not eligible 
to vote.
To follow the same line of argument concerning the adult citizens 
eligible to vote, one might suggest that there is a reservation on the 
classification in the table above worth mentioning. The third column 
includes countries were the percentage of adult population eligible to 
vote is between 20 and 90 per cent. Although it is a base upon which 
one can distinguish political systems, it would have been more 
fruitful had Dahl and associates provided detailed information about 
these countries and what the actual percentages were (it is worth 
mentioning that Dahl does give some information concerning what he 
called "special cases" about Chile, Switzerland and the United States 
in his list of polyarchies).
Moreover, it can be argued that countries with the highest 
percentage of adult citizens eligible to vote, more opportunities to 
participate and to oppose are available. One bears in mind that the 
minimum age for eligibility to vote varies from one country to 
another, and therefore may influence the percentage. Nonetheless,
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the point that needs to be clarified here is: is South Africa, for 
instance, more democratic than Tunisia or Nicaragua?
The answer to this question is obvious. The ranking of countries 
was in a hierarchical way; from the top down to the bottom. The 
nearer the country is to the top, the greater the opportunities to 
participate in national elections and to oppose government are 
available, and therefore the greater its degree of democracy. One 
would question this ranking if South Africa, a country where just
under 20 per cent of adult citizens are eligible to vote, is ranked well
above countries like Tunisia and Nicaragua, where over 90 per cent
of adult citizens are eligible to vote.23
It is borne in mind that countries with very high percentages of 
adult citizens who are eligible to vote are not necessarily
"democratic”, since different factors are involved in the percentage 
being high. Some countries see voting not only as a right, but as a 
duty. Moreover, some go further in taking actions against any citizen 
who abstains from voting. In addition to this, the ranking was based 
not only on the elections and the percentage of adults eligible to vote, 
but on different variables as well that would make such a process 
meaningful. Nonetheless, the question that cannot be avoided is: how 
democratic is a system where more than 80 per cent of the adult 
citizens are not eligible to vote? What would freedom of the press, of 
group opposition mean, and whether the electoral system is 
competitive or not in such a country? Elections are one form of 
expression. They are channels whereby a citizen can express his
23-"...percent of adult population eligible to vote. This indicator is basic to the 
concept of "democrativeness". The variation between nations on this measure 
indicates the percentage of population which excluded from the suffrage for 
whatever reasons (sex, race, residence, literacy, etc..." D. E. Neubauer (1967) op. 
cit. p. 1005.
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choice and preference: choice of candidates and policies in a 
multiparty elections, and "freedom" to agree or disagree when choice 
exists. What would freedom of group opposition lead to, if the 
majority of the citizens, who support this opposition, have not the 
right to bring it into office? Any system where the majority of the 
citizens is not eligible to vote is undemocratic regardless of the other 
variables that may exist. Therefore, one concludes that South Africa, 
in this ranking, should have been at the bottom of the scale, i.e., 
where the least opportunity to participate and to oppose.
Moreover, one would question the placing of countries in the
right-hand column of the table. According to Dahl, they are:
...countries where a constitutional government or 
elections have been superseded or nullified at least 
once since 1960, the constitution has been suspended, 
a state of siege declared, or massive civil violence 
occurred.24
One is not surprised to see how high the number of such 
countries is, however, this number should have been higher. The 
majority of Third World countries have experienced such practices. 
Nonetheless, how can one account for countries like Algeria or 
Nigeria, for instance, which should have been included within the 
category of countries in the right column? Algeria had a coup d'etat 
in 1965 following which the 1964 Constitution was suspended, and 
the National Assembly, elected in 1963, was dissolved. Nigeria also 
experienced coups d'etat (January and July 1966) as well as a 
massive civil war (the Biafra War). These events would not make 
them any different from those in the right-hand column. This raises 
the issue of whether the data were updated. One has no doubt that
24-R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. p. 234.
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they were, since the authors state that, nonetheless, the placing of 
these countries in the "wrong" column makes the system of ranking 
doubtful.
Coups d'etat are an illegal and yet the most common way by 
which leaders in the Third World seize power. It is against this 
background that such countries should be ranked. Ironically enough, 
countries in which the succession to power did not follow the same 
smooth and normal path have been ranked well above others which 
are stable, bearing in mind that the most significant, if not the only, 
dimension in Dahl's definition of democracy is popular sovereignty as 
understood in the electoral process.
In an attempt to clarify further the ranking, Dahl proposed a 
detailed table of different variables and categories used in the 
ranking of countries as well as the number and percentages of 
countries representing each category, and went on to provide a list of 
polyarchies and near polyarchies. His cut-off line was point 8 on the 
scale represented in table 1. The list of countries which Dahl calls 
fully inclusive polyarchies contains 29 countries, with three of them 
considered to be special cases for electoral restrictions as mentioned 
earlier.25
In order to conclude whether his list is meaningful and was 
achieved according to the data given, it was thought that a look at 
the variable used might yield useful conclusions. Since the primary 
objective is to measure democracy and distinguish between 
polyarchies and non polyarchies, it was decided to use only the 
number of countries in the categories that matter to this study. In 
other words, I shall just select the number of countries in the highest 
category, which means that the system is democratic. To overcome
25-For a full list of these countries see R. Dahl, (1971) op. cit. p. 248.
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the problem of one variable: "Party system: Quantitative", I decided 
that the scores received by the two categories: Multiparty and Two 
Party will be considered as one- by adding them and dividing the 
result by two. This has resulted in the following table:26
Table (7) 2: Variables Used as Indicators of Opportunities for
Opposition
No. v ar. variables description and categories.
13 Degree of freedom of the press:
4 0  1 -C o m p le te  (no c e n so rsh ip  or
governmental control either on domestic 
press or foreign correspondent.)
2 6 Constitutional status of current regime:
5 3 1-C onstitutional (governm ent conducted
w ith  r e f e re n c e  to re c o g n iz e d  
constitutional norms.)
2 9 Current electoral system:
4 7 1-competitive (no party ban, or ban on
extrem ist or extraconstitu tional parties 
only.)
3 0 Degree of freedom of group opposition:
4 1 1-Autonom ous groups free to en ter
politics and able to oppose government ( 
save for ex trem ist groups, w here 
banned.)
3 3 In te rest a rticu la tio n  by associational
groups:
19 1- Significant.
3 7 Interest articulation by political parties:
17 1-Significant.
4 0 Interest articulation by legislature:
12 1-Significant.
41 * Party system: Quantitative:
2 5 1-Multiparty (coalition or minority party
governm ent norm ally  m andatory if
26-Based on R. Dahl (1971) op. cit. pp. 238-40. I am only interested in the first 
categories of each variable, how ever, for variab le 41 (Party system  




1 2 2-Two party or effectively two-party ( 
re a s o n a b le  e x p e c ta tio n  o f p a rty  
rotation.)
4 8 Horizontal power distribution:
32 1- significant (effective allocation of 
pow er to fu n c tio n a lly  autonom ous
le g is la tiv e , execu tive , and ju d ic ia l
organs.)
5 0 Current status of legislature:
28 1-Fully  e ffec tive  (perfo rm s norm al 
le g is la tiv e  function  as reaso n ab ly  
"coequal" branch of national government.)
Source: Based on Dahl (1971) op. cit. pp 238-40
From the above table, one sees that the number of "polyarchies" 
varies from one category to another depending on the severity of the 
government in curtailing or respecting these variables. To establish a 
number of polyarchies, it was decided to add the number of
countries in these categories and divide the result by ten, which is
the original number of the variables employed. Then the score in
turn is compared with the number of polyarchies provided by Dahl 
to determine whether or not the process is genuine. The result 
achieved, after this operation, shows that there are 30.7 polyarchies 
in the world according to the data used by Dahl. This number is 
higher than the one given by Dahl.27 This number may be compared 
with another list by Rustow; the numbers at least match, although 
the basis of consideration differs.28 The inclusion of two more
countries within Dahl's list of polyarchies will make the number of 
such countries correspond to the one achieved after close scrutiny of
2 7 -Ib id .,
28-D. A. Rustow, A W orld of Nations: Problems of Political M odernization 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1967). Table 5, pp. 290-1. See also R. Dahl (1971) 
op. cit. p. 249.
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the variables used. Some have criticised Dahl for not placing Ceylon, 
for instance, within the column of democratic countries.29
Dahl does provide some answers about not including some 
countries included in Rastow's list in his final list of polyarchies.
However, it seems plausible to add to his list two countries from his 
list of near polyarchies. These two countries could perhaps be 
Colombia and Venezuela, which come at point 9 on his scale, along 
with others (Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras), but with no 
restrictions, and are included in his list of near polyarchies.30
If one recalls the discussion earlier, Dahl’s list of polyarchies was 
based on a cut off point in scale type 8. One would question this cut­
off point since it had no reasonable explanation upon which one can 
judge its validity. One would rather suggest that the clear cut should 
be scale type 9, and therefore all countries, up to this scale type, in 
column four should be classified as polyarchies. These countries, in 
addition to the three special cases of electoral restrictions, total 31
countries, which corresponds to the average countries included in the 
d ifferent categories of the variables used to measure this 
phenom enon.
Finally, this study does not, to some extent, confirm the general 
assumption that Western countries are more democratic than the 
rest of the world. The example of France, discussed above, is one par 
excellence, if one takes it as ranked on scale 11, well below some 
Third World countries such as Costa Rica, India or Columbia.31
29-"..., the reluctance of Dahl and associates to place Ceylon in the democratic 
column was not founded on comparative evidence. In fact, in 1968 Ceylon (Sri
Lanka) was one of the very few underdeveloped nations to have changed the
party in power by democratic processes since independence, a change that did 
not occur in India until 1977." R. D. Gastil (1978) op. cit. pp. 24-6.
30-R. Dahl, (1971) op. cit. p.248.
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II: Bollen's measurement of political 
democracy
Among the other scholars who have dealt with the measurement 
of political democracy, I shall look in particular at the work 
undertaken by Kenneth Bollen. I shall closely scrutinize his attempt 
to find out more about his proposed index upon which democracy 
can be measured. The purpose is to shed light on the fact that the 
issues discussed have raised many controversies, and to have a 
better conclusion about the phenomenon being measured once a 
comparison between the two attempts is obtained. However, before 
going into the index of democracy that Bollen proposes and 
determining how valid it is, a definition of the concept should be 
given. Bollen states that "validity concerns whether one is really 
measuring a concept."32 Therefore, he defines political democracy as 
follows:
31-"Dahl suggests that eight developing countries meet the criteria  of 
"polyarchy", or "rule by the many"( Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Jamaica, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela). According to 
Dahl, these countries hold fair, competitive elections, they allow their citizens 
access to alternative sources of information, they permit people to organize 
them selves to express policy preferences." A. A. Goldsmith, "Democracy,
p o litica l stability  and econom ic growth in developing countries. Some 
evidence on Olson's theory of distributional coalitions", Comparative Political  
Studies , Vol. 18, No. 4, January 1984. p. 520.
32-K. A. Bollen, "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An 
Evaluation of Human Rights M easures, 1950 to 1984", H uman R igh ts
Q u a r t e r ly (8) 1986 p. 587. Moreover, he sees that:"A theoretical definition of 
political democracy is a prerequisite to evaluating the validity of past indices 
and choosing indices for a revised index. The theoretical definition is
necessary to establish a standard by which the indicators may be evaluated." K. 
A. Bollen, "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy",
American Sociological Review (45) 1980 p. 377.
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It is these differences in the political power held by 
the elite, relative to the nonelite, that helps identify
how democratic a nation is. I define political
democracy as to the extent to which the political
power of the elite in minimized and that of the 
nonelite is maximized.33
This definition of political democracy suggests also, that the
electoral process is at the centre of it. Like Dahl, Bollen stresses the 
importance of the electoral process in the definition of political 
democracy, although Dahl attributes more conditions to the elections 
them selves.
Bollen sees political democracy as a balance between two
powers; the elite and the nonelite. For democracy to obtain, the
power of the former must be minimized and of the latter maximized.
The only way by which such a situation could be achieved is by 
elections and the manner in which they are conducted. That is, such a 
situation can materialise if elections are carried out and if the 
requirements or conditions necessary for bias-free elections are met.
Political democracy in this way involves two main dimensions:
popular sovereignty and political liberties,34 which constitute the
basis for Bollen's index of political democracy.
A close look at the two dimensions proposed by Bollen reveals 
that an aspect of human rights, represented in political liberties, is a 
m ajor component in the study and measurement of political 
democracy. The inclusion of this dimension will undoubtedly 
influence the ratings of countries, if any, when the measurement of
33-Ibid., p. 372.
34-K. A. Bollen, "Political Development and the Timing of Development", 
A m e r ic a n  Sociological Review , Vol. 46 (1979) pp. 578-80 and K. A. Bollen, 
(1980) pp. 375-6.
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their political democracy is attempted. Political liberties are strongly 
associated with the western developed world, which have little 
significance in the Third World or the former East European 
countries. Therefore, it would not be a surprise if the outcome of this 
study confirms the general assumption that western countries are 
more democratic than the rest of the world.
In the following section, I shall go in depth into Bollen's index of 
political democracy to understand the basis upon which his ranking 
of countries is achieved and to question the validity of his results.
2-1: Political democracy index
Bollen suggests an index for political democracy that fits his 
definition given above. He believes that the two dimensions [popular 
sovereignty and civil liberties] will enable the reader to understand 
how that balance is kept and therefore measure the degree of 
democratization of countries.
2-1-1: Popular sovereignty
The first dimension Bollen considers is popular sovereignty. This 
is understood within the context of the electoral process. In other 
words, the scrutiny of the electoral process would reveal how much 
power the nonelite have over the elite. This is to suggest that 
democracy is concerned with the issue of rule, control or decision­
m ak in g .35 How are elections conducted? The selection to the key 
posts such as the executive and legislative bodies are at the centre of 
the process. Bollen suggests three indicators to the this dimension,
35-K. Graham (1986) op. cit. p. 13.
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which are: fairness of elections, executive selection and legislative
selection. I shall examine them in what follows.
2-1-1-1: Fairness of elections
Among the first variables one looks at when distinguishing 
democratic countries are elections and how fair they are. Elections
and their fairness have been the centre of attention of those who
dealt with the issue of democracy, such as Dahl. This indicator in
Bollen's attempt is measured on a four point scale, to determine
whether elections are free from corruption and coercion or not. He
observes that:
The scoring of this variable is based on whether or not 
alternative choices exist, and on whether or not the
elections are adm inistered by a nonpartisan
administration. Also considered are whether or not the 
elections are rigged and if the results of the elections 
are binding on all parties.36
He differs from Dahl in that the latter stresses the importance of 
each individual possessing the same information and with each vote 
being weighted equally. To determine whether elections are free 
from corruption and coercion is not an easy task. First of all, one has 
to determine what is meant by corruption. Moreover, if the criteria 
discussed above are met, could one safely conclude that elections are 
fair?
Even in a situation where these conditions are met, elections 
cannot be free from corruption, since it has many aspects apart from 
its traditional meaning, i.e., the suspicious conduct of elections and 
the falsification of the results. Would not it be a kind of corruption if
36-K. A. Bollen (1980) op. cit. p. 376.
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one party had a monopoly over the mass media or the most 
significant ones, such as television? In such a case, it would have 
more opportunities to transmit its message and programme than 
other parties. There is no doubt that such a system would be
"democratic" since it offered alternative choices. However, such a 
choice would be merely a facade for the sake of international
prestige. Moreover, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to compare 
the degrees of corruption across elections or countries. This would 
very much depend on the availability of the data and the flow of
information, as well as the background of the judge who will analyze
the data. Data concerning the majority of the Third World countries, 
if not all of them, are difficult to come by. Moreover, when available 
they are highly unreliable.37
The inclusion of alternative choices in elections suggests that all 
the one party states are excluded from the measurement of political 
democracy. Elections, as traditionally known, do not exist in these 
countries. The greatest choice that might exist is between two 
candidates from the same political party up to the parliamentary 
level. In such way, and according to the definition forwarded above 
these countries would score very low on the four point scale 
proposed by Bollen.
37-"M any developing countries m anipulate data to suit their self-im age... 
There is a prohibition against collection and publication of data in some 
developing countries. There is at least two countries where the publications of 
national statistics is considered a punishable crim inal offense: Guinea and 
Kampuchea." G. T. Kurian, The New Book of World Rankings (New York: Facts 
on File Publication, 1984) p. XII. Moreover, the fact that many developing 
countries manipulate data to suit their self-image, conversely means the data 
reported in the West are highly exaggerated and do not represent the real 
s itu a tio n .
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2 -1 -1 -2 -E xecu tive  selection
This variable would answer a very significant question which is: 
how has the chief executive of a country come to power? This is to 
determine whether the country is democratic or not. Obviously, in a 
country where the chief executive has assumed power through 
elections, which is the most common way, the country is safely 
considered more democratic as compared to one where the chief 
executive has come to power through a different means.
One cannot agree more with Bollen on this point. However, some 
peculiar cases make this variable questionable. Most countries in the 
world have their chief executives elected, including those considered 
to be undemocratic. Although there were no alternative choices, 
nonetheless many one party states have seen their chief executives 
actually elected to their posts. The meaning of elections in this 
context would be that the highest organ of the party would select one 
candidate before having a popular referendum. Moreover, two 
examples of countries have had chief executives nominated for life 
because of the services rendered to their countries, Bourguiba in 
Tunisia and Tito in the former Yugoslavia. In other countries, Egypt 
for instance, the chief executives have been nominated by their 
predecessors. This is especially true for Sadat who was nominated 
vice president, and assumed the responsibility of chief executive 
after the death of Nasser. It is also the case of the present president 
who was nominated by Sadat. Moreover, the final case would be 
monarchs. The king in certain monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan or Morocco is the chief executive, who was not elected but 
assumed this responsibility by inheritance.
It was pointed out that Bollen focuses on whether the chief
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executive was elected or not. Nonetheless, there are many ways, 
apart from coups d'etat, whereby many chief executives in the world 
today have come into assuming their responsibilities. Bollen does not 
distinguish between these kinds of processes. He does not offer the 
reader a scale upon which the differentiation between systems apart 
from being elected or not. The score as well is not given. One has only 
to assume that when the chief executive is elected, the country
receives the highest mark, whereas the score is nought when the 
chief executive is not elected. Even if this assumption is true, it
would be unfair to place different countries in the nought category. 
Obviously, there is a difference between a chief executive who came 
through selection at the highest organ of the party, for instance, and 
one who came through a coup d'etat, or one who was directly elected 
by the population at large.
2-1-1-3: Legislative selection
This variable is measured on the basis of whether this body is 
elected or not, and whether it is effective in determining policies.
Nonetheless, one has to define what is meant by elected. Does it, for 
instance, mean that it just be elected from candidates representing
different political parties or just one, as is the case in one party
states in the communist and developing countries? Surely one will 
agree that the legislative body of country like Algeria was elected,
since it was there by the will of the people. The latter had a choice of
candidates from the same party to fill the vacant seats in the
Parliament or in the National Assembly. Moreover, what is meant by 
national policies, and how can one determine whether this body was
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effective or not in determining them?
It seems quite difficult to know what exactly national policies 
are. This depends very much on the circumstances of the country 
itself, and the view point from which the matter is seen. What would 
be a national policy for the dilemma facing some of the Third World 
countries? To have a market economy, open its borders to 
international investment and enter the international economy? This 
would mean more opportunities for jobs, the availability of goods, at 
the same time the widening of the gap between rich and poor and 
the dependency of that country even as far as its political decision­
making is concerned.
Under the dimension of popular sovereignty, Bollen failed to  
stress the importance of the independence of the judiciary. The 
variables discussed above are of paramount importance to the 
proper working of a dem ocratic system, nonetheless, the 
independence of the judiciary is at the centre of democracy as well. 
After all, the legitimacy of the political system as a whole is based on 
the idea of justice in general.
However, these variables cannot work properly unless coupled 
with more requirements of the most efficient democratic system. 
This is the other dimension that Bollen proposes, which will be 
discussed in the following.
2-1-2-P olitica l Liberties
Bollen suggests that:
Political liberties exist to the extent that the people of 
a country have the freedom to express any political 
opinions in any media and the freedom to form and
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participate in any political group.38
Being defined as above, they are of paramount importance to 
political democracy. One can not possibly think of fulfilling the 
requirements for popular sovereignty without making these political 
liberties generally available. Moreover, one would add that, political 
liberties are the other side of the same coin, represented by political 
d e m o c ra c y .39 As such these two dimensions are interdependent: 
popular sovereignty needs political liberties to work properly, and 
the latter will undoubtedly lead to the former. In the following, I 
shall look at the indicators suggested by Bollen which form political 
liberties.
2-1-2-1: Freedom of the press
The press is the most common channel whereby people become 
aware of what is happening around them. In countries where 
freedom of the press is guaranteed, people tend to be more conscious 
of their rights and the shortcomings of their elected representatives, 
and those who exert power on their behalf. There is a constant 
pressure from the press on the people in office which tends to curtail 
their powers on the one hand, and increase those of the nonelite on 
the other. It is not a surprise therefore for it to be known as the 
fourth power, in addition to the three traditional ones: executive,
38-K. A. Bollen (1986) op. cit p. 568.
39-"O ur paper tested w hether two theoretically  d istinct d im ensions of 
political democracy are empirically distinct. We concluded that they are not... 
Such a defin ition  precludes a faithfu l representation of the theoretical 
structure we sought to model: popular sovereignty and political liberties as 
distinct but correlated aspects of political democracy." K. A. Bollen, and B. D. 
G randjean, "Issues of theory, Issues of fact. Reply to Farnell" A m e r i c a n  
Sociological Review  (48) 1983. pp, 138-9.
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legislature and the judiciary.
Bollen measures this indicator on a nine-point scale.40 This is 
attained by looking at the degrees of control exercised over the 
press. This control may have different aspects such as censorship and 
interference with the daily work of the media.
One does not wish to repeat the same criticism of Dahl on this 
variable. Both scholars stress its importance for the proper working 
of a democratic system. Nonetheless, the scale upon which they 
judge differ. It would have been more useful and easier had Bollen 
included his nine-point scale in the appendix to enable the reader to 
better understand the variety of controls exercised on the press and 
how he weighted them.
2-1-2-2: Freedom of group opposition
One of the ways by which the power of the elite is decreased, 
and that of the nonelite is increased, is through group opposition. A 
democratic system is judged on, among other factors, the degree to 
which opposition groups are allowed to emerge. Bollen used a four 
point scale for this factor.41
A society in which everybody agrees on everything does not 
exist and is not likely to. An opposition to the elite would work 
better if citizens organised themselves into political parties or 
pressure groups, to better challenge the elite and curtail their 
powers. To the extent to which these opposition groups are allowed 
to emerge and exert their normal activities, a system is judged on its 
degree of democracy. Therefore, the higher the levels of tolerance of
40-K. A. Bollen (1980) op. cit. p. 375.
4 1 -Ib id .,
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group opposition, the higher the degree of political democracy.
Nonetheless, the extent to which opposition groups could emerge 
depends very much on the character of the opposition group itself on 
the one hand and on how institutionalized a country is on the other.
How institutionalized a country is, means how able the 
institutions of a country are to cope, adapt and be flexible whenever 
situations change: in other words, how fragile are its institutions? I 
shall return to this point after the consideration of the following 
factor.
2-1-2-3: Government sanctions
Bollen agrees with Dahl on the inclusion of this factor when 
measuring political democracy. However, one would have preferred 
not to see the inclusion of the second factor, i.e., freedom of group 
opposition in the measurement, although a very significant indicator, 
government sanctions overlaps with it.
Government sanctions refer to different actions, whether violent, 
economic or "legal”, by the government towards the limitation and 
curtailing of activities of one group or political party. Therefore, if 
government sanctions are very high in one country, it would be 
absurd to think of freedom of group opposition in the said country.
Moreover, it seems that the indicators represented under the 
dimension of political liberties are quite difficult to assess in their 
full meaning. Most of the data concerning these aspects are reported 
by the media or the international, regional specialized agencies. A 
practice by a country with long tradition of depriving its citizens of 
these rights would certainly not attract the same attention that
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would be given to another which was known to be ’moderate' or 
generally protective of these rights.
To go back to the point made earlier, both government sanctions 
and freedom of group opposition depend very much on how 
institutionalized a country is.42 There are different pressures on 
every government. However, the response to these pressures differs 
from one country to another. There is a limit for the extent of 
tolerance in every country. A country with inflexible institutions, 
which are unable to adapt, would be very much more vulnerable to 
the use of sanctions compared to others with flexible ones.
Bollen's index of political democracy, as seen earlier, is composed 
of six variables. When these variables are present, i.e., when a 
country safeguards these rights, the country’s percentage of 
democratization is high. He tested his index against different 
attempts to measure democracy, and concluded that it was the most 
valid. According to him, it was the only index which offered the 
reader the ground upon which the comparison of political democracy 
on a cross-national basis can be conducted, and for which adequate
data are available. Bollen observes that:
A number of these measures are limited to certain 
types of countries. For instance, Adelman and Morris 
(1971) and Coleman (1960) consider only LDCs...[Less 
Developed Countries] If the researcher wishes to 
restrict his/her attention to countries of particular
42-"The political institutions of developing societies tend to be weaker than 
those of developed societies in terms of variables such as adaptability to 
varying types of challenges, organizational complexity, autonomy from other 
social groupings, and consensus on basic operating procedures. As a result, the 
p o li t ic a l  in s titu tio n s  ty p ica lly  found  in  deve lo p in g  co u n tries  are 
com paratively  ineffic ien t and unreliab le . They perform  the ir principal 
functions poorly (including im portantly the maintenance of public order), 
and they do so at great cost." C. R. Beitz, "Democracy in Developing Countries." 
In R. D. Gastil (1978) op. cit. p. 155.
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type (e.g., LDCs), then one or more of these indices 
may be suitable. But if the generality of hypothesis of 
comparison of different countries in different regions 
or at different level of development is sought, then 
these indices will not do. In summary, a comparison of 
POLDEM [Political Democracy Index] with nine other 
measures shows that it is the only index that reports 
an estimate of reliability... In addition, POLDEM is 
available for a greater number of countries than are 
the others.43
Since the intention is to measure political democracy on a cross­
national basis, there is no doubt about how important Bollen's index 
is in carrying out such an exercise. All the attempts with which 
Bollen compared his work had taken the segmentation approach, i.e., 
limited themselves to a particular region or types of countries, or 
excluded some type of countries. However, this is not to say that if 
Bollen's index of political democracy is the only approach which 
would enable the researcher to conduct a comparison on a cross­
national basis, that he has to take it. There are some shortcomings, 
which would be highlighted once the assessment of the attempts is 
carried out in the next section.
Bollen proposes a ranking for different countries on their 
percentages of political democracy for the years 1960 and 1965. The 
scores received by each country are displayed in the following table:
Table (7) 3: Bollen’s ranking of countries according to their degree of 
political democracy for the years 1960 and 1965
Standard country country Political Democracy
code as listed by
Russet et al (A.P.S.R.) 1960 1965
0 0 2  USA 94.4 94.6
43-K. A. Bollen (1980) op. cit. p. 380.
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145 Bolivia 36.2 59.8
100 Colombia 71.4 69.7
0 1 0 V enezuela 73.4 72.5
211 Belgium 99.9 99.7
2 2 0 France 90.8 89.7
560 South Africa 58.9 64.7
7 80 Sri Lanka 85.9 94.0
265 East Germany 22.1 23.8
365 The Soviet Union 18.2 20.4
670 Saudi Arabia 09.7 12.0
Source: Based on K. Bollen (1980) op. cit. pp. 387-8.
As suggested elsewhere in the chapter, it would have made a big 
difference had Bollen included a system of scoring and how countries 
are assessed on each variable. As seen in the detailed scrutiny of the 
indicators used to measure the two dimensions of political 
democracy, the scholar’s scale for some variables was four points 
(freedom of group opposition), nine points for others (freedom of the 
press), and gave no indication on the scale upon which some 
variables are measured. This of course poses a problem when cross 
checking the results and how his percentages and ranking, in the 
table above, are achieved.
This ranking confirms the general assumption that Western 
countries are more democratic than the rest of the world, as well as 
that some countries in the Third World can be democratic as in the 
case of Venezuela, Colombia and Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, what seems 
to be difficult to understand, once again, is the case of South Africa. 
Bollen’s index of political democracy was based on two dimensions: 
popular sovereignty and political liberties, which are not particularly 
enjoyed in this country. Dahl stresses that less than 20 per cent of 
the adult citizens is eligible to vote, which would make popular 
sovereignty a meaningless dimension on Bollen's index. Moreover,
2 5 9
the use of force and violence, seen as part of the government 
sanctions, are daily events in this country which would, further,
weaken the claim for the enjoyment of any political liberties. 
Therefore, if the two dimensions of political democracy appear to be 
absent in South Africa, how would someone explain its relatively 
high ranking in this table?
This would perhaps suggest that the standards applied are not 
for all the citizens, but for the white minority, which would make the 
country relatively appear more democratic than it should have been. 
At the same time one would question the dimensions of democracy, 
and the validity of the variable used would they lead to any peculiar 
cases.
Ill:  Comparison, critics and assessment
Both Dahl and Bollen measure the same phenomenon. Their 
definition of political democracy is quite similar. In other words, they 
are concerned with the distribution of power between the elite and 
the nonelite. They both emphasize popular sovereignty as exercised 
through the electoral process, and Bollen stresses the need for
political liberties.
If one goes deeper into the analyses of Dahl's measurement of 
democracy, one finds that political liberties are another implicit 
dimension within his theory. Among the variables or conditions Dahl 
puts to the study of the electoral process, and therefore popular
sovereignty, are:
Countries hold fair, competitive elections, they allow 
their citizens access to alternative sources of 
information, and they permit people to organize
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themselves to express policy preferences.44 
As suggested elsewhere in the chapter, it would be absurd to
think about popular sovereignty without political liberties. If people
had no access to alternative information and no right to organize,
fairness of elections would be meaningless. Political rights are
another way by which citizens can exert some control over their
elected representatives and without them popular sovereignty would
not be effective.
So, once agreed that the two dimensions are at the centre of 
their analysis, the results obtained suggest further that, the two 
scholars are measuring the same thing and coming to similar 
conclusions. This can be seen in the following table representing the 
ranking of different countries from each of the two studies:
Table (7) 4: Comparison between Dahl's and Bollen's ranking
of selected countries
Countries Dahl's ranking: From Percentages in
the greatest to least Bollenl study
opportunity
1965 1960
Belgium Scalel 99.9 99.7
USA Scale3 94.4 94.6
France Scales 6 and 11 90.8 89.7
South Africa Scale 14 58.9 64.7
Bolivia Scale 11 36.2 59.8
Saudi Arabia Scale 31 09.7 12.0
Costa Rica Scale 8 90.1 91.3
Source: Based on K. Bollen (1980) op. cit. pp.387-8 and R. Dahl 
(1971) op. cit. pp.232-4.
As suggested elsewhere, they see political democracy from the
44-A. A. Goldsmith (1984) op. cit. p. 520.
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same viewpoint and their results are quite similar. Nonetheless, a 
word of caution should be entered at this stage as regards the 
validity of these results. If one looks closely at the table above, one's 
first impression would be that the results are similar. However, if the 
cases of France, Bolivia and Costa Rica are seriously taken into 
consideration, one would realize that there must be some differences 
between the methods or the variables used that would put the 
general approach in question.
In Dahl's table, France appeared twice, on points 6 and 11, on a 
scale of 29 points. This had left everybody suspicious whether that 
approach was valid or not. What interests us more in this respect is 
France as appearing in point 11, alongside Bolivia and behind some 
Third World countries such as Venezuela and Costa Rica. Dahl 
believes that this placing was doubtful, and took it to point 6 on the 
scale to make it more democratic than Bolivia. To this point one could 
not agree more with Dahl. However, after the study undertaken by 
Bollen, one side of the results obtained confirms the ranking position 
of France. The periods covered by the two studies are relatively 
similar and therefore would lead, if the phenomenon dealt with is 
the same, to similar results. If one looks at the percentage scored by 
Costa Rica and France, one realizes the difference was 1.6 in favour of 
the former in 1960, and 0.2 in favour of the latter in 1965. To 
simplify the matter, I decided to draw an overall percentage for the 
period studied; by adding the two percentages and dividing the 
results by two. This has led to 90.3 and 90.7 per cent being the 
averages for France and Costa Rica respectively. That would confirm 
the ranking of France at point 11 behind Costa Rica. On the other 
hand, the score received by Bolivia in Bollen's study would weaken 
the claim that France and Bolivia should be at the same point in the
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scale. The table above reveals that the average percentage of Bolivia 
is 43 per cent, which is less than half the one scored by France. This 
in turn, would leave no room for suggesting that these countries 
should be regarded as equally democratic.
The point that needs to be stressed is that, although there is 
ground for argument that France was in a peculiar place in Dahl's 
study, there are some doubts about it, however, the comparison 
with Bollen's study confirms, to some extent, this peculiarity. The 
objection to the ranking of France was because it was ranked at the 
same point as Bolivia, not because it was ranked below some Third 
World countries such as Costa Rica. The percentages given by Bollen 
would support this claim. Furthermore, Costa Rica, in another study 
undertaken by Kurian, is rated above the United States of America 
on an index of democracy.45
W hatever shortcomings occur, in any study, the most 
straightforward points to be looked at are the variables and methods 
used to reach the conclusions. Most significant of all is to ask this 
question: do the variables used confirm the theoretical definition 
given to the concept. In this case, at the centre of the definition of 
the concept of democracy is the degree of control exerted by citizens 
over their leaders, and how high this degree is. The most
45-"The index of democratization is based on two empirical political variables: 
(1) the share of smaller parties and independents of the votes cast in 
parliam entary and/ or presidential elections (competition) and the degree of 
e lec to ra l participation (p artic ipa tion )... The index of dem ocratization  is 
c a lc u la te d  by m ultip ly ing the percen tag es  of the co m petition  and 
participation and by dividing the results by 100.
Country. Index of Democ. Competition. Participation.
Denmark. 40.3 66.8 60.4
Costa Rica. 18.6 52.2 35.6
United States. 17.6 47.0 37.4
T. G. Kurian (1984) op. cit. p. 104.
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straightforward way whereby this degree is located is through 
elections. To this point, one concludes that the variables used confirm 
the definition of the concept. Against this background one asks, is 
this definition acceptable to all? Does not political democracy 
embrace more dimensions than the above discussed?
The definition of political democracy, and therefore of the 
variables employed in measuring it, incorporates liberal values that 
are difficult to apply in real life to different countries. Like Dahl, 
Bollen observes that his index would enable the researcher to 
"compare different countries in different regions or at different 
stages of development". Would not this be practically difficult and 
leading to unconvincing conclusions? If the aim is to make a 
comparison on a cross-national basis, then Bollen’s index will enable 
the researcher to do so. However, if the goal is the consistency and 
reliability of the results, then this index will be doubtful. How can 
someone compare, for instance, two countries at different stages of 
developm ent in terms of political dem ocracy? The term 
development, in this connection, is not limited only to economic, but 
to political development as well. Therefore, different variables 
should be taken into account when dealing with the issue of political 
democracy.
As suggested earlier, the level of socio-economic development 
helps the system to develop into a democracy. A country at an 
advanced stage of development would offer more opportunities to its 
citizens, as compared to a poor country at a lower stage of 
development. Among the opportunities the former can offer is 
education, which could not be possibly available to every citizen in 
the deprived areas of the undeveloped world.
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It is important to stress the crucial role education plays in 
raising the awareness and consciousness of the people. Democracy 
requires democratic behaviour. What would democracy mean to an 
illiterate individual? How can the mob organize an opposition to face 
its own government in a peaceful way? What would elections mean 
for them, or freedom to choose between candidates at an election? 
Furthermore, apart from the classical meaning of education, it also 
means the inclusion of the people in the daily life of the government 
and be part of the decision-making process, and to bridge the gap
between the government on the one hand and the people on the
other. Mr. Loubenchenko, the Soviet representative to the United
Nations' Human Rights Committee, rightly argues that:
It was also essential to educate the people who, for
many years, had taken no direct part in the political 
decision-making. There was a danger that, without 
adequate preparation, the d irect exercise of 
democratic rights might harm democracy instead of 
enhancing it.46
Apart from the level of literacy being high in the advanced 
countries, one would add as well that the population is urbanized,
and the systems of communications are more developed. The latter is
one way by which people tend to know more about what is
happening in their country and abroad quickly in contrast with the 
remote areas in an underdeveloped country. If democracy involves 
alternative sources of information, how would it be accounted for in 
a country where just one source of information is difficult to come 
by?
What has been considered in the studies above, is the fact that 
the two scholars have attempted to measure democracy as they
46-U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 928. 31 October 1989 par. 57.
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perceive it, with the variables they think refer to their definitions, 
and applying them on a cross-national basis. The phenomenon they 
studied is as it is perceived in their own countries, and therefore the 
outcome will favour the ranking of countries sharing the same 
characteristics as theirs. Likewise different studies which dealt with 
the observance of human rights were culture bound. Nonetheless, the 
question that should be asked here is that: are there not any other 
definitions of democracy parallel to those given above, as is the case 
with human rights? The definition of democracy proposed by both 
Dahl and Bollen suggests that it does not exist beyond the Western 
developed world and a handful of Third World countries, 
nonetheless, the term is widely applied to describe different 
countries either in the Third World or Eastern Europe in which the 
variables required are not provided for. Would not it then suggest 
that democracy may exist in another form? And if so, is it safe to call 
it democracy?
Marxist regimes, as they are and according to the definitions, are 
not democratic. There are no civil or political liberties. However, from 
a M arxist perspective, a Communist country is the ultimate 
democratic system. Marx observed in his Communist Manifesto 
(1848) that:
The first step in the revolution by the working class, is 
to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to 
win the battle for democracy.47
This system would eventually develop into a democracy because 
it represents the majority of the people, and even with just one 
party, a system can be still called democratic. This may perhaps
47-C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1972) p. 15.
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suggest that democracy in this respect is taken in the broader sense 
of the term, which differs from the one seen earlier. It is taken to 
mean equality and social justice, which only an egalitarian regime 
can provide.
Furthermore, Macpherson believes that a Communist country
can as well be labelled democratic even in the narrow sense of the
term, providing that some conditions are met. He argues that:
...a one party state can in principle be democratic even 
in the narrow sense provided (1) that there is full
intra-party democracy, (2) that the party membership 
is open, and (3) that the price of participation in the 
party is not a greater degree activity than the average 
person can reasonably be expected to contribute.48
It is quite difficult, if not impossible, to state whether these 
provisions are available within a one party state or not. However, 
what matters is that, even if systems differ from the ones referred to 
by Dahl and Bollen, they can still be called democratic. This in turn 
suggests that democracy exists, or may exist, in different forms not 
necessarily the one dealt with by the two scholars, although such 
understanding is the most common and widespread. The same thing 
could probably be said about Third World countries which have 
followed the same political system as in the Communist world. To the 
extent that the conditions are provided for, the degree of
democratization is measured.
Finally, what should be borne in mind is that, democracy is
regarded in the articles as the perfect system that everybody has to 
adopt. Another view might be that it is a necessity in some countries 
or regions in the world, but a luxury in most, if not all, Third World 
countries that they cannot afford to adopt. From this point of view
48-Ibid., p. 21.
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democracy is not the ideal system in many Third World countries 
given their present circumstances; another, more authoritarian form 
of government, would perhaps be better equipped to deal with daily 
events and to prepare for an eventual transition to democracy.49
What one needs to stress is that practical conditions in many 
Third World countries will hinder any development of a system 
towards democracy, and will therefore disadvantage them if they are 
dealt with in the same way as the developed world. Moreover, what 
seems to be d ifficu lt to overcome is the problem of 
operationalization of the concepts dealt with on a cross-national 
basis. Some of the variables used in the measurement of political 
democracy do not have the same meaning in different countries 
ranked by the two scholars considered, or by others.
49-H untington, for instance, argues that the process of po litical change 
includes two stages. One is the creation of authoritative political institutions; 
the other, the grow th of political participation. The sequence of these 
com ponents processes m atters. H untington holds that the more im portant 
process in developing societies is the creation of political institutions which is 
underm ined by the prem ature expansion of opportunities for po litical 
participation. It is necessary to have strong, widely accepted, and efficient 
political institutions before people can be permitted to participate in politics; 
otherwise he claims governments will be unstable and inefficient." C. R. Beitz, 
op. cit. p. 155.
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Chapter Eight 
Freedom House and the Comparative 
Study of Human Rights
In this chapter, I examine closely the work of Freedom House as 
an attempt to monitor and measure freedom on a cross-national 
basis through the Comparative Survey of Freedom. It should be 
pointed out at the beginning that the analysis will focus only on 
independent states, and on the dimensions of freedom as they are
considered in the Survey. It will accordingly take no direct account of 
dependent territories or of the differences in relationships between
freedom and different social and economic systems.
The Comparative Survey of Freedom has been published every 
year from 1973 to date. It was published twice a year for the first
two years.1 It is the only attempt, so far as is known, to measure
freedom on a cross-national and continuous basis. At least in 
principle, it must therefore represent a leading source of information 
for a researcher concerned with comparing political systems in terms 
of their degrees of freedom. Not only is the Survey published 
regularly, it also takes account of current developments and 
highlights gains and losses in freedom during each of the periods that 
it reviews. This in turn enables the researcher to carry out an 
analysis through a given period of time to compare development and 
pinpoint losses and gains in freedom in the countries that are being 
considered.
1- The Survey, sponsored by Freedom House, -an independent New York 
based organisation- published semi-yearly in 1973 and 1974, then yearly ever 
since in a bi-monthly publication called Freedom at Issue , and in an annual 
volume Freedom in the World since 1978.
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However, it does not necessarily follow that the Survey's 
findings should be taken as authoritative, and that discussion must 
be limited to its ranking of countries and the results it provides. On 
the contrary, one has to go far beyond that and question the validity 
of the results themselves. Why, for instance, should country A have 
been ranked above B? Any ranking of this kind obviously depends 
on the variables used in the study; and the scrutiny of the variables 
should in turn help to establish whether the Survey is a valid 
comparative measure. Equally, the sponsoring organisation itself, 
Freedom House, must be examined, in order to determine its degree 
of independence as a non-governmental organisation.
Ideological and financial independence are the key elements in 
any discussion of this kind. How did Freedom House come into being? 
Who are the people associated with it? How is it financed? Where do 
the data come from? Does it carry out its own research like, for 
instance, Amnesty International?
These questions will be considered in the first section. In the
next section I shall then turn to discuss freedom as it is understood 
by Freedom House. I shall look at both the dimensions that are
employed by the Survey and scrutinize the variables included in 
each. In addition, I will discuss the method and the ranking of 
countries. The variables used and the method whereby countries are 
ranked are crucial to an understanding of the Survey and its
shortcomings, and are necessary to any discussion of the adequacy, 
over time, of any assessment based on it. Following this, I shall apply 
the Survey in a more detailed fashion to a small number of countries 
considered as case studies. The chapter concludes with a general 
assessment of the Survey and whether the task it seeks to
undertake, to measure freedom on a cross-national basis, is in itself a
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feasible one.
I: Freedom House: the historical setting
A historical dimension to a discussion of Freedom House, 
although to some extent descriptive, is a necessary preliminary to 
the discussion that follows. The Comparative Survey of Freedom is 
published under the auspices of Freedom House, which makes its 
study vital to the proper understanding of the Survey and the results 
obtained. Although little information is available about the historical 
background of Freedom House itself,2 nonetheless an attempt will 
be made to look closely at the birth of this organization and the 
launching of the Survey. It is only against a background of this kind 
that one can properly understand the criticisms to which the Survey 
has been subjected.
In Freedom in the World 1989-90. Freedom House defined itself 
as follows:
Freedom House is an independent nonprofit 
organization based in New York that monitors political 
rights and civil liberties around the world. Established 
in 1941, Freedom House believes that effective 
advocacy of civil rights at home and human rights 
abroad must be grounded in fundamental democratic 
values and principles.3
2 - I n  a personal communication (A pril 1991), James Finn, the Editorial 
Director, assured the author that"...we are now in the process of composing the 
Fiftieth Year Annual Report and are doing some research of our own about the 
beginnings of Freedom House."
3 -Freedom House, Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
1989-1990  (New York: Freedom House, 1990). p. 1. Moreover, "Freedom House 
was founded forty six years ago when a group of civic minded citizens - 
including Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell L. Wilkie, William Allen White, Herbert 
Agar, George Field and o thers, decided that there should be an organization
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As a non-governmental organization which monitors civil rights 
and political liberties, Freedom House, from the outset, seems to have 
been linked with official American policy. Although it defended 
human rights in general, it was very much directed at defending and 
encouraging liberal elements in American society,4 and attacking 
communist and fascist regimes. Although its ostensible purpose is to 
enhance global freedom by pointing to shortcomings and abuses 
whenever they occur, it is nonetheless in practice very much 
concerned to defend American interests and the American model of 
freedom. This is especially true when one looks at the members of 
the board of trustees and their posts within the American 
government. This fact confirms the claim that this is an organization 
very much linked to the American view of freedom. Any list of the 
members of the board of trustees, at least since 1979, which are 
readily available for analysis, are people who either hold or have 
held different influential political posts within the American 
a d m in is t r a t io n s 5 . Further, it is perhaps worth mentioning the
that not only criticized and rejected totalitarian systems such as fascism and 
com m unism  but actively supported dem ocratic principles and the freedom 
they ensure. This remains the driving purpose of Freedom House." Freedom At 
Issue, January-February 1988 p. 3. Furthermore, "Freedom House, which was 
created in 1941 as a private, tax-exempt defender of U. S. interest in a world at 
war." H. M. Scoble, and L. S. Wiseberg, "Problems of Comparative Research in 
Human rights." In V. P. Nanda, et al. eds, Global Human Rights: Public Policies. 
Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies (Boulder: Westview, 1981) p. 152.
4-J. W. Richman, (President of Freedom House) said: "Thus, a principal
m ission of Freedom House will continue to be the encouragement of the 
"liberal" element of our society." Freedom A t Issue, January -F ebruary  1989 
106 p. 3.
5-W iseberg states that :"For instance, the 1979 board of trustees included a 
significant number of individuals who are readily identified as having held 
high government positions past and present." In Nanda, V. P. et al. eds, (1981) 
op. cit. p. 161.
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connection between the president of the board of trustees and the
launching of the Survey.6
On this basis, one may reasonably argue that the activities of 
Freedom House reflect particular interests and biases. However, 
there is another vital aspect which is worth investigating to 
determine the impartiality of any organization, which is its funding. 
It goes without saying that if any non-governmental organization 
receives or accepts substantial sums of money from any government,
this will potentially jeopardize its impartiality and the objectivity of
its judgements. Amnesty International, for instance, deliberately 
excludes any funding of this kind. Official funding may lead to the 
organization being manipulated by the funding government, and
undermining the efforts of such an organization. In the case of 
Freedom House, one can argue that it is financially independent of 
any government. Although information on this matter is scarce, the
organization claims that:
Freedom House receives funding from private 
in d iv id u a ls , co rporations, labor unions, and
foundations for all its activities. It especially wants to 
express its gratitude to the Pew Charitable Trusts for
its support for the survey project over the many
years.7
However, if it is independent from any government, this does
not automatically mean that it is independent and impartial in its
6"Leo Cherne was president of the board o f trustees of Freedom House at the 
time the survey was commissioned and first designated. Cherne has long been 
a key member of the International Rescue Committee, which despite its pre 
world W ar II origins, has for two decades devoted its attention alm ost 
exclusively to political refugees from repressive left wing regimes." V. P. 
Nanda et al. eds,(1981) op. cit. p. 161.
7-Freedom House (1990) op. cit. p. 1.
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judgements. Even if it is sponsored by corporations and individuals, 
serious questions arise concerning the nature of the sponsors and the 
amount of money received.
Although there is a file about every country that is considered in 
the Survey, and area experts are consulted whenever they are 
needed, however, Freedom House does not undertake its own
research. Scoble and Wisberg argue that:
Freedom House itself is not a research organization. It 
does not directly gather the raw data employed in its 
ranking of nations; instead it relies on observations 
obtained by others, primarily scholars and journalists, 
m ostly  W este rn , am ong whom A m ericans 
predom inate.8
Such reliance on what is reported by journalists and scholars 
makes Freedom House very vulnerable to seeing matters from the 
point of view that is implicit in its sources of information. Experience 
has shown in many cases that what is reported in the news does not 
actually represent the facts. The limitation of foreign journalists to 
specific areas of one country makes the task very difficult to provide 
a full and unbiased picture of what is happening. Some of the facts 
reported are merely based on guesses and personal judgement 
rather than hard evidence.
II: Dimensions of Freedom
This section will focus on the dimensions of freedom upon which 
countries are ranked. This may make it easier to understand the 
basis of Freedom House's work and to see the shortcomings in the 
compilation of the Survey.
8-Ibid, p. 155.
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The dimensions of freedom selected clearly relate to the manner 
in which freedom itself is conceptualised. It may therefore be 
appropriate to consider the definition of freedom, as proposed by 
Freedom House, to see whether the dimensions studied correspond to
the definition or not. Freedom House defines freedom as follows:
In the Survey freedom is defined in terms of those 
political rights that allow people to participate freely 
and effectively in choosing leaders or in voting 
directly in legislature, and those civil liberties that 
guarantee freedoms such as speech, privacy, and fair 
trial ... nor does it include welfare interests, as in the 
rhetorical extensions "freedom from fear" or "freedom 
from want." In this definition independence may 
contribute to political freedom, but an independent 
state is not thereby free.9
This definition of freedom suggests that the Survey focuses only 
on civil liberties and political rights as dimensions of freedom. It 
takes the view that they are universal and as such that everybody 
should enjoy them. Welfare rights, or social and economic rights, are 
not included. Moreover, independence is not a primary indicator 
upon which the degree of freedom is judged. Although one can agree 
with the Survey that independence does not automatically mean 
freedom, as defined above, it is nonetheless a very significant 
component of it. Moreover, certain economic rights are of paramount 
importance to the proper working and the enjoyment of civil rights 
and political liberties as they are defined in the Survey. In addition 
to this, as will be seen later, some indicators used to measure degrees 
of freedom around the world are taken from the two exceptions, i.e., 
welfare interests and independence.
9-R. D. Gastil, F reed o m  in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1979 
(New York: Freedom House in cooperation with G. K. Hall, 1979) pp. 4-5.
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To shed more light on the definition of freedom, it may be 
appropriate to scrutinize its two dimensions, and thus better 
understand the ranking of countries at a later stage. The dimensions, 
as identified by Freedom House, are political rights, and civil 
liberties.
2-1: Political rights
The initial Survey observes that:
When a country’s standing in political rights i s
analyzed, attention is first directed to general 
elections. We want to know how recently there has 
been an election, and whether there was any
competition. We want to know if there is a one-party 
system. A one-party system allows the least chance of 
opposition, while more than one party allows the most.
In an election we want to know the percentage of
voting for a particular party or candidate for head of
state. If contested, a vote with over 90% for one side is 
probably meaningless, while majorities over 70% seem 
suspicious. We also want to know how often the same 
results occur, and whether parties or leaders have 
replaced one another by democratic process. We are 
also interested in whether there is a regional or local 
elected government. Unless the country is very small, 
the more secondary elections there are, and the more 
power the winners gain by election, the more 
democratic we assume the society. In all elections we 
want to know what percentage of the people 
participate, and how exclusions are created.10
If one looks closely at the conditions above, one can assume that 
the country is free when they are satisfied; that is, people have a say 
directly or indirectly in the running of their government. In other
10-R. D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom” Freedom At Issue, J a n u a ry -  
February 1973 p. 20.
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words, the wish of the people is respected regarding the kind of 
government under which they want to live. However, some 
requirements for this dimension seem to be vague and difficult to 
assess. This is readily apparent when looking at the general elections 
and how recently one has taken place. ’'Recently" in this context is 
quite a flexible concept. What can be considered recent in this year's 
Survey, for instance, may not be considered as such in five or six 
years. If this is the case, how can one place France, where general 
elections are held every five years, as compared to different 
countries in the western world where they are usually held every 
four years, such as the U.K. and the U.S.A., to name just two? If one 
takes this indicator into account to judge the degree of freedom in 
two countries, the U.S.A. and France for instance, for a hypothetical 
period of twenty years, one sees that the former has held six 
elections, whereas the latter only five. However, would it be fair that 
France scored less on this indicator? Therefore, some clarification of 
what is meant by 'recently' would be helpful, bearing in mind that 
the concept refers to a period of time.
Elections obviously involve competition, and the existence of 
more than one party offers more competition. Nonetheless, the 
competition that a two-party system offers differs from that of a 
multiparty system. While limited numbers of political parties 
imposed in some countries perhaps helps to explain the percentage 
of the people who participate in elections, at the same time it offers a 
basis for understanding how exclusions are created -two phenomena 
in which the Survey has a particular interest. Although one may 
argue that there might be competition even within a one party 
system, it clearly offers the fewest opportunities for choice. Does a
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two party system like the one in the U.S.A., for instance, offer the 
same chances to people as a system of the kind that exists in 
N ig e r ia ? 11 In Nigeria the law prohibits the existence of more than a 
certain number of parties; people have no choice but to affiliate to 
one of these parties to compete, or not to participate at all if no party 
really  represents their views. However, in theory there is 
competition whenever elections are held. Nonetheless, the questions 
to be asked here is: would the situation change if more political 
parties were allowed to emerge on the political scene?
What, for instance, would be the score of the U.S.A. on this 
variable compared to the score of Nigeria if elections are held in that 
country in 1992? This might reflect the percentage of people who 
participated and the reasons for exclusions. It is difficult to agree 
with the Survey on the inclusion of this variable on different 
grounds, mainly because such an index does not really reflect the 
degree of freedom enjoyed in any country. The percentage of people 
who participate in elections and how exclusions are created can be 
interpreted in different ways. If the percentage in country A is 
higher than in country B, it does not automatically follow that the 
former is freer than the latter. There is a significant difference 
between the United States and, for example, European turnouts 
attributable solely to registration procedures.12 The minimum age of
11-In an attempt to return to civilian rule in Nigeria in 1993, the military 
governm ent has introduced a m ulti-party system. The law has limited the 
number of political parties to just two. For further details see A. A. Akinola, 
"Manufacturing the Two-Party System in Nigeria." Journal o f  Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, November 1990 pp.309-27.
12-In the United States, Powell argues that: "...turnout is advantaged about 5% 
by political attitudes, but disadvantaged 13% by registration laws.” Further, he 
argues that in the United States "perhaps two-thirds of eligible citizens are 
reg istered ." G. B. Powell Jr., "Am erican Voter Turnout in C om parative 
Perspective." American Political Science Review, 80 O ) 1976. pp. 17-24.
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voting differs from one country to another, as does the measuring of 
the vote; some countries see voting not only as a right but as a duty, 
and in some, such as Australia, it is compulsory.
However, what should be pointed out at this stage is the fact 
that, although the Comparative Survey is, in theory, a way to monitor 
the state of freedom around the world on a continuous basis, the 
criteria it employs have been changing.13 Thus, the fifth Survey 
(1975) concluded its description of the political rights dimension by 
stating:
We are also interested to a lesser degree in the 
existence of local or regional self-government, of 
freedom from military participation, or of foreign 
pressures on the system.14
It seems clear that two additional aspects were included in the 
political rights dimension; freedom from military participation, or 
foreign pressure on the system. The Survey does not offer any 
explanation of what is meant by these variables and how systems 
should be judged upon them until two years later (1977), when it 
stressed that:
Foreign control is defined for this purpose rather 
narrowly, emphasizing the extent to which the
government and people of a state are free to publicly
criticize a hypothetically dominating state, or how 
much the government is allowed to diverge from 
dom inating  s ta te 's  position  in in te rn a tio n a l 
consultations and organizations.15
13-R. D. Gastil states that: "The approach and purposes of the Survey have not 
changed, but the ratings and criteria of judgem ent have been continually
revised." Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1978 (New
York: Freedom House in cooperation with G. K. Hall, 1978) p. 4.
14-R. D. Gastil, "Com parative Survey of Freedom V" Freedom At Issue ,
January-February 1975 p. 3.
15-R. D. Gastil, "Comparative Survey of Freedom VII" Freedom At Issue ,
January-February 1977 p. 6.
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In addition to these variables, the Survey seems to have added 
another variable, a recent shift in power, when discussing political 
r ig h ts .16 However, what is meant by a recent shift in power should 
be clarified. This should be done not only in terms of time, but power 
itself should be defined. Does it mean the leader or the chief 
authority or the political party in power?
A shift in power, if any, where elections are conducted in the 
ideal way does not really depend on how free the country is. If the 
power is meant to be the chief authority, then the shift in power 
depends very much on the country's constitution. A shift in power is 
bound to take place in a country like the United States where the 
constitution prohibits the president to rule for more than two 
mandates, as compared with another which does not. If, on the other 
hand, power meant political party, the Survey seems to forget the 
achievements and popularity that the party in power might enjoy. It 
may well be argued that there has not been any shift in power over 
a period of time without affecting its degree of freedom. The 
majority of the people may be satisfied with the records of those 
exerting power on their behalf. In this connection, Sweden provides 
the best example, where the Social Democratic Party enjoyed a 
period of virtually continuous rule (up to 1991) without any 
suggestion that the country was less than a model democracy.
If one looks at the different Surveys that Freedom House has 
conducted, one sees that new variables emerge in the discussion of
16-R. D. Gastil states that: "An empirical test of democracy is the extent to 
which there has been a shift in power through the operation of the electoral 
sy s te m ."  Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1986-87 
(New York: Greenwood, 1987) p. 15.
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political rights. The quotation above from the initial Survey differs in 
the variables included from the list in the later Surveys. In the mid 
1980s, one sees that new variables have been included to determine 
the score of every country on political rights. These include: whether 
a major group is denied reasonable self-determination and whether 
there is any informal consensus.17
Having dealt with one dimension in the Survey's definition of 
freedom, I turn now to a critical scrutiny of the other dimension to 
see if more variables were added to the initial definition of civil 
liberties.
2-2: Civil liberties
The initial Survey of Freedom defined civil liberties as follows:
We are interested first of all in freedom of the press.
Is the press critical? Does it support persons who 
might replace those in power? Alternative systems? Is 
it independently controlled? Or privately owned?
Beyond the press, we want to know how much
government control there is over television and radio. 
Unfortunately, even in countries where the press is 
relatively independent and untrammeled, the often 
more popular radio and television systems are 
frequently under government control. Although this 
control may be carefully hedged about with legal
restrictions, only in a few states with long and 
continuous dem ocratic traditions of dem ocratic 
abstinence, such as in Great Britain, are we reassured 
by legal guarantees of impartiality, particularly for
17-R. D. Gastil states that: "We want to ask whether as with the Kurds in 
Turkey, there is an important group that is denied a reasonable degree of self- 
determ ination... F inally , we ask whether there is an inform al consensus
underlying the political system such that even those im portant segments of 
society formally out of power still have an important input into the political 
p ro c e s s ."  Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1984-85 
(New York: Greenwood, 1985) p. 7.
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free judiciary. It also seems reasonable to consider 
freedom from harsh and unusual punishments and 
torture. Another evidence of civil liberties is offered 
by a defined and restricted sphere of government 
atten tion .18
Before considering these criteria more closely it may be worth 
pointing out that civil liberties in this dimension include four 
variables, which are: free press, independence of the judiciary, 
freedom from cruel and inhuman punishment, and a restricted 
sphere of government. Whether civil liberties include only the four 
items mentioned above or not is not the point at issue. What matters 
more is the number of items the Survey considers in the ranking of 
countries upon this dimension, and whether more have been added 
since the initial Survey. This will undoubtedly help to establish 
whether a diachronic analysis on this dimension is possible or not, 
since the addition of one new item may influence the ranking of 
different countries if they score well on the added items. However,
before looking at the later Surveys, a scrutiny of the quotation above
should be attempted.
The Survey puts a heavy emphasis on the press and how free it 
is. As with different attempts that measure democracy, freedom of 
the press is very much at the heart of the definition of freedom.
Different requirements are used in the Survey to determine whether 
the press is free or not, such as whether it is privately owned, critical 
of government or supports persons who may replace those in power.
The standards upon which to decide whether a press is free or
not are not clearly set out in the Survey. The Survey seems to
18-R. D. Gastil (1973) op. cit. p. 20.
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suggest that if the press is privately owned and independently 
controlled, it is therefore free. However, a press owned by the
government may also be critical of the system and may favour
different alternative policies. The degree of control over the press in 
general is hard to determine. The Survey does not offer any
boundaries as to where this control can be located. On a more global 
level, censorship and the unbalanced flow of information are
significant features of both developed and developing countries, 
including communist states. Censorship on the part of the majority, if 
not all, of Third World countries and communist states, and the 
unbalanced flow of information between the developed and
developing world, make the press very much manipulated, and the
people in these countries may often hear only what their own
government wants them to hear. The manipulation of the news by a 
few international news agencies makes this flow of information just
one way, and feedback is almost non-existent.
Although one can agree with the Survey on the importance of
the variables used to judge this dimension, it is difficult to accept its 
contention that they can determine whether civil liberties are 
provided for in one country or not.
However, in the seventh Survey (1977), and in addition to the
items considered above, the civil rights discussion concluded with the
following:
In addition to these four, we consider two types of 
supporting or subsidiary freedoms. First are those 
from totalitarianism: economic independence of the 
media from government, and freedom of individuals to 
move about, choose among educational systems and 
occupations, obtain private property, operate in the 
market freely , or organize and jo in  private 
organizations of choice. These latter freedoms include
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freedom of religion as well as freedom to organize and 
join unions.19
As is clear from this quotation, one sees that by 1977 the civil 
liberties dimension included more items than it did in the initial 
Survey. Furthermore, some of the items discussed in this dimension 
really depend on the socio-economic level of the country. In other 
words, social and economic rights are very much at the centre of this 
dim ension and may influence the ranking of countries,20 a
circumstance which at this time the Survey tended to ignore. It did 
acknowledge their importance at a later stage, however, and
unsuccessfully tried to justify its position as follows:
Civil rights are also affected by the presence or 
absence of nongovernm en ta l, env ironm ental 
inadequacies, such as illiteracy and debilitating 
poverty... Questions of illiteracy and poverty bring us 
back, of course, to the positive rights which we argued 
above should be outside our concern. Yet they must be 
taken into account in so far as they affect a
population's ability to express opinion or vote
effectively.21
It is clearly stated that economic and social rights, such as 
illiteracy, poverty and the social and economic welfare of large 
sections of the population, may affect the state of human rights in 
any country. However, the Survey leaves unexplained how important 
they are and how they can be judged. Are they, for instance, just 
complementary to the other rights? Are they scored on the same
19-R. D. Gastil (1977) op. cit. p. 8.
20-"The final point on the civil liberties checklist is freedom from extreme 
government indifference or corruption. When governments do not care about 
the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population, the human 
rights of the people suffer". Freedom House (.1990) op. cit. p. 20.
21-R. D. Gastil (1977) op. cit. p. 8.
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basis as the other rights? How can one, for instance, state that it is
just for economic and social reasons that a country's score was low?
No ready answer to these questions is available as the Survey
has not attempted to provide one. It simply gathered the information
concerning the two dimensions of freedom, added different items to 
the initial list, and tried to draw a ranking of countries depending on 
their scores on the two dimensions discussed above. The methods 
used and the ranking of countries are discussed in what follows.
I ll:  The method and the ranking
It should be pointed out at the beginning that the scores for both 
dimensions range from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 the 
least. Then, depending on the score received by each country, the 
final ranking is attempted; which can be either "free", "not free", or 
"partly free". In terms of categories, the "free" category is either 1 or 
2, the "not free" is 6 or 7, whereas the "partly free" category is 
somewhere in between.
Before going in depth into these categories, and how the 
boundaries between them are drawn, it may be appropriate to 
clarify the method used.
3-1: The method
On first sight the method used by Freedom House in ranking 
countries appears simple. However, this impression begins to fade 
when one gets deeper into the analysis of different surveys.
The basis of the Survey's method in ranking countries is to
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assign each item on the two dimensions (political rights and civil 
liberties) a "high”, "medium", "low" or "very low" score compared to 
the check list. This checklist, it may be noted in passing, remained 
unpublished until the mid 1980s.22 Nonetheless, although the four 
different categories may help to assign a country to one category or 
another, in borderline cases the boundaries between them are left 
unexplained. The method itself seems to be doubtful for several 
reasons.
Firstly, the checklist for the two dimensions, and the exact 
number of items included in each, was not made available, at least 
for the first ten Surveys. This would have enabled the reader to 
check and recompute the standards upon which the Survey drew its 
conclusions.
Secondly, it seems that the number of items on the checklist has 
increased, or changed since the initial Survey. Although it was not 
made available, the addition of different items to the lists of the two 
dimensions automatically means the addition of a number of items to 
the checklist.
Thirdly, the seventh Comparative Survey of Freedom (1977) 
states that:
This year a number of changes of this kind occurred 
because of the introduction of a new and more 
adequate checklist for comparative examination.23
The quotation above confirms further the discontinuity of the 
method and the results achieved. The self-confession concerning the
22- H. M. Scoble, and L. S. Wiseberg, "Problems of Comparative Research in 
Human rights," in Nanda, V. P. et al. eds., (1981) op. cit. p. 156. A well detailed 
checklist for both political rights and civil liberties can be found in R. D. 
Gastil (1987) op. cit. pp. 9-10.
23-R. D. Gastil (1977) op. cit. p. 8.
2 8 6
introduction of " a more adequate check list" confirms this claim. This 
means that the old checklist, used in the six previous Surveys prior 
to 1977, was inadequate and therefore the results obtained from it 
were misleading or did not represent the actual situation.
Finally, not only were the number of items on each list changed, 
but the actual strategy itself seems to have changed. The strategy 
followed, was to assign each item on each dimension a "high", 
’’medium", "low" or "very low" rating, and the number of items was 
11 for political rights and 14 for civil liberties according to the
checklist that was published in 1987. However, the 1990 Survey 
states that:
The team assigned initial ratings to countries by 
awarding from zero to two points per check list item,
depending on the degree of compliance with the
standard. The highest possible score for political rights 
is eighteen points, based on up to two points for each 
of the nine questions. The highest possible score for 
civil liberties is twenty six points based on up to two 
points for each of the thirteen questions.24
Faced with these comments one questions the consistency of the
Comparative Survey as a genuine attempt to measure freedom on a
cross-national basis. The constant changes in the basis of the ranking
suggests that the process as a whole is subjective, depending very
much on the judgement of the people involved in the Survey,
otherwise how can one account for the Survey's statement that:
In addition, we sometimes decide that we have been 
regarding an issue from the wrong point of view.25
24-Freedom House (1990) op. cit. p. 21.
25-R. D. Gastil (1977) op. cit. p. 8. A very interesting case of this example is the 
one of South Africa. Although it was assigned (5) and (6) for political rights 
and civil liberties respectively for the years 1980 and 1982, nonetheless, it was 
first ranked partly free (1980) and not free in (1982) "due to reevaluation by 
the author".
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Since the method that had been followed in the ranking of 
countries was already set, one would assume that it was the only 
way that issues could be considered. The availability of one more 
piece of information may change the ratings of a country, however,
being "regarded from the wrong point of view" is quite unclear and
may suggest further that it is up to the Survey to exercise a 
necessarily arbitrary judgement.
3-2: The ranking
The countries investigated in the Comparative Survey of 
Freedom are placed in one of the three categories: "free", "partly 
free", and "non free". The placing of countries in such categories 
depends very much on how well they score on both dimensions of 
freedom. It is worth noting that these categories cannot be defined 
exactly, but they are of a comparative significance in determining
whether state A, for instance, falls within the same category as state 
B, below it or above it.26
As suggested earlier the ranking is based on two dimensions,
therefore some questions ought to be clarified in order to understand 
why state A, for instance, is ranked below state B, when it has scored
26-R. D. Gastil, "Comparative Survey of Freedom." Freedom At Issue, J a n u a ry -  
February 1989 p. 48 "No point of these scales can be exactly defined. They are 
constructed  com paratively and judged in tha t way, rather than against 
absolute standards. Their purpose is to give an idea of how the freedoms of one 
state stack up against those of another." See also R. D. Gastil "Comparative 
Survey of Freedom." Freedom At Issue, January-February 1988 p. 20. "It is 
necessary to look at patterns of answers, and ask whether, in terms of 
democracy, country A belongs with countries with similar ratings or belongs 
above or below that level."
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the same points for both civil liberties and political rights. Are the 
dim ensions (that is, political rights and civil liberties) treated 
separately or not? Is more weight put on one dimension than the 
other? Do dimensions influence one another? And how is the rating 
ach ieved?
The first Survey seemed to have taken each dimension 
separately and given it a score ranging from 1 to 7 to determine the 
degree of freedom of the countries concerned. It stresses that its 
judgements are not based on quantitative techniques; nonetheless, at 
a later stage, when its results differ, it uses this technique to obtain 
the average status of freedom.27 Moreover, its strategy of ranking 
countries seems to have changed over the years. This will be looked 
at closely at a later stage in this section. However, what does matter 
at this point is that the Survey has ignored one problem in its 
ranking of countries at least up to the sixth Survey (1976). Up to that 
year, a relatively simple procedure was used to determine where 
countries were placed "free","not free", and "partly free". However, it 
is not always the case, and it is not always as simple as it seems. The 
borderline cases are not easily ranked, i.e., countries which can 
qualify to be ranked for more than one category, which were 
pinpointed for the first time in the sixth Survey (1976).28 Although
27-R. D. Gastil (1978) op. cit. p. 22. "It must be remembered, however, that the 
ratings are not arithm etical units, but merely categories on arbitrary scales. 
W hen the ratings for political rights and civil liberties differ, the cumulative 
judgem ent is decided by averaging."
28-"B orderline cases are more d ifficu lt, and the final category  is not 
pred ictab le simply from the numbers. Thus, while a (7) and (5) state, for 
instance Chile* is bound to be not free in our ratings, one marked (6) and (5) 
may or may not be. In making this judgement we must consider how a state 
stacks up against other partly free or not free states overall, and consider 
where it would fall in a finer analysis within the still rather broad ranges of 
categories (6) and (5)." R. D. Gastil "Comparative Survey of Freedom." F reedom
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recognized as difficult, no attempt was made, at the time, to explain 
how the placing of such countries might be in these categories. The 
Survey eventually realized the need to clarify this point, and in an 
attempt to help the reader understand its judgements and explain
these borderline cases stated that:
...Although political rights are given slightly more 
weight in borderline cases, such cases are generally 
decided by a judgement of the position of a state 
within the numerical categories. For example, (6) and 
(5) may lead either to a rating of "not free" or "partly 
free", depending on whether the (5) and (6) are a high 
(5) or low (5), or a high (6) or low (6).29
In an attempt to clarify the borderline cases and explain the 
methodology of ranking them, the Survey made things more 
complicated and created some ambiguity surrounding the process as 
a whole. As suggested earlier, the first six Surveys seem to have
dealt with political rights and civil liberties separately, whereas in 
1977, it seems to have linked them together by placing more
emphasis on the civil rights dimension,30 and a year later (1978), as 
seen in the previous quotation, the weight was put on political rights.
The question that should be answered now is what might be 
meant by "low" and "high" in this connection. How did the Survey 
achieve such results? Upon what basis did it make its judgement? If
A t Issue, January-February 1976 p. 16.
29-R. D. Gastil (1978) op. cit. p. 22. A very clear example of these borderline 
cases can be found in the 1980 survey. Countries such as Yugoslavia, Hungary, 
Ivory Coast and Liberia have all scored (6) for political rights and (5) for civil 
liberties, nonetheless, the first two were ranked within the not free category, 
whereas the two last were ranked partly free. R. D. Gastil (1980) op. cit. pp. 17- 
9.
30-"In general a low civil rights score will reduce political rights- although 
not vice versa. An election without a right to express opinion publicly is 
hardly free." R. D. Gastil (1977) op. cit. p.6.
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one recalls the argument concerning the ranking of countries, one 
sees that they are comparative in nature. In other words, they are not 
made against absolute standards, but just to determine how state A 
should rank against state B. Nonetheless, if there are no clear-cut 
thresholds among the categories, how can one speak about a sharp 
distinction within the units making the final ranking in the 
categories? If the Survey can make a distinction between "low (6)" 
and "high (6)" for instance, to determine whether a country should be 
classified "not free" or "partly free", this will automatically lead to an 
exact distinction between the categories and a sharp drawing of 
boundaries, and therefore, borderline cases will be easily assigned. 
The placing of borderline cases, as described above, suggests that the 
four-fold method, assigning each item in the category a "high", 
"medium", "low" or "very low" rating, has been followed. Nonetheless, 
if the method has changed, how has the placing of countries been 
affected?
The change of method has indeed led to a change in the ranking 
of countries in the Comparative Survey of Freedom. In 1989, the 
Survey seemed to have abandoned the three categories by which it 
ranked countries for a new one. The basis remained the same: a list 
for both civil and political rights ranging from 1 to 7 each is 
produced. However, instead of a categorization into three, the Survey 
placed different countries on a 13 point scale, ranging from 2 to 14 to 
determine their freedom, with 2 being the least possible score a 
country could obtain (i.e., 1 point for each of the two dimensions), 
whereas 14 was the highest (representing 7 for each). Along this 
scale, the nearer a country is to the 2, the freer. This new method 




This section focuses on some particular countries, or group of 
countries, in an attempt to scrutinize the Survey more closely, and to 
monitor the trends either in gains or losses of freedom in the 
countries selected.
The choice of countries cannot be an easy task. However, since 
the Survey judges different countries by the same standard,3 1 
therefore, it was thought appropriate to include one country from 
each of the three worlds. In other words, the sample will include one 
Western country, another from the Third World, and one from the 
former "Eastern bloc". The inclusion of these countries should help 
the reader understand the difficulties that may arise whenever one 
tries to compare countries at different stages of development, and 
with different traditions by the same standards. Thus, this section 
will follow the Survey's accounts for the United States of America, 
Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia.
The first impression one gets before going into the following 
cases is that the attempt to compare such countries is absurd. One is 
inclined to agree with this reaction. To the layman, let alone the 
specialist reader, when a comparison is made between the United 
States and Ethiopia in terms of freedom, democracy or human rights, 
taking into account whatever variables, it is likely to be of very 
limited validity. However, it was included to show that the Survey 
has assumed the very delicate, if not the impossible, task of
31-"The Survey attempts to judge all places by a single standard, and to point 
out the importance of democracy and freedom." Freedom House (1990) op. cit .
p. 1.
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measuring freedom on a cross-national basis regardless of the 
differences that may exist between countries.
4-1: The United States of America
Founded over two centuries ago, the United States is often 
regarded as the most democratic and free country in the world. The 
freedoms it enjoys are the envy of millions of people elsewhere in 
the world. Having said that does not automatically mean that in the 
U. S. everything is perfect, nor that every other country should seek 
to achieve the American standard.
The case of the U.S. was included in this study for two main 
reasons. First, because it is the model upon which the Survey was 
based, which makes it a logical choice in any attempt to determine its 
shortcomings. Secondly, to enable the reader to understand the 
reasons behind the American people enjoying such freedoms.
Having been taken as the model upon which freedoms are 
measured on a cross-national basis, it is not a surprise therefore to 
see that there has been no change in either dimensions. In other 
words, a close look at the Surveys since 1973 reveal that the U.S. has 
scored 1 each on both dimensions for the series of Surveys in
question, making it among the freest countries classified. It would be
absurd to expect otherwise. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind 
that these achievements did not exist in a vacuum. They are the 
result of social progress over the centuries. In addition to that,
economic conditions helped such a process. According to Freedom
House, the current system of government began functioning in 
1 7 8 9 ,32 which suggests that there are established traditions and
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institutions by which the country is governed, and through which 
demands and pressures are channelled. Moreover, the way whereby 
conflicts are resolved is already established to leave no room for 
violence or instability. These traditions are coupled with the fact that 
the U.S. is one of the richest countries in the world, which makes 
social and economic conditions available for the granting of such 
f r e e d o m s . 33 These traditions, or even social and economic 
conditions, simply do not exist in the majority of Third World 
countries, which have existed only for few decades. Many African 
states, for instance, achieved their independence in the late 1950s or 
early 1960s.
Many, if not all, the freedoms discussed in the Survey are now 
taken for granted by Americans ( one uses the term Americans to 
restrict oneself to the case study, though the argument is equally 
applicable to all Westerners), and become part of their daily life. But 
they are a dream for the people in the Third World. Such a fact 
makes the aspirations of these people very different. The people in 
the Third World are longing for civil and political rights, whereas 
those in the developed world are interested in different issues which 
curtail their personal freedoms. In assessing freedom in the world in
1990, Freedom House stated that:
Environmentally, many parts of the U.S. have serious 
problems. Unacceptably high levels of air, water and 
ground pollution threaten inhabitants with higher 
disease rates, and may lead to reductions in personal 
freedoms in the 1990s such as restrictions on the use 
of automobiles and water supplies.34
32-Ibid., p. 259.
33-Freedom House argues for instance that: "women won the right to vote in 




Issues such as the environment are simply not a concern to the 
people in a poor country like Chad, Sudan or Ethiopia. What matters 
more to them is when and where does the next meal come from.
4-2: Czechoslovakia
A former communist country which has been affected by the 
wave of political reforms in Eastern Europe is the second case. It was 
included because it represents a country in transition from the "not 
free" to the "partly free" category, and perhaps to the "free" in the 
next decade. I shall further assess the chances that freedom in the 
former Czechoslovakia may prevail.
Up to late 1989, the former Czechoslovakia has always figured 
among the non free countries in the Surveys. If it were not for the 
Soviet invasion in 1968, the former Czechoslovakia might have well 
been in the "partly free", if not the "free" category following Dubcek's 
reforms. Civil and political rights under the hard line communists 
who followed him were non-existent. However, the situation has 
been changing gradually. As with the majority of communist 
countries, in late 1989 the communist government in Prague 
announced that it did not intend to retain the monopoly of power 
and that non communists might be included in the cabinet. Such an 
announcement led to a non-communist being elected to the post of 
president: Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner. With him in 
office, the country saw the end of communist rule, and the 
establishment of a wide range of Western-style political liberties. 
This led Freedom House to reconsider the ranking of Czechoslovakia,
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as in the case of other communist countries such as the former 
Yugoslavia and Hungary in the mid 1980s, which was moved for the 
first time to the "partly free" category in an updated Survey on 28 
December, 1989.
Such a change in ranking was expected since the country has 
moved towards the observance of the freedoms with which the 
Survey is concerned. Moreover, in the light of such a transformation, 
it seems reasonable to expect the trend to continue and the former 
Czechoslovakia to end up in the "free" category, if the experience is 
not hampered by unexpected events.
As suggested above, the former Czechoslovakia has entered a 
new era, however, such an evolution is at a vulnerable stage. 
Although one is optimistic about the fact that more changes will take 
place, nonetheless, caution is required when one bears in mind that 
the country lacks recent democratic traditions.35 Marek Boguszak et 
al. argue that:
These are people who, in 41 years of Communist rule, 
were severely discouraged from taking any interest in 
public affairs, and most learned to live entirely private 
lives.36
Although the people of the former Czechoslovakia have opted for 
an alternative to communist rule, nonetheless, the latter has made a 
huge impact on their lives in general. For over four decades such 
freedoms and practices were not known to the people. Neither the 
new ruling elite or the people as a whole had previously any real say
35-"Despite the dem ocratic changes that began in November, Czechs in 1989 
did not have the m echanisms to dem ocratically change their government. 
Until November political detention marked the worst crackdown on dissent in 
a decade." Ibid., p. 86.
36-M. Boguszak, et al., "Czechoslovakia Ready for Democracy" The W ashington 
Post 2 July, 1990.
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in the running of their country. In other words, one should be 
warned against the euphoria of a quick transition to democracy. For 
the time being there is no doubt that Czechoslovakia is heading that 
way, which earned the country a ranking position among the "partly 
free" countries in the Survey. However, more conditions are to be 
created to remove the possibility of any threat to this evolution.
The case of the former Czechoslovakia, as in different former 
communist countries, shows that the government has now become 
more flexible towards the kinds of liberties with which the Survey is 
concerned. The changes that have taken place in these countries, 
among them Czechoslovakia, make them closer to the viewpoint from 
which freedom is seen in the Survey. It suggests, therefore, that the 
more the country's acceptance of the standard and its resemblance to 
the model, the freer it is.
4-3: Ethiopia
The first impressions that come into one's mind when the name 
of Ethiopia is pronounced are: famine, disease, illiteracy and civil 
war. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, where politics is 
characterized by massive violation of human rights, continuous 
killing by both government and rebel forces, and the political 
system itself is very corrupt. Perhaps the most publicised case of 
today's Ethiopia is famine, which has been threatening the country 
especially since the mid 1980s.
Given such circumstances, it is hardly a surprise to see that 
Ethiopia has always figured in the "not free" category. According the 
Surveys that have been examined, the best standard the country
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achieved was in 1975; (6-), (5?) for political rights and civil liberties 
respectively, which arguably could have earned it a ranking among 
the "partly free".37 However the situation has worsened ever since,
and the reluctance of the Survey to reduce Ethiopia's rating can
perhaps be ascribed as well to the fact that it witnessed a coup d'etat 
against Emperor Haile Selassie which brought Lt. Col. Mengistu to 
power in 1974.
Living under a military government with a constant threat of
famine and a massive and costly civil war in the north, added to that 
the unpopularity and vulnerability of Mengistu's regime to any coup 
d 'e ta t ,38 (this actually happened in 1991) it is quite difficult to 
imagine the people of Ethiopia enjoying the freedoms discussed 
above. There are some objective circumstances which act as obstacles 
towards the achievement of a democratic society in Ethiopia. Above 
all, Ethiopia lacks the economic and social conditions that would
favour such a transition. Moreover, the country lacks democratic 
traditions. Giorgis, a former commissioner of relief and rehabilitation 
in Ethiopia and a member of the Central Committee of the Workers'
Party of Ethiopia, stresses that:
In 1974 there was a popular revolution and a military 
coup. In the absence of any tradition of democracy and 
political organizations operating freely in the country,
37-"W e have been especially reluctant to reduce the ratings of Ethiopia and 
M alaysia. In the m idst of a reforming revolution, Ethiopia appears to have 
been diverted from its progress earlier this year toward constitutionalism . 
M ost tragic was the all-too-fam iliar evocation of a vague nationalist ideology 
of Ethiopia Tikden, whose principles no one is to be allowed to question. In its 
name, the oligarchical parliament was dismissed as out of step, and executions 
have taken place," R. D. Gastil (1975) op. cit. pp. 5-6.
38-"In May [1989] a coup attempt launched by key military figures wanting a 
negotiated end to the the northern wars was snuffed out. According to one of 
the coup's planners, 680 officers have been arrested or executed since the 
attempt." Freedom House (1990) op. cit. p. 100.
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the military had to take power, and Mengistu was a 
member of the armed forces.39
In addition to the economic and political conditions that prevail 
in the country, it is worth mentioning corruption and the heavy 
reliance on the secret police to crack down on any attempt or 
organisation aimed against the regime. The war in the north made 
the situation very difficult.
Under such conditions it would be absurd to think about 
changing the present leadership in a constitutional way, let alone 
granting civil and political rights. The only way, under the present 
circumstances, whereby a new government will come to office is 
through a military coup, which may perhaps lead the country 
towards constitutionalism. However, experience has shown that 
military regimes rarely evolve in this manner.
In this case one is not trying to suggest that the economic 
conditions Ethiopia is experiencing makes it impossible for it to be 
free. Other examples, from the Survey itself, suggest that a country, 
although poor, can be ranked free: India is the best example. 
However, what need to be stressed in this respect is that a 
combination of factors, among them economic ones, may make it 
very difficult for these freedoms to be enjoyed.
It is generally agreed upon that India has a tradition upon which 
its democracy is based, a factor that does not exist in Ethiopia.40 The 
latter has not experienced a democratic government, and the people 
did not have first-hand experience in the running of their affairs. A
39-Freedom House, Ethiopia: the politics of famine Focus on issues No. 10. (New 
York: Freedom House, 1990). p. 12.
40-In contrast with Ethiopia, India has had a long history with dem ocratic 
practices. The National Congress Party, for instance, is one of the eldest parties 
in the world.
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shift from an emperor to a military dictator obviously did not help 
the development of any democratic traditions or institutions.
The aim behind these cases is an attempt to show the reader 
that it is impossible and absurd to compare different countries, with 
different circumstances, by the same standards. The reader would 
have understood by now that freedom as conceived in the Survey 
may be fully applicable to a handful of Western developed countries. 
Although they may be wanted everywhere, and should be enjoyed 
by every human being, special circumstances make them impossible 
and may harm, rather than enhance, the slow transition of a country 
towards democracy if they are introduced prematurely.
V: The Survey's assessment
In assessing the Comparative Survey of Freedom, two vital 
questions will be answered to help the reader evaluate the validity 
of the ranking. First, is it possible and useful to measure freedom on 
a cross-national basis? Second, is the model, applied by Freedom 
House, universally applicable? Having answered these questions, the 
reader will be able to judge whether the ranking and percentages of 
countries as given by Freedom House are persuasive, and whether an 
assessment over time of one or more countries is possible. I shall try 
to highlight what can be considered as shortcomings in the Survey, 
and the discussion will accordingly emphasise defects to an extent 
that would not be true of a dispassionate assessment of the Survey 
as whole.
To begin with, the question of a longitudinal assessment should 
be attempted for both categories and countries. For the categories,
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for instance, it may be helpful to consider the following table:
Table 8 (1): Percentages of the "free", "partly free" and the "not 
free" people in the world for selected years:
Y ea rs F ree P artly  Free Not Free
Jan. 73 32% 21% 47%
Jan. 75 35% 23% 42%
Jan. 78 35.70% 21.40% 42.90%
Jan. 80 37.00% 21.30% 41.70%
Jan. 81 35.90% 21.60% 42.50%
Jan. 82 35.86% 20.14% 44.00%
S o u rc e : Based on Freedom At Issue (1988) op. cit. p. 21.
For the purpose of this study, 
percentages of each category.
I have selected only the
If one is interested, for instance, in trends in the proportion of 
people worldwide that are "free" or "not free", then it is time-series 
statistics of this kind that must be employed. But how reliable are 
those provided by the Comparative Survey of Freedom?
The Survey in this area is very weak and unreliable. It was 
pointed out earlier that it kept adding different items to both its 
dimensions of freedom, which would make the results obtained on 
the basis of the initial list different from the ones on the new lists. 
This in turn explains why the categories are not successful in 
representing the gains and losses of freedom around the world. The 
changes in the items considered in measuring freedom in the world 
will go hand in hand with the changes in the percentages themselves. 
Moreover, the non publication of the original checklist, and the 
introduction of a new and more adequate one, will confirm further 
the claim that an analysis over time of the gains and losses of
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freedom, based on the Survey, is a meaningless exercise. One has to 
know, for a start, the initial checklist and its shortcomings. In other 
words, why was there a need for a new and more adequate
checklist? This makes it still difficult to argue that there is continuity 
between the findings of the Surveys.
One might argue, for instance, that although it appears that 32% 
and 37% respectively represent the percentages of the free people in 
the world for the years 1973 and 1980, nonetheless, one should not 
necessarily see this difference as a global gain of freedom. These 
percentages represented two quite different situations. The items, 
and therefore the checklist, upon which the former percentage was 
obtained differed from the basis upon which the latter one was
conducted. Even if one looks beyond that, it is clear that the actual 
technique whereby the scores of countries and these percentages are 
obtained has changed, which makes analysis over time quite an 
impossible task.41 Furthermore, the emphasis changed from civil to 
political rights in 1979, which suggests that there was a cut-off 
between the results or categories achieved before and after this date. 
A country which had been ranked "partly free" could have well been 
ranked "not free" compared to one which had received the same 
score if it was not for this emphasis or weight. Two examples 
highlight this case: South Africa and the Soviet Union, although their 
total for the two dimensions was 11 each. Nonetheless, South Africa 
was classified "partly free" since it received 6 and 5 for civil and
41-"To be sure hundreds of millions classified as free were just marginally so,
and alm ost as many classified as partly free, could with slight shift of 
arbitrary category boundaries, have been considered not free." Gastil (1978) 
op. cit. p. 4. In addition to the fact that the Survey sometimes decides that a 
matter has been seen from the wrong point of view, as pointed out earlier, one 
can only assume that there has been a shuffle w ithin the categories 
depending on the changes of the attitude towards any country.
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political rights respectively; whereas, the Soviet Union received 5
and 6 for the two dimensions respectively and was classified "not
free".42
This situation leads one to ask more questions about the system 
of weighting. Even taking into account the interdependence of the 
two dimensions, nonetheless, a system of weighting should not be
introduced as a means to distinguish certain categories. The
inconsistency of the Survey in the weighting of its dimensions adds 
to these difficulties.
Turning now to the question of the applicability of the model 
developed by Freedom House in all countries of the world,
ethnocentrism is at the heart of it. The impression that one gets from 
going through different Surveys is that they not only offer the
Western, and particularly the American, model of freedom as the 
ultimate goal, but they are a tool whereby different countries outside
this sphere are attacked. The 1981 Survey states that:
On the most general strategic level we need to identify 
the most powerful organised, international threat to 
freedom. Today this is the communist movement, and
particularly that part of it backed by the Soviet Union.
Its absorption of countries is hard to reverse, and its
commitment to allowing democratic process and law to
control ideology is minimal.43
One does not have to be biased towards the Western model in
42-Freedom House (1990) op. cit. p. 23.
43-R. D. Gastil (1981) op. cit. p. 10. He further states that: "For societies to 
survive, their people must believe in the reality of their freedoms. The 
struggle to realize principles in practices must be unrelenting in every 
country. For the world wide struggle for freedom to succeed, people in both not 
free and free states must believe that what used to be called the "free world", 
defined as the world outside the communist orbit, offers better future than the
communist world and its co p ies ts ."  Ibid., p. 11.
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general to accept that it offers better opportunities and more 
freedom compared with other systems. Nonetheless, the Survey has 
departed from its original goal of monitoring freedom in countries 
around the world to become a propaganda tool and a means of 
attacking countries which do not resemble this model. Moreover, it 
intervenes in the internal affairs of countries as to advise them how 
to conduct their international relations. In a letter (2 January 1990) 
to Vaclav Havel of the former President of the former
Czechoslovakia, Bruce McColm, Director of Freedom House wrote:
...M r Castro condem ns the movement toward 
democracy throughout the world. Therefore, on behalf 
of Freedom House, an organization which has 
supported the struggle for freedom and democracy 
throughout the world for nearly 50 years, I would like 
to ask you to reappraise your current relationship 
with Havana with a view of terminating your 
government's representation of Castro's regime in the 
United States.44
The ethnocentrism of the Survey is seen in how countries are 
ranked. There surely is a distinction between what people want in 
different countries. What the Survey seems to be convinced of is that 
everybody, wherever they may live, would want the freedoms it is 
concerned with if they had the chance to choose. Nonetheless, it is 
not always the case. The priorities that are selected depend very 
much upon the circumstances of the countries themselves. One is not 
denying how valuable civil and political rights are to the enjoyment 
of freedom; nevertheless, the enjoyment of the basic needs as well 
are of paramount importance and may affect freedom itself. In the 
majority of Third World countries, if the people had the right to 
express themselves, enhancing their social and economic situation
44- The Washington Post Tuesday, 9 January, 1990.
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would almost certainly be at the top of their list of demands. 
Experience has shown, at least in the case of Algeria to name just 
one, that when the freedoms the Survey is concerned with were 
granted in the late 1980s, many people stressed that freedom for 
them meant a shelter or a job. What would be the situation of a 
country governed by a chief executive who assumed power through 
a coup d'etat, who worked for the benefit of his people and whose 
people agreed with the way he managed the affairs of the state? 
What would have been the situation of a country where a coup d'etat 
had just occurred and the majority of the people agreed with it? The 
Survey seems to have set a standard, which was thought to be the 
best, and countries are judged on whether or not they approach it, 
leaving out of consideration the particularities of each country.
The Survey gives the impression that a great deal is known 
about different countries through the gathering of the information 
upon which it made its judgements. However, what it not considered 
is how these phenomena are viewed in a different context. Does it 
really matter for people in Ethiopia if they are denied the right to 
free speech and assembly? Probably such an issue does matter, 
however, not as much as many other, more basic, issues such as food.
The granting of such freedoms is a long process, and depends 
not only on the will of governments, but on how prepared the people 
are to accept these ideas and practices. These freedoms may be the 
ultimate goal themselves, and many people may envy Westerners for 
these freedom s.45 However, such enjoyment is a result of an
45-"Essentially our model is that of Western constitutional democracy, and we 
are asking to what extent the countries of the world accord with this model. To 
many readers this has seemed a paternalistic or ethnocentric viewpoint, but 
we believe that the freedoms attained by Western democracies are desired by 
people everywhere." Gastil (1975) op. cit. p. 3.
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evolution over the years, if not centuries. Many Third World 
countries lack the institutions and the appropriate channels through 
which such a change may take place. Economic conditions may also 
make it difficult for them to enjoy these freedoms. In other words, 
there are some practical obstacles that many countries face in the 
Third World in achieving a high level of freedoms.
Political rights and civil liberties need a material base in order to 
work properly. It would be absurd to talk about a people enjoying 
civil and political liberties at a time when the very same people are 
illiterate. How does it affect the status of a group of people living in 
remote rural areas, illiterate, and with virtually no access to the mass 
media, if the chief executive is elected or not? There are still many 
areas in different countries in the Third World newspapers or 
television programmes cannot reach. These people are not free 
because they cannot be free. Freedom, as understood in the Survey, 
requires a citizen in the model of J. S. Mill, someone who is active, 
informed and knows his duties and rights. At the same time, it also 
requires institutions already set to channel different demands, and a 
government which respects the "rules of the game". Unfortunately, 
all these are rarely encountered in the majority of Third World 
countries.
The Survey, in fact, is highly ethnocentric and difficult to apply 
on a cross-national basis. It represents the American model of 
freedom, which hinders the chances of countries such as Ghana, 
China, Ethiopia or Nigeria, with their traditions of totalitarian rule. 
Each of these has its own circumstances which may lead to such 
freedoms being denied, or provided in a different form.
The point that needs to be stressed here further is that although
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the Survey may be successful in assigning countries to the different 
categories seen above, except perhaps for the borderline cases, it 
fa ils  nonetheless to account for the social and economic
circumstances as well as traditions of different countries. As pointed 
out earlier, both Ethiopia and the former Czechoslovakia had special 
circumstances; for the former it does not have" any tradition of
democracy and political organization", and for the latter "Czechs in 
1989 did not have the mechanisms to change their governments". 
Such statement are undoubtedly crucial to the understanding of why 
the ranking of these countries, as well as others, has been that way.
The Survey has simply selected a set of variables that 
corresponded to his theoretical definition of freedom, and tried to 
apply them on a cross-national basis. The ranking for each year may 
be appropriate, nonetheless, the question that needs to be asked here 
is: do the variables or the concepts used in this Survey have the 
same meaning in the different countries under consideration?
In the light of the foregoing it is of paramount importance to 
stress one of the variables that the Survey uses in its checklist for 
civil liberties; corruption. It is perhaps the key factor in the 
explanation of the bad ranking of Third World countries. It is usually
suggested that the denial of freedoms is under different slogans such
as economic development or national unity, but it is very much as 
well because of the corrupted official exerting power on behalf of 
their people. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is a threat to 
those "illegitimate " governments and the privileges they enjoy 
because of their positions.
Another point of interest is freedom from foreign control. This 
control may influence the degree of freedom in any country being 
subjected to it. Nonetheless, the question that needs to be answered
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here is, what harm has a country done in being subjected to such a 
control, to see its score reduced? It should be the other way around.
No country in the world can live by itself. There should be contact
and interdependence between them. Such interdependence varies, of 
course, between them to the point of domination or control. Until the 
Survey realizes that the dominant state should have points deducted 
from its score, one cannot see how such a Survey can be taken 
seriously. What is the difference between a chief executive of a 
country in Black Africa, Nigeria for instance, who assumed power 
through a coup d'etat, and one in Latin or Central America who came 
to power through corrupt elections financed by the U.S. or was 
simply put in office by the Americans, as in Panama?
The constant interference in the internal affairs of Third World 
countries endangers the transition, if any, toward democracy and 
therefore the enjoyment of these freedoms that might exist in these 
countries. It might be seen from another point of view that such an 
interference is the only way whereby citizens in these countries will
be free. Freedom House stated that:
The Survey attempts to judge all places by a single 
standard, and to point out the importance of 
democracy and freedom.46
There is no doubt about the importance of democracy and 
freedom, nonetheless judging all countries by the same standard will 
not lead to convincing results because of the reasons discussed 
above. Differences in the level of economic development, social 
conditions, political awareness and the degree of development of 
institutions make the task difficult, and may disadvantage Third
46-Freedom House (1990) op. cit. p. 19.
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World countries compared to developed world.
The Survey has been subjected to extensive criticism either for 
its methods or for being ethnocentric. Thomas Quigley, for instance, 
stresses that:
Mr Gastil says his definition of freedom would not be 
"extended rhetorically" as the expression "freedom 
from fear". But until he has shown some sensitivity to 
such fundamental freedoms as the right to self- 
determination, equality, health, education, work, and 
adequate standard of living, maintenance of one's 
culture, and protection from arb itrary  arrest, 
detention, or torture, he is not qualified to speak for 
more than the tiny minority of which white, male 
Americans are today's paradigm.47
However, although the quotation above confirms the Survey's 
cultural bias it seems clear that the Survey has been improved as a 
result of the criticisms it has been subjected to over the years. If one 
scrutinizes closely the different aspects of the Survey, one sees that 
they kept increasing over the years. Some of the aspects that were 
lacking in the initial Survey, which were pointed out in the above 
quotation, have been considered in different surveys at a later date. 
Self-determination, equality and freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
detention, or torture have been considered in the measurement of
47-T. E. Quigley, " 'Miss Freedom' Awards Are, at Best, Irrelevant." Worldview,  
November 1974. p. 39. Further, Blaser Art, "Assessing Human Rights: N.G.O 
contribution." in Nanda et al eds, (1981) op. cit. p. 272 states that: "Goulet in 
criticizing the Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom, labels it a 
reduction ist approach that "m easure, and that very inadequately, a few 
dim ensions of western style political freedom." Furtherm ore, in reviewing 
G astil's  book Freedom  in the W orld 1978 Larz Schou ltz  concluded 
by:"...requesting that subsequent volumes an effort [should] be made to mute 
their overbearing ethnocentricity and to employ someone to rationalize what 
can only be labelled an idiotic methodology." Universal Human Rights, (2 )  
1980 p. 94.
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freedom. This suggests that the Survey, although quite ethnocentric, 
is open to criticism and may learn from it. Nevertheless, it still falls 
short of expectations in that many aspects which are of direct 
relevance to freedom are ignored. Social and economic conditions are 
crucial to the enjoyment of freedom. Therefore, since these 
conditions differ, the standard upon which countries are judged 
should not be the same. This is perhaps the reason behind the 
contradictory character and ambiguity in many aspects of the 
Survey, and its attempt to undertake a major task of measuring 
freedom on a cross-national basis.
Having said that does not automatically mean that the Survey is 
useless. It does provide a means of measuring at least part of the 
phenomenon with which it is concerned; and its shortcomings have 
been steadily reduced. Thus, for instance, the new ranking of 
countries on a 13 point scale:48 and different aspects have been 
added to both dimensions to make them as comprehensive as 
possible. Still, however, a lot has to be done to make the Survey’s 
approach relatively acceptable to all. Experience has shown that the 
Survey has taken into consideration some of the constructive 
criticism, which leaves the author optimistic about the possibilities 
that further criticism  may help to bring about still further 
improvements.
48-The reader should be warned here that, although as pointed out earlier in 
the text, the Survey introduced a new ranking whereby countries are placed 
on a 13 points scale (Freedom at Issue, Jan/Feb. 1989 p. 54), there was no 
mention of its traditional categories "free'', "partly free", and "non free", and 
countries are judged by their closeness to the top. However in 1990, without 
any explanation, it seemed to have gone back to its old strategy of putting each 
country in one of the three categories.
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Chapter Nine 
Human rights and comparative politics
In the first part of this dissertation a lengthy discussion focused 
on the definition and the content of human rights. It is a concept 
vigorously contested between East and West on the one hand, and 
developed and developing countries on the other. The clash between 
liberal and socialist ideas, and the emergence of many Third world 
countries on the international political scene, strengthened such 
vigorous contestation. This made agreement on a widely acceptable 
definition of the concept very difficult, not to say impossible. The 
discussion, then, moved to consider the operationalisation of this 
concept by looking at some of the attempts to measure or 
conceptualize the phenomenon on a cross-national basis. Non­
governm ental organisations such as Amnesty International and 
Freedom House, political scientists such as Dahl, Bollen and Humana, 
or international bodies such the UN Human Rights Committee, have 
been concerned with the issue of human rights and political 
democracy. Some of these have developed different criteria upon 
which they measure the phenomenon and therefore rank countries. 
Others have just been concerned with monitoring the situation in 
countries around the world and helping governments improve their 
records.
The discussion that follows examines and assesses the extent to 
which these exercises have successfully conceptualised the problem 
of human rights, and particularly whether the task itself, to compare 
human rights on a cross-national basis, is a feasible one. It seeks to 
evaluate the case studies, and asks whether they have been
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successful in resolving the problems relating to comparative political 
analysis on the conceptual, data and operational levels.1 The 
interpretation of human rights, as discussed in the first part, has a
long history, is influenced by various factors, and therefore varies
between individuals, political scholars/researchers and regimes. 
Quantification of human rights, however, is a more recent exercise 
when different organisations and scholars took an interest in the 
subject, gathered inform ation and engaged in system atic 
quantification and measurement which resulted in a ranking of 
countries. If "the very variety of human rights", Horn argues, "makes
it d ifficult to fit them into a single structure balanced
m e a s u r e m e n t " 2 , how did the case studies undertaken in this 
dissertation attem pt to measure the phenomenon? Thus, the 
discussion begins with an overall assessment and comparison 
between the different inquiries undertaken in this study. I shall 
particu larly  look at the definitions em ployed and their 
operationalisation through the approaches and the variables selected. 
This analysis should help to provide a better understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each study as an attenpt to measure 
human rights on a cross-national basis. Then, I shall discuss whether 
or not a comparative study of human rights, in the light of the 
different studies discussed earlier and the diversity of political 
systems, is a plausible one. The discussion concludes with a number 
of recommendations for future research.
1- For further details see Bahry, D. "Crossing Borders: The Practice of 
Comparative Reseach", in Manheim J. B. and Rich, R. C. E m p i r i c a l  
Political Analyis (London: Longman, 1986)
2-Horn, R. V. Statistical Indicators for Economic and Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 180
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I: The case studies: A comparison
It has been suggested earlier that a clear-cut definition of the 
content of human rights has yet to be achieved. The United Nations, 
which is considered by many to be the authority on the subject, has 
steadily increased the items on its list of human rights. The 'third 
generation ' of human rights, and particularly the right to 
development recognized as an inalienable human right in 1986, are 
the best example of this broadening of a concept that was originally 
conceived more narrowly. Nevertheless, the inquiries undertaken in 
this study have limited their scope in general to some aspects of the 
subject. The rights of solidarity, and economic, social and cultural 
rights, to some extent, have not really been taken seriously by the 
scholars and organisations involved with the issue of human rights.
1-1: Inadequate definitions and data
1-1-1: Inadequate definitions
One might suggest that international conventions, signed by the 
majority of countries, provide a strong base upon which human 
rights can be defined and measured. However, one must bear in 
mind the fact that a comprehensive list of human rights, based on 
United Nations documents, is extremely lengthy, which in turn makes 
coverage of every aspect a near impossible task. In the case studies 
undertaken in this dissertation, the choice of variables upon which 
measurements were based was necessarily an arbitrarily one. 
Indeed, apart from Charles Humana's second study (1986) and the
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work of the Human Rights Committee, the inquiries suffer a kind of 
personal arbitrariness.
The Human Rights Committee's definition is based on the 
provisions of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
and its Optional Protocol. It applies them to states which have 
already committed themselves to fulfill these obligations by ratifying 
such a document. Humana's second study (1986) is based exclusively 
on the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants. This makes it 
more balanced since it is drawn from the main documents of human 
rights. His first study (1983), however, suffers from arbitrary 
selection since some of the aspects considered are not really 
supported by international instruments.
Amnesty International seems to have understood that covering 
different aspects of human rights would not lead to fruitful results, 
and has therefore opted for a narrow definition. There are, of course, 
some advantages to this strategy, especially the fact that 
comparatively more accurate information is available on the chosen 
aspects chosen. However, this narrow definition also has its 
shortcomings. Amnesty has based its annual reports on a few aspects 
of human rights that it has arbitrarily selected, and has tried to give 
a picture of human rights in different countries in the world. It is 
difficult to accept the contention that one is talking about the state of 
human rights in a given country when the aspects chosen for 
consideration are so few. To make generalizations on the basis of a 
few variables is not likely to lead a researcher to convincing 
conclusions whenever a comparison is undertaken.
There is no doubt about how significant are some of the issues 
with which Amnesty is concerned, such as 'prisoners of conscience', 
to the whole debate of human rights. Amnesty is the leading
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organisation in the issue of 'prisoners of conscience', and its findings 
are authoritative and of genuine importance to anybody who is 
concerned with this particular question. However, this is just one 
issue among many.
Freedom House, Dahl and Bollen have exclusively reserved their 
definitions to refer to political rights and civil liberties, and attempt 
to construct a ranking of countries upon these aspects. Perhaps the 
unbalanced dialogue on the issue of human rights and democracy has 
led to these different assumptions. The fact that most scholars and 
organisations involved with these issues are based in the West has 
meant that they have tended to look at matters on the basis of their 
own perceptions. The definitions adopted for the study of human 
rights and democracy confirm this claim. They are usually drawn 
from a range of civil and political rights, that are most treasured in 
the West. Thus, if one looks at the definitions employed on a cross­
national basis, one sees that they are unsatisfactory or ethnocentric 
in many instances, representing what the scholar or the organisation 
thought to be the norm.
1-1-2: Inadequate data
Dahl's, Humana's and Freedom House's studies suffer from a lack 
of information and personal judgements. If one recalls the peculiar 
positions of France (Dahl ranked it twice on points 6 and 11 on a 29 
points scale), one sees that the actual strategy whereby such a 
ranking is achieved is questionable, or perhaps a better strategy 
could be developed. If it was not for personal judgement, one 
assumes that France would not have been moved upwards on the
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scale. Perhaps the judgements themselves could be harsher when 
one is dealing with a country with long traditions of democracy and 
respect for human rights. When the answers do not quite correspond 
to the prior knowledge of that country, its final ranking will be 
significantly lowered.
Humana's studies were divided according to the strategies 
followed. It was obvious that a number of countries were assessed 
through summary forms because of lack of information and data. 
However, even the countries analyzed under the questionnaire, the 
recorded data were doubtful in many cases. One would add, further, 
that Freedom House also still cannot overcome this problem. It has 
been pointed out earlier in this thesis that, while some countries 
have received the same scores, their final rankings have been 
different. Moreover, even within one country which has received the 
same score over different years, its final ranking has differed from 
year to year. This suggests that the approach as a whole in these 
studies needs to be looked at more carefully and can perhaps be 
considered as the weakest point of the measurement. There has been 
a selection of variables and a choice of the aspects one looks at 
against a set of criteria. In principle, whenever the results are 
similar, the final ranking of countries should be the same. This is not 
actually the case, particularly in Humana's and Freedom House's 
inquiries.
Furthermore, it seems that there is some inconsistency on the 
part of Freedom House. Different items have been added to the initial 
list, the strategy followed to obtain the final ranking has changed and 
those involved with the Survey have intervened repeatedly to 
reevaluate the ranking position of certain countries.
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Moreover, statistics can be quite misleading if one is to rely upon 
them exclusively. It is perhaps appropriate to see these facts within 
their proper context. If one is to rely on the number of 'prisoners of 
conscience' Amnesty publishes, one has to be careful in dealing with 
them. The interpretation of such figures is vital in attaining a clear 
picture. When one says, for instance, that there are 10,000 'prisoners 
of conscience' in countries A and B respectively, one ought not 
automatically conclude that the two countries violate human rights to 
the same extent. The question that needs to be asked is what is this 
number as a percentage of the total population? It may be a high 
percentage of the population in countries such as Kuwait or 
Luxemburg, but it might be insignificant in countries like China or 
India. Thus, quantification can suffer from different interpretations 
which made a general agreement difficult to reach.
Moreover, the scarcity of data and its unreliability add to the 
existing difficult issue of comparing human rights on a cross-national 
basis. It has always been claimed that the former communist 
countries had better records than liberal democracies in providing 
for economic and social rights. However, the collapse of communism 
in these countries and the unprecedented flow of information that 
has followed about their domestic records suggest that these claims 
are of little validity. In addition, some of the human rights abuses 
which were denied for decades have been confirmed by the 
successor governments in this part of the world.
1-2: Approaches
1-2-1: Independence of variables
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Such an arbitrary definition and selection of the variables has 
led, in the inquiries, to the issue being looked at separately from the 
environment in which it evolves and develops. The Human Rights 
Committee represents an exception in this area. It is perhaps worth 
stating again that such practices, either respecting or violating 
human rights, develop in accordance with the realities of a given 
society. They are influenced by the environment in which they occur. 
However, if one looks, for instance, at the different annual reports 
Amnesty publishes, one is faced with a situation where some facts 
and statistics are reported about almost every country in the world 
w ithout deep reflection on what exactly is happening in any 
particular one. Furthermore, if one looks at time-series statistics on 
the treatem ent of a particular government of 'prisoners of 
conscience', for example, will that lead to satisfactory conclusions?
Amnesty reports on the aspects on which it has particular 
interests, nonetheless, such aspects need to be explained in more 
detail. Why, for instance, has the number of 'prisoners of conscience' 
suddenly increased for one year or two in one particular country? 
There is no satisfactory explanation of this matter in its annual 
reports. The space reserved to every country is too small to enable a 
clearer picture to be established. This, in turn makes a comparison 
very difficult.
On the other hand, Amnesty does publish country reports. These 
are more informative, since the focus is just on the chosen country. 
More details are available and different explanations are provided 
which may influence the government’s treatement of its citizens. 
However, these reports are still limited in number; they do not cover 
every country and could be out of date after their publication
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because of the changes that the country in question may have 
w itnessed .
Dahl and Bollen, similarly, have concentrated their efforts on 
civil and political rights and these factors are looked at with little 
reference to the actual circumstances in which they evolve. In this 
respect, it is perhaps appropriate to stress that, although Dahl did not 
take into account the conditions that favour polyarchy in his 
measurement, he made a significant point by stressing them. Thus, 
polyarchy did not exist as such, but some conditions have to be met 
first for such a system to work properly. If one goes deeply into the 
conditions discussed by Dahl, one sees that they are of paramount 
importance to the understanding of why some countries are more 
democratic than others. Conditions such as historical sequences or the 
level of economic development, for instance, play a significant role in 
favouring a democratic system.3 However, when Dahl proceeded to 
the measurement of polyarchy, his judgements were based only on 
the opportunities to participate and to oppose. In the total absence of 
the seven conditions that favour polyarchy in terms of Dahl's 
discussion, one must assume that a system is not democratic and 
therefore that opportunities to participate and to oppose are non­
existent.
Both Charles Humana and Freedom House do not give 
satisfactory explanations as to why some countries and not others 
violate human rights. They both develop their own criteria upon 
which they measure countries' performances and therefore construct 
a ranking. Nevertheless, they take these variables independently 
from what is happening in reality. Freedom House highlights gains
3-R. Dahl, Po lva r chv  (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971); 
S. M. Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinemann, 1959)
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and losses in freedom around the world, thus updating its Survey; 
however, the explanation of these changes is very limited. The same 
thing could be said about the work of Charles Humana, especially his 
first study in 1983.
The UN Human Rights Committee, on the contrary, takes into 
consideration the circumstances of every state party to the Covenant 
whenever their reports are considered. This makes its work more 
significant towards improving their standards. The Committee does 
accept that some conditions may hamper the observance of human 
rights and may make it very difficult for some countries, especially 
in the Third World, to bring their laws into accordance with the 
provisions of the Covenant.
Perhaps the best example of this effect is the right to derogation, 
under article 4 of the Covenant, in time of public emergency which 
makes human rights more vulnerable to violations. The article 
stresses that the rights to be derogated from should be in accordance 
with the demands of the new situation, and that the Committee 
should be notified of these measures. This, in turn, enables the 
Committee to take into account the circumstances of the country 
concerned and the environment in which the rights have evolved.
One would suggest further that one aspect Amnesty is concerned 
with is difficult to satisfy: the death penalty. As pointed out in the 
chapter four, many Muslim countries carry out this sentence, at best, 
for religious reasons. Thus, it is difficult to be abolished since the 
laws are inspired , in some instances, by the 'Koran'.
1-2-2: Ranking and non-ranking approaches
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Although the main aim of all the the studies undertaken, among 
others, is the improvement of human rights around the world, their 
approach is quite different. While the Human Rights Committee tries 
to help states parties to the Covenant enhance their human rights 
standards by providing assistance whenever needed, Amnesty 
publicizes abuses and pressurises governments to treat their citizens 
fairly. Dahl, Bollen, Humana and Freedom House, at the other end of 
the spectrum, have engaged in a a systematic comparison and 
ranking of countries on different scales. However, they differ in 
theyways whereby this ranking is achieved.
It seems that the approach undertaken by the Human Rights 
Committee, and the one taken by Amnesty to some extent, would be 
likely to achieve more useful results. Both of them do not engage in 
any sort of ranking. Amnesty puts different pressures on 
governments which in many instances succeeded in securing fair 
trials or freeing some 'prisoners of conscience'. However, in the long 
run, the practice in the country concerned seemed to persist. The
Committee's approach, on the other hand, is completely different. It 
is a body which works under the auspices of an international 
organisation of which almost every country is a member. It
approaches governments from an angle on which they have agreed. 
It engages in friendly dialogues aimed at helping, not condemning, 
the practices of the state concerned. Although it is a long process, it 
has tended to achieve an overall improvement in the long run.
Any ranking of countries in terms of human rights and political 
democracy is bound to to be controversial, and could be difficult to 
accept in many parts of the world. Controversies seem inevitable not
only with regard to the variables chosen, which can be ethnocentric
as discussed earlier, but also regarding the strategies adopted, the
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information and the data gathered and the personal assumptions of 
those involved in the studies themselves.
1-2-3: Weighting
Bollen and Dahl do not engage in any kind of weighting in the 
measurement of political democracy. They deal with the different 
aspects independently to conclude whether the aspect in question is 
respected or not. Although it is relatively the most acceptable 
strategy whereby every right should be considered equally 
compared with others, it is very difficult to come to a clear-cut 
conclusions on the boundaries of the variables they measured. 
Variables such as 'freedom of the press' to name just one, are very 
difficult to assess. Bollen, for example, assesses it on a nine-point 
scale based on a judgemental source, while the breakdown of this 
variable in Dahl's study resulted in four categories, which may 
suggest that it is assessed on a four-point scale. The point that needs 
to be stressed here is which countries received nine points on
Bollen's scale and which countries had complete freedom of the press 
according to Dahl? By which means can one decide such a point? The 
aim of the these questions is not to directly compare the tow scales 
in these two separate excercise, but to stress the need for
clarification of when does one category end and another begin.
Both Humana (1986 and 1992) and Freedom House in their
efforts to quantify human rights and freedom have opted for a 
system of weighting in their final ranking of countries. This system 
of weighting if generally misleading and should be disregarded if
these studies are to be considered more seriously. To be fair to them,
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both studies have introduced such a system at a later stage since 
their initial ones: Humana in his second and third editions, and
Freedom House in the late 1970s.
A system of weighting inevitably gives more importance to some 
rights than others. It can be understood, in principle, that some 
rights could be more valuable than others, nonetheless, the denial of 
the latter does not mean that they do not constitute a serious 
violation. That is what Humana did in hisl986 and 1992 studies,
which influenced the ranking of some countries and made his studies 
vulnerable to criticism. However, what Freedom House has done 
seems to be more confusing. If one takes the 1977 and the 1978 
Surveys, one sees that the weight has changed from one dimension to 
another. This may suggest that the system and the approach as a 
who»le are at fault.
In any inquiry where a system of weighting is employed, the 
results and the final ranking are open to question. Once again an 
arbitrary selection of the variables or dimensions to weight is left
completely to the discretion of those involved in the studies. This not 
only biases the results and the ranking in general, but is a significant 
weakness in any study based upon this kind of exercise. It only takes 
a country to take advantage of the weighted rights to see its position 
ahead of others which did not.
Moreover, and perhaps the most important point in the studies 
which engage in the measurement of human rights and democracy, is 
the ranking of a peculiar country: South Africa. It is very difficult to 
accept the contention of Dahl, Bollen and Freedom House that South 
Africa is more democratic and free than the majority of Third World 
countries and some former communist countries. Humana, on the
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other hand, ranked it very low on his studies.
Any study that considers South Africa to be more democratic
that many other parts of the world is questionable, unless the 
application of the variables was to the whites only. In any country 
where 80 per cent of the adult population was not eligible to vote 
(people were denied the right to participate in elections, and indeed 
to oppose the government), how can one suggest that the country in 
question is democratic or free? South Africa was classified among the
democratic countries in Dahl's and Bollen's studies. Freedom House,
on the other hand, has classified South Africa either in the 'partly 
free' or 'not free' categories. However, the former classification does 
not seem to be really appropriate in some cases given its 
comparative nature.
1-2-4: Longitudinal assessment
Finally, the nature of the studies themselves is of paramount 
importance to any over time assessment or comparison of countries 
in terms of human rights and democracy. The studies carried out by 
Dahl and Bollen are significant, but are narrow in scope. The strategy 
they followed may perhaps be limited to some countries, however, 
the data need to be updated to take into account different changes 
that have taken place over the past two decades since the studies 
were carried out. Humana's studies are more recent, and enable the 
reader to make comparison between the three inquiries and pinpoint 
the gains and losses in human rights in countries that need to be 
studied. However, these studies are, once again, limited in time and 
do not provide the reader with some information concerning the the 
periods of time that a researcher wishes to cover.
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However, the Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International 
and Freedom House offer more grounds upon which to carry out an 
over-time comparison. Although the Committee discusses a state's 
report every five years after consideration of the initial one, this 
practice, however, enables any improvement in the field of human 
rights to be monitored. One is able to conclude, after considering 
different reports of a given state, whether the state in question has 
taken the necessary steps towards bringing its laws within the 
provisions of the Covenant. This is turn helps one to conduct a 
comparison between two or a number of states to find out about the 
attitudes of these states towards improving their human rights 
records.
Freedom House and Amnesty, however, offer a year-to-year 
picture of almost every country in the world. This makes an over­
tim e assessment more plausible and easier to execute. In this 
respect, Freedom House is more successful and straightforward than 
Amnesty. The latter describes the situation in country A for year 1, 
then describes it for year 2, and so forth. It is left to the reader to 
conclude whether the state in question has improved or not over the 
years. It implicitly states that, since the number of ’prisoners of 
conscience', for instance, has increased or decreased, but the actual 
conclusions, either better or worse records, are not particularly clear.
Freedom House, on the other hand, offers a clear picture to that 
end. Its annual reports contain not only global gains and losses in 
freedom around the world, but also countries' annual positions. It is 
readily apparent when one takes different successive reports and 
tries to monitor the state of freedom in countries like India or Brazil, 
for instance, one can easily see the trends for these countries, since
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they are clearly highlighted by the organisation. This makes a 
comparative study of freedom relatively easier than if one takes, for 
instance, Amnesty's reports.
Having dealt with the different studies to monitor human rights 
andi dem ocracy, especially those which have engaged in 
m easurem ent and ranking on a cross-national basis, the question 
that needs to be asked here is: is a comparative study of human 
rights on a cross-national basis possible? This will be dealt with in 
the following section.
II: Is a comparative study of human rights on a cross­
national basis possible?
In the light of the case studies dealt with above and the 
diversity of political systems in the world, total comparability of 
human rights, at any rate, is very difficult, if not impossible. A 
variety of problems may face a researcher if he is to engage in such 
an (exercise.
Human rights, as already suggested earlier, mean different 
things to different people. It is very difficult to achieve a consensus 
on what a list of human right should consist of. Although some might 
suggest that such a consensus was achieved and resulted in the 
Universal Declaration, it is not the case for various reasons. First, the 
majority of Third World countries did not participate in the drafting 
of th is document. Second, many 'rights' have emerged since the 
adoption of this document in 1948. Third, and perhaps the most 
significant, within this consensus there were priorities of rights 
championed by different governments. This makes a comparative
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study of human rights on a cross-national basis a very difficult 
exercise, even on the basis of the Declaration. In this connection one 
cannot avoid asking these question: what is the basis upon which one 
is to  conduct such a study? And what is the definition one should 
employ in the comparative study of human rights?
The most basic problem is of a conceptual nature. Concepts alien 
to particular societies are the source of the difficulties surrounding 
the process as a whole. In many instances, problems are viewed from 
one angle: the viewpoint from which the scholar sees the
phenomenon in their own societies. What can be considered as a 
hum an right in a given country might not be automatically 
considered as such in a different country. This difference in 
perception, in turn, leads to a completely different understanding of 
w hat a violation is, and thus to an overall misplacing of countries' 
positions if a ranking is undertaken.
If one conducts a comparative study of human rights on a cross­
national basis, one needs measures which refer to the same concept 
in the different countries upon which the study focuses. The use of 
civil and political rights, while reference is made to human rights, in 
a country such as Chad or China is simply difficult to accept. Concepts 
such as ‘multiparty elections’ and ‘freedom of associations’, for 
instance, simply do not “travel” ver well4, they restrict a researcher 
to study countries with multiparty systems, which hold election and 
guarantee freedom of associations. Such qualifications, as we have
4 -F or a comparative study to be valid, research should measure the same 
concept from one culture to another. For further discussion of the idea that 
concepts should be able to travel see Giovanni Sartori ‘Concept Misinformation 
in Com parative Politics’, Am erican Political Science Review , 54 (1971) pp. 
1033-53; and more generally G. Sartori (ed.) Social Sciences Concepts (Beverly 
H ills: Sage, 1984).
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seen in the case studies, automatically eliminate more countries than 
they include. Furthermore, the difficulties in translations is an added 
burden, especially when one finds no precise meaning for a concept 
in another language. Thus, the very idea itself may connote two 
different phenomena.5
The second fundamental problem concerns the data and 
information. A comparison without data on the subject hardly makes 
sense. To conclude whether a given country is good or bad, or 
whether it stands above or below another state, one needs data to 
support the arguments and make conclusions more convincing. 
However,when it comes to human rights, data are generally scarce 
and difficult to come by. It is an issue where governments are often 
unforthcoming about their records, or deliberately misleading in the 
records they report.6 So, there is a tendency to hide or falsify the 
facts concerning the ways whereby citizens were treated. Nobody 
knows the exact number of those imprisoned during the Cultural 
Revolution in China, for instance, or those tortured in Latin America 
during the reign of military government What is reported in the 
press or by non-governmental organisations, at best, does not
5-In this respect, Professor Donoho argues that: "further, abstract rights 
may leg itim ate ly  mean and require d ifferen t things in diverse cu ltu ral 
settings. Each country's cultural and political heritage, as well as the vagaries 
of language itself, fundamentally shape the meaning of abstract rights, such 
as political participation, due process, and equal protection." Douglas Donoho, 
"Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful 
Standards" Stantford Journal o f  International Law , Volume 27, No,2, 1991 p, 
369.
6 -D ata  concern ing  the state o f hum an righ ts is generally  scarce. 
G overnm ents, especially in the Third W orld and the former com m unist 
countries, are notorious for not cooperating with the specialised agencies. 
M oreover, the response was that human rights were fully respected. Different 
A m nesty’s reports and the reports by the Human Rights Committee, after the 
reforms in the former communist countries suggest that efforts were made to 
hide facts.
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represent the actual situation and at worst, is based on mere guesses. 
Furthermore, what makes the situation even worse is that some 
countries are closed societies with virtually no contact with the 
outside world. Data concerning their GNP or level of literacy are hard 
to obtain, let alone those concerned with human rights.
Moreover, having established the fact that different perceptions 
of human rights may lead to a different understanding of what a
violation is may pose a problem of different nature. Although some
data may be available on different countries, they may not represent 
a ’violation' in the country in which they occur7. Amputation of an 
arm might not only be seen as a violation of human rights, protected 
by different provisions of international instruments, but as cruel and 
inhuman punishment as well. However, it is not seen as such in some 
countries. Under Islamic law, for instance, amputation of an arm is
the punishment for repeated theft. The point that needs to be
stressed in this context is, in principle, this penalty does not 
represent a violation of human rights in an Islamic society where the 
teaching of Islam is fully implemented. The practice is there and will
remain. However, would data on such an aspect yield convincing
resu lts?
Moreover, the availability of data may pose some problems. 
Would one treat the same data obtained for Japan or Sweden in the 
same manner one does with those obtained from Zaire or Ethiopia? 
The accuracy of such information, not only on human rights, but data 
in general, is of a very debatable character. Those provided by a
7 -’Even if data were availab le’, Bahry points out, ‘many countries use
slig h tly  d ifferent defin itions in representing  data, and thus th ir own
publications may offer us information that is not entirely compared from one 
country to another.’ D. L. Bahry (1986) op. cit. p. 232.
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developed country are bound to be more accurate than those by a 
developing country.
In addition to the concept and data difficulty, and especially as a 
result of data the scope of the study is more or less limited or 
imposed. The reports published by non-governmental organisations, 
for instance, are based on the information available. In the total 
absence of information on one country, the country may not figure in 
the study. This actually happened in the early 1980s with Amnesty 
International when its reports did not include Saudi Arabia. The 
Human Rights Committee makes any comparison based exclusively 
on states party to the Covenant. Therefore, any attempt to measure 
human rights on a cross-national basis would automatically be based 
upon the information provided by these organisations which might 
not cover some of the countries one is interested in, or does not 
provide over time data if a longitudinal assessment is sought.
Although concepts and data are crucial, they are not, however, 
the only problems one faces in engaging in total comparability of 
human rights. The diversity of political systems is today's world adds 
to these difficulties. This diversity consists not only in the type of 
political system and institutions, but on the level of economic 
development as well.
Liberal democracies are those systems under which most human 
rights are observed. They the systems, as far as the case studies are 
concerned, where people are most clearly free and enjoy many of the 
freedoms and rights. However, it is not the only kind of political 
system that prevails in today's world. In addition to it, one may find, 
for instance, one-party states, communist regimes and military 
governments, which have different influences on the human rights 
situation.
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Respect or abuses of human rights depends, to a great extent, on 
the form of the political system. A close look at what kind of a 
system is prevailing in a particular country tells how the citizens are 
treated. Military governments, for instance, may be said to be based 
on a heavy military apparatus and a coercive system ready to smash 
every movement aimed at changing the situation. Yet, this system 
has frequently been a feature of many Third World countries. 
Changes in government in these countries scarcely follow a smooth 
path. Under such a system it is difficult to argue about the 
observance of human rights. Power is assumed by a military junta 
and a division of powers of the traditional kind is not generally 
observed.
Respect for human rights is based on, among other things, the 
independence of the judiciary and competitive elections to the 
executive and legislature, as well as a free and independent press to 
ensure freedom of expression. These are hardly met in the majority 
of Third World countries and what remains of the communist states. 
Furthermore, the lack of institutions able to adapt to different 
situations adds to these difficulties. In such countries it is difficult to 
anticipate respect for human rights on the same scale as in liberal 
dem ocracies.
It is perhaps worth stressing that the ultimate goal would 
eventually be total respect for human rights, but such a process may 
take a long time. The fact that most Third World countries are newly 
independent adds to these difficulties. The form of government they 
may choose, or might be imposed on them, may perhaps be better 
equipped, at the time, to deal with any problem than another form of 
government would be.
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M oreover, the level of economic development may play a
significant role in enhancing observance of human rights. It is not 
only up to governments to grant such rights, but it is also up to the 
people to claim them. The pressures people put on their governments 
may have a significant impact on the changes in ways whereby they 
are treated. However, for people to pressurize their governments, 
they must be aware of their rights. In this context, education and 
communications are vital for such an awareness. However, many 
people are unaware of what their rights are. The level of illiteracy is 
very high in the majority of poor countries, and many rural areas are 
still out of reach of television or newspapers. In such an
environment, one wonders what human rights would mean to these 
people. In addition to these, one would suggest further, the level of 
poverty that prevails in developing countries, and the social and 
economic problems, such as hunger and disease, that they have to
put up with. At best, human rights to them would mean the 
enhancement of their living conditions.
The type of political system and the level of economic
development may play significant roles in determining the attitudes 
of governments towards their citizens. The way in which they 
respond to the pressures of their citizens could be ascribed, further, 
to the institutions being able to adapt to different situations. This 
would lead to a peaceful response to such pressures. However, there 
is a limit to what institutions in the Third World can cope with and 
adapt to. If demands and pressures exceed what the institutions can 
cope with, this will often lead to the use of violence as a way to 
respond to such pressures.
It is against this background that one has to look at human
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rights on a cross-national basis. The level attained by liberal 
democracies may be ascribed to a process which has evolved over 
centuries. Such a process is, to some extent, taking place in the rest of 
the world.
However, if cross-national comparison is very difficult and might 
raise problematic questions, it does not automatically follow that one 
has to abandon the idea entirely. One may decide to take a narrow 
approach to the issue of human rights and conduct a cross-national 
comparison. Once again, such an approach will not give a general 
picture of every country undertaken in the study. However, it 
suggests that, at least in principle, some rights can fairly be 
compared on a cross-national basis without any serious challenge in 
terms of bias. In this connection freedom of conscience can perhaps 
be the starting point for such a universal comparison. The freedom to 
practise any faith cannot be said to be a culturally biased concept, 
and it does not really depend on how wealthy a country is, as with 
all social and economic rights.Furthermore, the collapse of many 
communist countries, which as a matter of fact curtailed such rights, 
is an added factor for such an argument.
Furthermore, what seems to be a better approach to the study is 
a 'segmented' one8. In other words, one has to choose a number of 
countries one wishes to investigate before engaging in any kind of 
comparison. One way of conducting such an exercise is through ‘a 
m ost-sim ilar-system s design’9. This choice, undoubtedly, would
8-M. Dogan, and D. Pellasy, How to Compare Nations: Strategis in Comparative 
Po litics (New Jersy: Chatham House, 1984) pp. 101-5.
9-D. L. Bahry (1986) op. cit. p. 229; Hans Daalder, ‘The Development of the 
Study of Comparative Politics’, in Hans Keman, (ed.) Comparative Politics. New 
directions in theory and methods. (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993) p. 
49; M. Dogan and D. Pellasy, How to Compare Nations. Strategies in Comparative 
Po litics 2nd edn, (New Jersy: Chatham House 1990) pp. 132-43,
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avoid many of the difficulties discussed above. Moreover, it offers a 
basis upon which a large, if not the total aspects of human rights can 
be compared. Liberal democracies, for instance, taken as a whole can 
offer fertile ground upon which such an exercise can be carried out. 
This has been made more plausible, and therefore might avoid 
‘G a lto n ’s problem ’10, by the fact that many former communist 
countries saw the end of communist rule, and became ready to 
accept the western notion of human rights. The differences that have 
existed between them over the years have become less significant. 
This, is turn, has enlarged the scope of countries if any comparative
study of this kind is to be carried out.
Another way of measuring human rights is through the use of 
the opposite strategy referred to as the ‘most-different-design’11. 
Selecting relatively different countries for comparison, one may come 
to conclusions which suggest shared characteristics of the countries
studied. This might suggest that the differences that might exist 
between countries are not the only explanations to their different 
attitudes, but other possible explanations may be revealed.
I l l :  Recommendations for future research
The study of human rights has received an unprecedented 
attention over the past two decades. More political scientists and 
different organisations have focussed their attention on it, and tried
to develop frameworks through which this issue can be examined.12
10-..’[The] ‘Galton problem* is to say: few cases, many variables, which make 
it difficult to arrive at conclusions of a causal nature’. H. Daalder (1993) op. cit. 
p. 49
11- D. L. Bahry (1986) op. cit. p. 230; Hans Daalder, (1993) op. cit. p. 49; M.
Dogan and D. Pellasy, (1990) pp. 132-43,
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Yet, the conceptualisation of human rights on a cross-national basis is 
far from being adequate. Moreover, the reliance on the quantification 
of human rights is in itself a doubtful straregy. The methodology 
whereby different percentages and ranking were achieved, at least 
in the case studies discussed above, is of questionable validity which 
may jeopardize any classification.
However, many of the difficulties encountered may be overcome, 
or at least reduced, in future work if fuller attention is given to the 
following:
(i) Whenever human rights are dealt with, they should be taken 
within the environment in which they are studied and the cultures of 
the actors involved in it. Scholars as well as organisations should not 
only limit themselves to 'what', but go further to ask 'why'. Questions 
on the state of human rights in Canada and Nicaragua, for instance, 
are significantly different from questions on the state of human 
rights in Nicaragua compared with Canada. If one takes just the 
'what', the conclusion will be that Canada observes human rights 
better than Nicaragua and thus may offer arbitrary conclusions. 
However, if future work concentrates more on the 'why', it will not 
only identify the reasons behind such violations, if any, but will 
make the first steps towards an overall improvement. It is the view 
of the present author that the aim behind any comparative study of 
human rights is not only to identify which is good and which is bad, 
but also to offer solutions to problems that may exist. Conclusions of 
this kind can only be achieved by looking for 'why'. Economic, 
military and political factors may be very significant in answering
12-In addition to the studies discussed in this dissertation see for instance J. 
Donnelly, and R. E. Howard, "Assessing National Human Rights: A Theoretical 
Framework" Human Rights Quartely (10) 1988: 214-48.
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these questions.
(ii) A more balanced view of the issue of human rights should be 
sought. The dialogue on human rights is still unbalanced and 
concentrated overwhelmingly in the W est13. Different traditions, as 
discussed earlier, may have a significant impact on the study and 
measurement of human rights and how they are seen from a 
different perspective. The study of non-Western societies by scholars 
based mainly in the West leads, sometimes, to arbitrary judgement 
without deep knowledge of the day-to-day needs of these people and 
their aspirations. More concern should should be given to scholars 
from the Third World to carry out studies on their own countries and 
others. The criteria they would use in measuring human rights may 
differ from those encountered in the studies undertaken hitherto. 14 
The 'dialogue* would, undoubtedly improve the understanding of 
those involved with the issue of human rights in the different parts 
of the world. Furthermore, it may uncover the different peculiarities 
and priorities that some countries may have. Thus, this global
13-’. . the scoring pattern ... suggests that socialist (pre-G lasnost) and less 
developed countries did not accept the idealised Western view of human rights 
and allot them a lesser role in their systems, as compared perhaps with 
religious and political goals. This seems to support an ethnocentric view of 
hum an rights, rather than the assumption of a universally valid standard.’ 
Horn, R. V. (1993) op. cit. p. 183.
14-Dominguez states that: "A rather different alternative form ulation has 
been presented by A rgentina's Bariloche Institu te. The Bariloche group 
identified a neem ber of n e e d s  without satisfaction o f which human beings 
are in one way or another impared to become ill. The needs, it is claimed, are 
universal... The Bariloche Institute's authors have argued that human being 
tend to satisfy needs along a hierarchical scale, though the hierarchy of needs 
may be different from f the hierarchy of aspirations. This assumption of 
hierarchies led those authors to concentrate on four basic needs: food, health 
care, housing and education. The Bariloche Institue’s work, therefore, stresses 
a set of values quite different from those emphasized by Fredom House." J. I. 
Dominguez et al, Enhancing Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979) p 32.
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balance can be achieved through:
(a) The United Nations, not only by organizing different study 
programmes, but through to help the establishment of research 
centres. The 29th Graduate Study Programme (Geneva, 8-25 July, 
1991), for instance, attended by the present author, provides a good 
example of a more balanced discussion of the issue. It was a 
significant initiative whereby graduates from different parts of the 
world, with their differences in religions, traditions, cultures and 
levels of economic developments, gathered to discuss current 
international issues. Human rights was on the agenda. It is the kind 
of opportunity where one finds out about the interests and priorities 
of others, the different issues that need to be looked at more closely 
and the obstacles that a country may have to overcome. At the same 
time, the United Nations Organisation lays down the principles and 
the international agreements it sought to implement.
(b) Apart from the United Nations, this balanced view may be 
achieved through different regional organisations. The works of the 
Arab League and the Organisation of the African Unity, for instance, 
with their counterparts in Europe and America should be taken more 
seriously. Each of these organisations works within its region, thus, is 
more closely linked to the problems and the understanding of the 
concept in the relevant cultural traditions of the regions.
(iii) The study of human rights and democracy ought to adopt a 
more global approach. In other words, abuse of human rights should 
not be made the responsibility of the state concerned only, but 
should be taken on a more global level. This would give more weight 
to foreign domination, as a variable, and perhaps to a change in the 
way some variables are judged. Moreover, this may suggest, further,
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a change in the variables upon which any scholar may wish to 
undertake a comparative study of human rights and democracy.
Foreign domination was considered, in some inquiries dealt with 
previously, as a variable which influences the level of enjoyment of 
freedom and democracy. In fact, in some instances, when one 
considers the level of freedom in a particular country, one is not 
really dealing with the country in question, but rather with the 
dominant one. Kampuchea provides a good example, where one is in 
fact considering Vietnam. The same thing could be applied to Finland 
when it was under Soviet domination. Thus future work should be 
concerned with condemning not only the country which violates 
human rights, but others which might be involved as well. Every 
government violates human rights in one way or another. A global 
view of human rights would answer some of these questions. In the 
view of the present author, a government which violates human 
rights in Africa, for instance, is as guilty as that which supplied the 
equipment to do so. It is a difficult matter to establish since interests 
take priority over principles, nonetheless, future work should not 
only be concerned with the violators only, but with those who help 
also .
By the same token, from a moral point view, it makes little, if 
any difference, if a human being is sentenced to death or left to 
starve. In future research particular attention should be paid to 
different new variables that can perhaps be introduced in any scale 
for measuring human rights. The destruction of food for commercial 
reasons by some governments is perhaps a starting point to the 
development of such new criteria.
Furthermore, although many Third World countries are still
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concerned with political rights and civil liberties, which are mostly in 
the West (iv) the study of human rights should move to cover more 
issues in liberal dem ocracies. Issues such as women's rights, 
refugees, and the rights of indigenous people, such as those in 
Australia, are very much at the centre of human rights and are too 
significant to be left ignored.
Finally, given the changes that have been taking place over the 
past decade, the greatest threat to mankind is the new challenges it 
faces. The time has come when the rights of (v) 'the third generation1 
should be considered more seriously bv those involved in the issue 
of human rights. Future work should concentrate on this new set of 
rights, and the best possible ways to generate respect for them, 
which may be the basis for an overall respect for human rights.
3 4 0
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